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P R E FA C E
‘The provisions of European Union law on cartels . . . must be inter-
preted as not precluding a person who has been adversely affected by
an infringement of European Union competition law and is seeking to
obtain damages from being granted access to documents relating to a
leniency procedure. . . . It is, however, for the courts and tribunals of
the Member States, on the basis of their national law, to determine the
conditions under which such access must be permitted or refused by
weighing the interests protected by European Union law.’
With these words, the European Court of Justice closed the judgment in
the case Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt in 2011.1 Already before the de-
cision in the Pfleiderer case, EU courts had dealt with the tension between
a victim’s right to claim damages for infringement of EU competition law
and the effectiveness of the public enforcement of competition rules by the
European Commission (EC) and national antitrust authorities. Infringements
of EU competition law such as cartels cause serious harm not only to the
economy as a whole, but also to the customers of those who commit the in-
fringements. These victims of infringements are entitled by EU law to com-
pensation for the harm caused. However, only recently one could read about
private parties claiming damages for losses due to cartels in the newspapers.
So far, shortcomings in the applicable legal frameworks have made it ex-
tremely costly and difficult to bring an action for damages. As a result, only
few claims were brought before national courts. However, public attention
has increased recently because these shortcomings in the legal frameworks
regulating the interaction between private and public enforcement of compe-
tition law resulted in several court cases and finally in a directive on antitrust
damages actions which was signed into law in November 2014 (European
Union, 2014b).
By the judgment delivered in the Pfleiderer case, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) held that there are no existing common rules governing the
right to access cartel documents in private follow-on damages actions. Ob-
taining relevant evidence has been identified as the main obstacle for po-
tential claimants in their attempt to prove their harm. The key issue related
to the access to cartel documents concerns statements that have been made
by wrongdoers in order to seek leniency from fines. ‘Weighing the interests
1 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
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protected by European Union law’ refers to the following challenge: On the
one hand, these voluntarily made, detailed leniency statements provide a
useful source of evidence for the victims and therefore can facilitate actions
for damages, fostering private enforcement. On the other hand, the disclo-
sure of leniency statements for follow-on actions for damages can reduce the
attractiveness of the leniency programmes that have become one of the most
effective tools for cartel detection. In other words, the objective of private
enforcement—full compensation for victims—and the objectives of public
enforcement—detection and disclosure of cartels—could be at odds.
The first chapter of this dissertation provides an economic analysis of
the interaction between Leniency Programmes and Private Actions for Damages.
Within a theoretical framework, I show how private damages claims follow-
ing a cartel decision affect the objectives of the public enforcement of com-
petition law —detection and deterrence of cartels. In an infinitely repeated
game I analyse firms’ incentives to compete, to collude and keep their cartel
secret, or to collude and later apply for leniency. The antitrust authority tries
to enforce a competitive market by investigating firms and proving collusion.
It also provides a leniency programme that offers a reduced fine for firms
which voluntarily cooperate and report their participation in a cartel. If a
firm is found to be guilty of colluding, it does not only has to pay a fine
imposed to the antitrust authority, it may also be exposed to private dam-
ages payments. I distinguish the exposure to damages payments on the basis
of whether a firm cooperates with the antitrust authority or not. Intuitively,
the exposure to damages payments affects a firm’s strategy on collusion and
participation in the leniency programme.
I find that if private enforcement is strengthened in such a way that firms
that are found guilty of collusion and that did not participate in a leni-
ency programme are exposed to higher damages payments, a firm’s profit
from collusion decreases. Additional to this deterring effect, firms in a cartel
might change their strategy from keeping their cartel secret to revealing in
exchange for a reduction in fine. These results speak for increasing the ex-
posure to damages for non-leniency firms because a stronger enforcement
of damages claims against these firms supports the objectives of the public
enforcement.
However, I find that the effect of increasing the exposure to damages pay-
ments for firms that revealed their cartel—the leniency firms—has two con-
flicting effects on deterrence. On the one hand, damages payments may re-
duce the incentives to collude, thereby incentivizing better compliance with
competition law. On the other hand, increasing the exposure to damages
payments for leniency firms can stabilize a cartel’s agreement, which in turn
makes collusion more profitable. Surprisingly, this cartel stabilizing effect
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has not been considered so far. The effectiveness of the leniency programme
is undermined by higher expected damages payments as applying for leni-
ency becomes less profitable.
The results of my model show that the interaction between private and
public enforcement depends on which cartel members are exposed to the
private damages claims following a cartel decision. Additionally, private en-
forcement does not affect the objectives of public enforcement—deterrence
and disclosure—equally, but can support one and jeopardize the other.
In June 2014, the ECJ decided upon another aspect of private damages
claims following a cartel decision. In the Kone AG and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruk-
tur AG case2, the ECJ ruled that victims of cartels should also be allowed to
seek damages from cartel members for loss resulting from ‘umbrella pricing’.
Under the ‘umbrella’ of a cartel, non-cartel members can set their own prices
higher than they would otherwise have been able to without the cartel.
This aspect of cartel pricing shows how similar cartels and patent pools—
which are the focus of chapter 2—are, even though their impact on prices
and welfare can be completely opposite. A patent pool can be considered a
group of firms which jointly fix a price for their product. But as opposed
to a cartel, a patent pool of complementary patents has a pro-competitive
effect if it reduces total royalty rates compared to individual pricing. One
problem of patent pools concerns their stability. As in the case of a cartel,
non-participating firms under the umbrella of the patent pool can set their
royalty higher than they would otherwise have been able to without the
patent pool. They can free-ride on the patent pool and profit from the effect
that the patent pool reduces total royalties without joining the patent pool.
The second chapter, On the Stability of Patent Pools, raises the question
as to how free-riding on a patent pool by firms which license their pat-
ents individually affects the pool’s stability. A patent pool bundles patents
for the purpose of joint licensing. Patent pools operate in an environment
comprising three systems—the competition rules, the patent system and the
standardisation process. Most jurisdictions look favourably on patent pools
including only complementary patents as drivers of innovation. Although
the first patent pool had come into existence as early as 1856 in the sewing
machine industry (Lampe and Moser, 2010), the number of patent pools in-
creased only after the U.S. Department of Justice acknowledged the potential
pro-competitive benefit of patent pools in 1995. Today, most patent pools de-
velop around an already established standard. Essential patents are required
for complying with a technical standard and are therefore complementary.
The bundling of complementary patents can reduce total royalties compared
to a disintegrated market in which each patent owner sets its royalty indi-
2 Case C-557/12, Kone AG and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG [2014]; judgment of 5 June 2014.
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vidually. An additional advantage of patent pools is that they simplify or
even only enable the implementation of a standard. Because the number of
patents declared essential and incorporated in (technological) standards has
increased extremely over the past few decades, the costs of negotiating indi-
vidual licences for each patent can be too high for patent owners as well as
for licensees.
For example, in the 1990s the core international digital video compression
standard, required for virtually all digital television including DVD, faced a
patent thicket. Blocking patents, hold-up behaviour and a huge number of
patents by many patent owners made it almost impossible to use the stand-
ard. The creation of patent pools facilitated licensing and market adoption.
Today, this standard is one of the most successful consumer electronic stand-
ards. In the last decade, patent pools have also formed in industries not re-
lated to compatibility standards or platform technologies. The ‘Golden Rice
Pool’ bundles patents for a genetically engineered strain of rice, the ‘Medi-
cines Patent Pool’ aims to improve generic low-cost production of key HIV
therapies while ‘Librassay’ makes patents in the field of molecular diagnos-
tics available through a single license.
Even though a patent pool reduces transaction costs and the complements
problem of excessive high royalties, it also entails a major problem. Participa-
tion in a patent pool is voluntary, which is why the patent pool needs to be
incentive compatible in order to attract patent owners. The bundling of com-
plementary patents not only reduces the royalties paid by the licensees, but
it also increases profits of the patent owners compared to individual licens-
ing. But because all standard-essential patents are needed in order to use
the standard’s technology, patent holders can decide not to join the patent
pool and license their patent individually. The reduction in the total royalty
due to the bundling of patents in the pool allows the essential patent owners
outside the patent pool to increase their royalty.
I analyse the stability of a patent pool using the concept of farsighted sta-
bility. According to this concept, agents are farsighted in the sense that they
do not only correctly anticipate changes in royalties and in profits, but also
foresee changes in the size of the patent pool following a deviation. Until
now, the stability of patent pools has only been analysed using the concept
of myopic stability, in which agents are unable to foresee other agents’ reac-
tions following a deviation. My results show that although free-riding can
be profitable for a patent owner, the patent pool participation rate can be
considerably larger if agents are assumed to be farsighted compared to my-
opic. I provide an algorithm to define the farsighted stable set of patent
pool outcomes and apply the algorithm to a model of linear demand and
price leadership of the patent pool. I show that grand patent pools, in which
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all owners of essential patents join one patent pool, can be in the set of
farsightedly stable outcomes. A complete break-up of a patent pool is never
farsightedly stable. These results are not restricted to the analysis of the sta-
bility of patent pools, but can also be applied to other fields that deal with
coalitional stability such as team formation, political agreements and cartels.
While the first two chapters employ theoretical models to analyse firms’
incentive to behave cooperatively or non-cooperatively in cartels and patent
pools, the third chapter deals with The Incentive Effect of Competition—a joint
work with Klaus Schmidt and Carmen Thoma. This chapter attempts to
answer if the degree of competition affects the incentives to invest effort with
the help of laboratory experiments. In particular, we are interested to find
out whether firms invest more effort when they are in a competitive market
than when they are in a monopolistic market, even though the monetary
incentives to invest are in equilibrium the same in both markets.
It appears to be a recurrent phenomenon that firms increase their efforts if
the degree of competition increases unexpectedly. The spate of cost-cutting
in the oil industry after the 1986 price crash (Borenstein and Farell, 2000),
the advent of the most technologically progressive period in the US after the
Great Depression (Field, 2003) and the sharp productivity increase in the
Great Lakes iron ore production after the Brazilian market entry (Schmitz Jr,
2005) are examples of the effect of competition on productivity and innova-
tion. In the last example, the Great Lakes iron ore producers faced no com-
petition for nearly a century. In the early 1980s, Brazilian iron ore producers
were unexpectedly offering iron ore at lower prices in the Great Lakes region.
In response, the production process in the Great Lakes iron ore industry un-
derwent a change, labour productivity doubled, material productivity rose
by 50% and capital productivity increased within a few years, after years of
little change before the Brazilian market entry.
The connection between competition and innovation has long been the
interest of economists, dating back to Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962).
Theoretical models on the relationship between competition and innovation
offer mixed results and reveal the counteractive effects of competition and
innovation. Moreover, the interdependence of competition and innovation
is also problematic in empirical studies because the causal relationship re-
mains unclear. Most empirical studies find that innovation increases linearly
with competition (Geroski, 1994; Nickell, 1996; Blundell et al., 1999) or that
innovation increases with competition and at some point decreases again
(Scherer, 1967; Aghion et al., 2005). This non-linear relationship can emerge
because the rents from innovation depend on the level of the innovativeness
and competitiveness of the industry.
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Even though a large body of literature addresses the issue of competition
and innovation, its focus is on the monetary incentives to invest. Surprisingly,
no research has been devoted to the question as to how competition affects
the incentives to invest independent of the monetary incentives which might
vary depending of the degree of competition and the innovativeness of an
industry. We analyse this question with the help of laboratory experiments,
a method that allows us to control for the degree of competition and the
monetary incentives to invest.
In the first experiment, subjects decide how much of their given budget
they invest in a risky R&D project. The project’s probability of success in-
creases with their investment. Subjects are either in a monopoly, duopoly
or an oligopoly treatment. In the monopoly treatment, a subject’s payoff de-
pends only on its project success, whereas in the competitive treatments a
subject’s payoff depends on its own project’s success as well as on the success
of their competitor(s) who invest simultaneously. Our results reveal that sub-
jects in the competitive treatments invest significantly more than the subjects
in the monopoly treatment, even though the Nash equilibrium investment is
the same across treatments.
To investigate which aspect of competition incentivizes the subjects to
invest more, we conduct a second experiment. Letting subjects invest se-
quentially allows us to align the complexity and risk of the investment in a
monopoly and a duopoly treatment. Our results show that a higher degree
of complexity and the uncertainty about the competitor’s decision are pos-
sible drivers of the higher investment in the competitive treatments which
we observed in the first experiment. In the experiment with sequential de-
cisions, the average investments do not differ across treatments. But the fact
that subjects in the duopoly treatment compete against another subject still
impacts the investment decision. We observe that with competition, subjects
invest more if their expected payoff decreases exogenously. A decrease in
their payoff seems to motivate higher investments. Subjects in the monopoly
treatments in contrast are discouraged from investing in the same situation.
This difference can only be explained by the incentive effect of competition,
because the relation between cost of investment and probability of success is
in both treatments unaffected by the exogenous shock. The results of Chapter
3 indicate that the relationship between competition and innovation does not
only depend on the monetary incentive to invest, which has been the focus
of the literature so far, but that there is also an incentive effect of competition
independent of monetary incentives.
Each of the three chapters is self-contained, having its own introduction
and appendix. Consequently, each chapter can be read independently of the
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other two. A consolidated bibliography of all chapters can be found at the
end of the dissertation.
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L E N I E N C Y P R O G R A M M E S A N D P R I VAT E A C T I O N S F O R
D A M A G E S
1.1 introduction
De jure there is no interaction between the private and public enforcement of
competition law. Nevertheless, the interaction between leniency programmes
and cartel damages claims has produced several court cases and broad dis-
cussions over the recent years. In particular, cartel damages actions that fol-
low an AA’s decision may give rise to several problems. One of these prob-
lems is at the focus of this chapter—the interaction between private follow-
on claims for damages and leniency programmes.
Very recently, on 26 November 2014, the ‘Directive of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages un-
der national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the
Member States and of the European Union’ was signed into law (European
Commission, 2014; European Union, 2014b). This directive came into exist-
ence after long discussions about the coexistence of private and public en-
forcement of competition law in the EU.1
The European Commission (EC) found that shortcomings in the applic-
able legal frameworks so far make it excessively costly, if not impossible,
for victims of cartels to obtain relevant evidence to bring an action against
the cartelists.2 The access to case documents for potential claimants on the
one hand facilitates damages claims, but on the other hand gives rise to
problems concerning the public enforcement of competition law. Leniency
programmes are an often-used tool of public enforcement and require the
firms to make detailed leniency statements in order to get reductions from
1 A Green Paper (European Commission, 2005) was followed by a White Paper (European Com-
mission, 2008), which led to the publication of a Proposal for a Directive by the European
Commission in June 2013 (European Commission, 2013e). A modified version was adopted
by the European Parliament in April 2014 (European Parliament, 2014), followed by the
final adoption by the Council in November 2014 (European Union, 2014b). For the full
overview of the history and the documents accompanying of the European discussion, see
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.
2 Until now, most of the private actions for damages were brought by large businesses. The
harm caused by competition law infringements is often widely spread and each victim has
a low-value damage (European Commission, 2013b). The EC recommends that some form
of collective redress mechanism should be available in all EU Member States to improve the
change for compensation of consumers and SMEs (European Commission, 2013a,d).
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fines. Owing to the system of joint and several liability3 and the unlikely
event that leniency applicants appeal, revealing firms are in a different po-
sition than non-revealing firms in follow-on damages claims as they may
become the primary target of damages claims.
In this chapter I analyse the effect of follow-on damages claims on cartel
deterrence and cartel disclosure. I study how facilitating damages actions
affects the public enforcement of competition law. I develop a theoretical
model in which symmetric firms decide whether to compete, to collude and
keep their cartel secret or to collude and later apply for leniency as part of
their strategy. To analyse the effect of damages payments on the cooperation
with the AA (AA) and on collusion, I distinguish between the exposures to
damages payments for revealing firms and for non-revealing firms.
The results of my model have several interesting implications for the
design of the interaction of private damages claims and leniency programmes.
First, my model provides insights into the effect that private enforcement
has on the incentives to collude or to compete in a market additional to
public enforcement. Second, it shows how private damages payments affect
the incentives to report a cartel under legal frameworks which differ in the
exposure to damages for revealing and non-revealing colluding firms.
I find that an increase in the exposure to damages payments for firms
which are found guilty and which did not cooperate with the AA decreases
the value of collusion. Additional to this deterring effect, higher expected
cost in case of collusion increases the incentives to disclose the cartel to the
AA. A stronger enforcement of damages claims against firms which did not
reveal their cartel supports the objectives of the public enforcement, namely
deterrence and disclosure of cartels. An increase in the exposure to damages
payments for firms which revealed their cartel to the AA has two opposite ef-
fects on deterrence. On the one hand, the expected costs of collusion increase
and this may deter firms from collusion. On the other hand, it stabilizes a
cartel’s agreement never to reveal and this in turn makes collusion more prof-
itable. Surprisingly, this cartel-stabilizing effect has not been considered so
far. The effect on the incentives to cooperate with the AA is unambiguous:
Higher expected damages payments for revealing firms reduce the incen-
tives to apply for leniency because revealing becomes less profitable.
My analysis uses the basic framework developed by Motta and Polo (2003),
which considers the effect of leniency programmes on cartel deterrence and
cartel detection. I modify the timing and expand the model by damages to
analyse the interaction of leniency programmes and cartel damages actions.
3 Under the rule of joint and several liability, a person who was harmed by several wrongdo-
ers can claim total damages from one, several or all liable wrongdoers, regardless of their
individual share of the harm caused.
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The economic literature on leniency programmes4 builds upon the litera-
ture on law enforcement and shows that self-reporting and leniency policies
can have positive effects by reducing costs and preventing crimes (see for
example Kaplow and Shavell, 1994, and Kofman and Lawarrée, 1996). The
paper by Motta and Polo (2003) is the first paper that discusses leniency pro-
grammes in a dynamic setting in a multi-agent environment. In this model,
symmetric firms interact repeatedly and choose whether or not to collude,
playing grim trigger strategies. The AA reviews the industry with some
probability and colluding firms can decide if they want to cooperate with the
AA which reduces their fine. Firms report information as part of a strategy.
On the one hand, lenient treatment of cartel members reduces the expected
fine and this increases the incentives for collusion. On the other hand, le-
niency programmes reduce the cost of prosecution and make enforcement
more effective. Motta and Polo (2003) show that if the AA reallocates re-
sources from prosecution to detection, the positive effect tends to dominate
the negative effect. Private actions for damages and their interactions with
leniency programmes are not part of the model of Motta and Polo (2003).
Several other papers show that leniency programmes may have counter-
productive side effects and that programme characteristics such as fines, re-
wards and the timing of reductions granted have to be designed carefully
(Spagnolo, 2004; Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2006; Aubert et al., 2006; Harring-
ton, 2008; Motchenkova and Leliefeld, 2010; Chen and Rey, 2013).
My research question also relates to the literature on private and public
enforcement of competition law. So far, the legal and economic literature
has focused on the comparison of private and public enforcement of com-
petition law or on the comparison of the EU and the US legal system of
private and public enforcement of competition law.5 My analysis in contrast
4 Spagnolo (2008) gives a good overview of the literature of leniency policies.
5 For a detailed overview of private enforcement of competition law, see for example Komninos
(2008); Basedow (2007); Basedow et al. (2011). Wils (2009) proposes a separate-task-approach
for the public and private enforcement of competition law in the EU and lists issues at which
both interact. Segal and Whinston (2007) survey the economic issues of public vs. private
enforcement in different jurisdictions. They analyse advantages and costs of private enforce-
ment compared to public enforcement in deterring anti-competitive behaviour. Their discus-
sion of economic issues of the optimal enforcement mix follows the US perspective, in which
private enforcement pursues punitive objectives additionally to the fines imposed by the pub-
lic authority. Peyer and Hüschelrath (2013) analyse the optimal enforcement mix of public
and private enforcement for different anticompetitive conducts. Segal and Whinston (2007)
and Peyer and Hüschelrath (2013) both focus on the comparison and the optimal mix of the
two enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, McAfee et al. (2008) compare the welfare effects of
public and private enforcement. They assume that private claimants may act strategically and
may have informational advantages to the public authority. Therefore, private enforcement is
only welfare increasing if courts are sufficiently precise. This comparison of the effectiveness
of the two mechanisms and their advantages and disadvantages is again mainly of interest
in the analysis of the US system of private and public enforcement of competition law.
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focuses on the interaction of private and public enforcement of competition
law. The model which I consider is different from the models which com-
pare public and private enforcement as I do not introduce private enforcers
as additional strategic players (as in McAfee et al., 2008). My model analyses
the most common form of private enforcement in the EU, in which private
enforcement builds upon public enforcement and claimants file actions for
damages following the decision of the public authority.6
Marra and Sarra (2010) analyse how the incompleteness of competition
laws influences the incentives of individuals to turn to court following a
competition law infringement. In their model, the incompleteness of law
introduces uncertainty that influences the behaviour of plaintiffs as well
as that of defendants. They assume that the law remains incomplete until
the first relevant court judgment and that follow-on litigants are able to ex-
ploit the first-movers effort. To stimulate private enforcement of competition
law, Marra and Sarra (2010) propose direct measures such as the increase in
available information and indirect measures such as filling legislative gaps
and additional incentives for first movers in private enforcement. Although
my model also allows for the incompleteness of law, I do not distinguish
between stand-alone and follow-on claimants and their incentives to bring a
claim. In my model, I analyse the effect of the exposure to damages claims
on a cartelist’s incentives to collude and cooperate with the AA. A cartelist’s
effective exposure to damages payments can vary between zero and total
harm caused by the cartel. These variations can either be explained by an
exemption by law to pay full damages or by the incompleteness of law. Ow-
ing to this incompleteness, claimants may have a lower probability of being
fully compensated and cartelists are exposed to damages payments which
are lower than the harm they have caused.
An empirical analysis of the costs and benefits of private enforcement is
difficult because the full costs and benefits are hard to observe. There are
only few empirical studies on the private enforcement of EU competition
law due to the lack of systematic data collection.7
The problems of uncertainty caused by the current legal rules on the inter-
action of private and public enforcement of competition law have resulted in
several court cases and broad discussion among legal practitioners and schol-
ars. Nevertheless, to my knowledge no economic model addressed the topic
6 Calcagno (2012) analyses stand-alone private damages actions in a framework similar to
McAfee et al. (2008).
7 A problem in addition to the lack of data collection on private enforcement cases is the fact
that many follow-on cases are settled before they reach court and therefore do not show
up in the statistics. Rodger (2006a,b, 2009a, 2013, 2009b) give an overview of UK private
enforcement cases until 2012. Peyer (2012) analyses the existence of private antitrust litigation
in Germany and finds that actions for damages are rare but injunctive reliefs are widely used.
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of the interaction between leniency programmes and private cartel damages
claims. I try to fill this gap and shed light on the effect of cartel damages
payments on firms’ incentives to collude and on the incentives to cooperate
with the AA once a cartel has been set up.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 gives a comprehensive
overview of the legal background of private and public enforcement of com-
petition law and the most relevant court cases in the EU. These cases initi-
ated the debate about the interaction of private enforcement of competition
law and leniency programmes with the focus on the special role of leniency
applicants. Section 1.3 sets up the model of private and public enforcement
of competition law. Section 1.4 analyses the effect of the exposure to dam-
ages payments on the incentives to collude and to report a cartel. Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 private and public enforcement of eu competition law
1.2.1 Objectives, Legal Framework and Problems
Competition law enforcement pursues three main objectives. The first one
is injunction, that is to stop the infringement of the law and to deter future
infringement. The second objective is compensation, that is to reimburse
the victims of the infringement for the harm suffered. The third objective is
to punish the infringer. These three objectives can be pursued by the com-
bination of private and public enforcement of competition law. In the EU,
private and public enforcement are seen as complementary tools. Whereas
the public enforcement aims to punish and deter illegal actions, the objec-
tive of the private enforcement is to guarantee ‘full and fair compensation
for victims once a public authority has found and sanctioned an infringe-
ment’ (European Commission, 2013a, p.2). In the US, private enforcement
also includes a punitive element by awarding treble damages due to the lack
of a strong public agency. The majority view of scholars is that both private
and public enforcement are needed in order to achieve the injunctive, com-
pensatory and punitive objectives of competition law.
EU competition rules are primarily enforced by the EC and the national
AAs in the public interest. Additionally, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have
direct effect so that victims of infringement can privately claim damages for
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breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU before national courts in civil actions.8
In 2001, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) emphasized the importance of
the private enforcement of competition law and justified the right to com-
pensation for anti-competitive behaviour. In the Courage judgment, para.26,
the ECJ stated that ‘[t]he full effectiveness of Article 85 of the Treaty [now
101 TFEU] and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down
in Article 85(1) would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to
claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to
restrict or distort competition’.
Private actions for damages for an infringement of competition law can
be either follow-on or stand-alone actions. Follow-on actions are lawsuits
which are brought in wake of a public investigation. In several jurisdictions
of the EU Member States, a probative value of national AA decisions ex-
ists for subsequent actions for damages, i.e. claimants do not have to prove
the illegal conduct. Furthermore, the EU has adopted a rebuttable presump-
tion that cartel infringements cause harm.9 Stand-alone private actions for
damages are initiated independently and are more complex and difficult to
litigate for the claimants because of the lack of an existing evidence for the
illegal conduct. As a result, a relatively high proportion of private antitrust
enforcement actions in the EU are follow-on claims (Renda et al., 2007, p.40).
Because private enforcement in most cases builds upon public enforcement
of competition law, a smooth interaction of both is desirable.
The current legal framework in the EU for damages actions in cases of
competition law infringements has not proved satisfactory because individu-
als encounter difficulties in obtaining compensation for their harm. Even
though the EU law guarantees the right to compensation, actions for com-
pensation are generally adjudicated by national courts and it is therefore
for the domestic legal systems to define rules on the exercise of the right to
compensation.To date, most victims of infringement remain uncompensated.
8 The European Court of Justice announced that this right is guaranteed by primary EU law
(Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, para.26; joined Cases C-295/04 to
C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006]
ECR I-6619, para.60; Case C-360/09, Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt [2011]
ECR I-5161, para.36; Case C-199/11, Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others). Civil ac-
tions for damages are generally adjudicated to national courts of the EU Member States and
it is a matter of the national courts to lay down detailed rules. The international jurisdic-
tion of the national court is often determined by Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters, OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1. This Regulation has been recently replaced
by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1,
which for the most part will enter into force on 10 January 2015.
9 European Union (2014b, Art.17) provides a rebuttable presumption with regard to the exist-
ence of harm in cartel infringements.
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Only 25% of antitrust infringements found by the EC in the last seven years
have been followed by civil actions. From 2006–2012 only 15 out of 54 final
cartel and antitrust prohibition decisions taken by the EC were followed by
actions for damages in the Member States. In the same period only 52 actions
for damages were brought in seven Member States (European Commission,
2013a, p.1).10
Two problems are seen as the main reason for the low rate of private en-
forcement. First, the diversity of the national rules governing the compensa-
tion of competition law infringements creates legal uncertainty for potential
victims as well as for potential defendants. Second, victims find it difficult to
obtain relevant evidence to proof their harm. Concerning the first shortcom-
ing, a study commissioned by the EC found that legislation and handling
of damages actions in the EU are of ‘astonishing diversity and total under-
development’ (Waelbroeck et al., 2004, p.11). Another report carried out for
the EC finds that only in 10 EU Member States private antitrust litigation ex-
ists but ‘seems very sparse and related to isolated streams of cases’ (Renda
et al., 2007, p.9). Furthermore, the study finds that the conditions for private
enforcement of competition law have not improved significantly since 2004.
Parallel to the EC’s discussions about a reform of the legislation for more
effective civil redress, several Member States have experienced an increase
in private damages actions. Germany, the UK and the Netherlands have be-
come the favourite forums for antitrust litigation. The reason for this focus is
that some features of these jurisdictions are seen as plaintiff-friendly and the
EC considers the procedural rules for antitrust damages actions to be more
effective than in other countries (European Commission, 2013c, para.52).
Three factors play an important role in determining whether and how vic-
tims of competition law infringements are compensated. The first factor is
the existence of a right for compensation for victims of antitrust violations. In
most jurisdictions the victim’s right for compensation exists and includes
compensation for the harm suffered as well as compensation for the gain of
which it has been deprived. If the right for compensation exists, the second
important factor is whether certain groups of infringers are exempted from
damages claims by law. If all cartel members are jointly and severally liable
for the damages caused by the cartel, a victim can ask full compensation
from any of the cartel members. There can be several exemptions from this
rule, such as to partially exempt leniency participants. To privilege reveal-
ing firms in relation to victims is seen as problematic in the EU because it
10 Given that there is no centralized register for the private enforcement of EU competition law
which involves litigation before 28 national courts, the EC notes that these figures should be
considered as a rough indicator.
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infringes the primary law principle of effectiveness.11 A possibility to ex-
clude revealing firms from the full burden of damages claims by law is
to privilege them in relation to their non-revealing co-infringers. The final
Directive (European Union, 2014b, Art.11) restricts the civil liability of the
leniency applicants and of small and medium-sized enterprises to claims
by its direct and indirect purchasers or providers unless victims are unable
to obtain full compensation from the other infringers. Furthermore, certain
groups can be partially exempted from damages payments by restricting
the amount of contribution which co-infringers are allowed to recover from
them.12
The third factor is the possibility of victims to effectively exercise their right
for compensation. The right can be significantly restricted by high costs and/
or high legal uncertainty and procedural difficulties. The second important
problem of private enforcement is the access to evidence, which is seen as
the key aspect of any civil damages action to prove an infringement and to
quantify the harm suffered (Atlee et al., 2013). In general, to assess and proof
the harm, the actual position of the injured party has to be compared with
a hypothetical position in which the infringement did not occur. The costly
analysis of this counterfactual scenario is difficult without crucial pieces of
evidence which is often in the hands of the infringers or the AA. Over the
past years, a special tension has arisen over the right of victims to gain ac-
cess to documents provided to the EC on a voluntary basis in effort to seek
leniency from fines. Leniency programmes define rules which offer full or
partial immunity from fines to firms which commit or committed infringe-
ments of the competition rules and cooperate with the AA.13 These rules
were first adopted in the US in 1978 and are now in place in almost all
European countries.14
Fine reduction and immunity from fines granted in leniency programmes
‘have become essential instruments to enforce competition rules at both EU
and national level’ (European Commission, 2013a, p.3).15 Private and pub-
lic enforcement interact if actions for damages have an influence on cartel
11 The ECJ expressed its concerns about restricting the civil liability of leniency participants
at the expense of the injured parties in Case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau
Chemie AG and Others, para.47.
12 European Union (2014b, Art.11(5)) restricts the amount of contribution of an immunity recip-
ient to the amount of the harm it caused to its direct and indirect purchasers or providers.
13 In the UK, the leniency programme also protects employees from personal sanctions. If an
employee agrees on activities that infringe the competition rules, he commits a criminal
offence.
14 In the EU, the leniency programme rules are defined in European Union (2006).
15 From 2008 to 2011, 21 out of 24 EC cartel decisions and from 2010 to 2011, 31 out of 51 na-
tional competition authorities cartel decisions were based on leniency applications (European
Commission, 2013c, p.20).
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deterrence and detection. The EC is concerned that the disclosure of leni-
ency documents will undermine the procedure’s effectiveness and attrac-
tiveness. Leniency applicants could be more cautious in their submissions
and statements to reduce the risk that these statements are used against
them in follow-on civil actions. These undertakings may have an increased
exposure to damages in follow-on claims and may therefore be disadvant-
aged over companies that did not cooperate with the AA. The uncertainty
about the exposure of damages claims could deter the company from reveal-
ing, faced with the disclosure of the information it provides to third parties.
Furthermore, the EC fears that the disclosure may undermine the decision
making process, hinder public enforcement proceedings and could reveal
the competition authority’s investigation strategy (European Commission,
2013e, para.4.2).
A crucial point in overcoming the obstacle of proving the harm is the pro-
vision of relevant information. Of particular interest for this study is the
decision of the AA concerning the disclosure of internal documents in gen-
eral and the leniency statements in particular.16 Depending on the type of
information which the AA discloses, the focus of follow-on damages claims
can be either on the revealing or on the non-revealing firms.
In the recent past the EC has systematically denied access to case files
asserting that leniency statements should not be used against the leniency
applicants in private actions for damages. On the one hand, the Leniency
Notice of the EC guarantees that leniency statements will not be disclosed
by the EC to complainants or other third parties without consent (European
Union, 2006, para.33). On the other hand, the Leniency Notice clearly states
that participating in a leniency programme cannot protect an undertaking
from civil law consequences (European Union, 2006, para.39). This contradic-
tion is further complicated by Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Coun-
cil and Commission documents. According to this regulation, claimants seek-
ing redress for infringement of competition law are able to address an in-
formation request to the EC in order to obtain evidence directly from the
regulators’ files.
16 In the final Directive (European Union, 2014b, Art.6), the EC’s proposal to generally exclude
leniency and settlement documents from disclosure has been adopted.
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1.2.2 Recent EU and Member States Court Cases on Access to Information in
Follow-on Damages Actions
A broad discussion about the access to information in follow-on damages ac-
tions emerged after the June 2011 Pfleiderer ruling of the ECJ.17 In 2008, the
German Federal Cartel Office imposed fines on manufacturers of decor pa-
per for price fixings and capacity agreements. Pfleiderer, a customer of these
companies, requested full access to the cartel files in order to bring an ac-
tion for damages. The Federal Cartel Office refused the request whereupon
Pfleiderer brought an action against the refusal before the Local Court in
Bonn. The Local Court referred the question whether access to leniency doc-
uments should be provided to the ECJ. The ECJ ruled that in absence of
any binding EU regulation on this special issue the national courts have to
decide on the basis of national law whether access to leniency documents
should be granted, thereby balancing the interests on a case by case basis.
The ECJ emphasized that the right to claim damages for infringement of
competition law discourages illegal conduct and therefore fosters effective
competition. Nevertheless, the ECJ feared that the integrity of the public en-
forcement process could be jeopardized if leniency applicants are at risk of
damages claims on the basis of voluntarily submitted documents. The Local
Court denied the access to leniency documents because in their opinion the
latter effect outweighed the former effect.
In the Donau Chemie ruling18, the ECJ held that European Union Law, in
particular the principle of effectiveness, precludes a provision of national
law that deprives third parties of all rights to access a cartel file. Prior to this
case the Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (Austrian Federal Competition Author-
ity) ordered Donau Chemie and Others in a final judgment to pay a fine due
to cartel agreements. Thereupon, the Verband Druck- und Medientechnik
(VDMT, Austrian Union of Print and Media Technology) was seeking access
to the file relating to the proceedings between the Bundeswettbewerbsbe-
hörde and Donau Chemie and Others in order to assess the nature and
amount of potential loss suffered by the VDTM members. Austrian Law
provides that defendants have to consent the access to the file, which Donau
Chemie and Others did not. The ECJ took issue with this national rule. Even
though it is for the Member States to establish and apply the national rules
in the absence of binding EU competition law rules, Austrian law was found
to effectively bar claimants from their EU right to seek compensation for
cartel harm.
17 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161.
18 Case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and Others [2013].
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Following the ECJ decisions, the EU Member States have weighted the
effective application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the right to claim
damages for loss caused differently. This legislative divergence is given by
different national rules on the access to evidence and also by the lack of
adequate rules in some Member States. The ECJ’s decision to weight the
interests on a case by case basis and the diversity of national rules has led to
inequalities and uncertainty concerning the conditions for possible claimants
to exercise their right to compensation as well as for possible defendants to
be held liable for infringement of competition law.
The German Courts refused access to leniency documents. In the judg-
ment of the Pfleiderer case, access was refused because the purpose of the
inquiry appeared to be put at risk. In Roasted Coffee, the Higher Regional
Court in Düsseldorf rejected the disclosure of leniency documents holding
that the confidential treatment of the leniency applications outweighs the
information interest of the claimants.19
The UK courts, however, ruled differently. In National Grid the claimant
considered to bring a follow-on damages claim against the participants of
the Gas Insulated Switchgear cartel20 in which ABB was granted immunity
from fines by the EC. National Grid applied for the disclosure of information
at the English High Court21 which included information provided by ABB
to the EC on a voluntary basis to seek immunity from fines. Following this
request the English High Court invited the EC to submit observations on
several questions. The EC answered that the principles of the ECJ ruling in
Pfleiderer cover leniency programmes of both the national AAs and the EC
and that the issue of access therefore has to be decided by national rules.
Hereupon the English High Court decided that a number of passages from
the confidential version of the EC’s decision and limited passages of other
documents should be disclosed.
In the recent EnBW case22 the ECJ decided that the EC may reject the
request by a plaintiff in a national follow-on proceeding for documents pro-
duced in an EU cartel case.23 In line with its recent decisions in Bitumen24
19 In 2009 the Bundeskartellamt fined several coffee roasters for price fixing (Case B11-18/08)
after a leniency application has sparked off the investigation. In 2011 several customers of
the fined coffee roasters asked for access to the case files. Decision of the Higher Regional
Court in Düsseldorf: OLG Düsseldorf, BB 2012, 2459-2462.
20 Case COMP/F/38.899, Gas Insulated Switchgear C(2006) 6762 final.
21 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v. ABB Ltd & Ors [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch).
22 EnBW claimed that it is a victim of the Gas Insulated Switchgear Cartel and sought access
to the case documents in 2007. The EC rejected the request and EnBW appealed the decision
before the General Court which set aside the EC’s refusal. The EC in turn appealed.
23 Case C-365/12 P, European Commission v. EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG [2014].
24 Case T-380/08, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Commission [2013].
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and CDC25 the court ruled that the EC cannot presume that these documents
fall under the exemption of the Transparency Regulation but has to analyse
each document. Overall, these cases demonstrate the legal uncertainty of po-
tential claimants and defendants and how differently has been decided on
the access to documents over time and in different EU Member States.
1.3 the model
The model uses the framework developed by Motta and Polo (2003), who
analyse the effect of a leniency programme on cartel participation and detec-
tion. Additionally, my model allows for private enforcement of competition
law. Firms which are found guilty by the AA have to compensate the vic-
tims of the cartel.26 I introduce two parameters which measure the exposure
to damages claims for revealing and for non-revealing firms. This allows
me to compare private enforcement regimes which differ in the wrongdoers’
exposure to follow-on damages claims.27
Everything described below is common knowledge to all agents. I analyse
an economy with several symmetric industries. Each industry comprises a
group of firms and each firm can either collude or compete in its industry.
For tractability reasons I assume that firms are symmetric. Firms take into ac-
count the enforcement activity of the AA, which will review one industry at
a time. The AA can prove collusion with some probability, in this case firms
pay a fine to the AA. A leniency programme exists, offering reduced fines
for leniency firms. If firms are found guilty, they also have to pay damages
which depend on the duration of the cartel and on the private enforcement
regime.
25 Case T-437/08, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims v European Commission [2011].
26 The claim for damages is only one out of several remedies. Especially in cases of infringe-
ments in which the AA has not (yet) delivered a judgment, an injunctive relief may be cheaper
to enforce for the victim than damages claims. Furthermore, consensual dispute resolution
mechanisms of competition litigation such as out-of-courts-settlements, arbitration and me-
diation are options to avoid costly law suits. Declaration of nullity of contractual provisions
is another possibility of private enforcement. With more settlements as well as with more
actions for damages, the infringer’s expected cost of collusion increases. The disclosure of in-
formation in settlement cases may raise similar problems with follow-on damages claims as
the disclosure of leniency documents. The acknowledgement of the participation in a cartel
and the cooperation with the AA in exchange for a simplified procedure and a reduction in
fine may bring the settling parties in a weaker position in follow-on damages claims if the
settlement documents are available for the claimants.
27 The effective exposure of convicted firms to damages payments depends on the existence of
a right for compensation and the victims’ possibilities to effectively exercise this right, which
again heavily depends on access to leniency statements (see Section 1.2.1).
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1.3.1 Exposure to Damages
A firms has to pay damages if it is found guilty either by cooperating with
the AA (applying for leniency) or by being proved guilty without coopera-
tion. A firms has to pay damages if it is found guilty either by cooperating
with the AA (applying for leniency) or by being proved guilty without co-
operation. LetD be the amount of damages that each firm would have to pay
for one period of collusion without any restrictions. The factor βLP ∈ [0, 1]
describes the effective exposure to damages D for leniency firms and the
factor βNLP ∈ [0, 1] describes the effective exposure to non-revealing firms.
In case there is no right for compensation or it is practically impossible to
obtain compensation, βLP = βNLP = 0. In case of full exposure to dam-
ages claims, βLP = βNLP = 1. In this case a right for compensation exists
and victims are able to exercise this right. Neither firms which cooperate
with the AA nor firms which do not cooperate fall under an exemption and
therefore each infringer has to pay full damages D. If a right for compen-
sation exists and the focus of damages claims is on the non-revealing firms,
βLP < βNLP.28 On the other hand, if a right for compensation exists and the
focus of damages claims is on the leniency firms, βLP > βNLP.29 Even if all
cartel participants are legally liable for damages, procedural issues may shift
the focus on the leniency participants.30
28 A partial or total exclusion of immunity recipients can emerge due to a legal exclusion from
damages claims. It may also result because of the information provision by the AA: If the AA
denies claimants access to leniency files (which contain collected relevant evidence), it may
be excessively difficult for the claimants to prove the harm caused by these firms. Claimants
then focus their actions for damages on the firms which did not participate in a leniency
programme. The shift of the focus of damages claims is possible because under a system of
joint and several liability the victims of an infringement are able to recover their full damages
from any of the infringers regardless of the individual share of the liability.
29 Even though βLP > βNLP is possible, I assume the following restriction on the differences
between damages payments: βLPD − βNLPD < δVCR − δ
piN
1−δ + F(1 − r). The difference
between the damages payments in case of participating in the leniency programme and not
revealing is assumed to be lower than the difference between the value of the strategy CR
minus the reduced fine and the value of the collusion profit minus the fine.
30 If for example the AA discloses all documents relating to the cartel investigation including
the leniency statements, the risk of damages claims for the leniency participants is higher
compared to the non-revealing cartel participants. The voluntarily submitted, detailed doc-
uments (including an admission to unlawful practices) provide a useful source of relevant
evidence for claimants and put the leniency participants in a weak position in follow-on dam-
ages claims. Furthermore, through the cooperation with the AA the court’s decision becomes
final earlier for the revealing firms than for the non-revealing firms as the latter may appeal
the decision.
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1.3.2 Public Enforcement
The AA is able to commit to a set of policy parameters: The probability
that it will review an industry, the probability to prove a cartel guilty and
full and reduced fines. With probability α ∈ [0, 1] the AA reviews the firms
in an industry. With probability p ∈ [0, 1] the AA can prove collusion if
firms do not reveal. The full fine F has to be paid by each firm which does
not cooperate with the AA and is proved guilty. The reduced fine rF with
r ∈ [0, 1] is part of the leniency programme and has to be paid by each
leniency firm.
The timing of the AA’s actions is as follows. The AA observes the economy
in period t. If there is no collusion, the AA does not review any industry.31
If the AA observes collusion it reviews one industry of the economy in the
following period t+ 1; each industry gets reviewed with probability α. The
firms are able to react to the review of the AA in this period. If firms make
use of the leniency programme and reveal the cartel to the AA, the review
stops and the colluding firms are found guilty. In this case the AA starts
to observe the economy again in the following period. If no firm reveals the
cartel to the AA, the AA tries to prove the cartel in the following period t+ 2.
The AA is successful with probability p and is not able to prove the cartel
with probability 1− p. In both cases, the AA observes the economy again in
the following period. If the AA proves the firms guilty either by the firms’
confession or on its own, it is able to restore competition in this period.
1.3.3 Firms’ Strategies
Firms play an infinitely repeated game. Their strategy consists of a market
action and the revelation action. Firms decide whether they want to collude
or to compete (market action) and whether they reveal their cartel once re-
viewed by the AA (revelation action).
For these decisions firms take into account the policy parameters set by the
AA which are constant over the game. Furthermore, firms take into account
the private enforcement parameters that define the exposure to damages
payments if they collude and are found guilty. In case of several equilib-
rium strategies, firms coordinate on the Pareto-dominant strategy. Firms in
this game play grim trigger strategies.32 A firm’s deviation from the mar-
ket action as well as a deviation from the revelation action is regarded as
a deviation from the strategy and is punished by the other firms by never
colluding again.
31 I assume that there are no type I judicial errors.
32 See Friedman (1971) for grim trigger strategies.
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I define three strategies: One non-collusive strategy (NC) and two collus-
ive strategies—collude and reveal (CR) and collude and not reveal (CNR).33
In strategy NC, firms never collude. Playing the strategy CR, firms collude
from period t on as long as no deviation occurs. Each firm’s profit from col-
luding is piM in this period. If the AA does not review the industry in the
following period t+ 1, a firm’s profit from colluding is again piM. If instead
the AA reviews the industry, firms cooperate with the AA and the AA im-
poses the reduced fine rF on the firms. In this period t+ 1, a firm’s profit is
that of a competitive industry, piN < piM. Additionally, each firm has to pay
damages βLPD, with βLP defining the exposure to damages D. If neither a
deviation from the market action nor a deviation from the revelation action
occurred, firms continue to play CR in the following period t+ 2.
Playing the strategy CNR, firms collude from period t on as long as no de-
viation occurs. Each firm’s profit is piM in this period. In period t+ 1 firms
continue to collude and each firm’s profit is piM, independent of whether
the AA reviews the industry or not. In period t+ 2 the AA tries to prove the
cartel. If the AA proves the firms guilty, the AA imposes a fine F on the col-
luding firms. Each firm has to pay damages payments βNLP2D, with βNLP
defining the exposure to damages. The damages payments are doubled be-
cause firms collude for two periods. If the AA proves the firms guilty, each
firm’s profit is piN in period t+ 2. If the AA cannot prove the firms guilty in
t+ 2, each firm’s profit in this period is piM. As long as no deviation from
the market action and the revelation action occurred, firms continue playing
CNR in period t+ 3.
Whenever a deviation from the strategy occurs, firms will never cooper-
ate again and will behave competitively from the next period onwards. By
deviating from collusion, a firm obtains a payoff piD > piM in the deviation
period but in all following periods each firm receives only piN.
33 Motta and Polo (2003) also define the strategies NC, CR and CNR. In my model, firms
playing the strategies CR and CNR are not only exposed to fines by the AA but also to
private damages payments, which vary depending on the revelation action. Additionally,
I modify the timing and firms’ profits in order to analyse the effect of private actions for
damages on firms’ incentives. The timing of the game in my model is different to the timing
in Motta and Polo (2003) in order to allow for periods of collusive profits in case of a cartel.
In the model by Motta and Polo (2003), firms which collude and reveal never obtain the
high profits from collusion if the AA reviews their industry, because firms reveal in the
single collusion period if reviewed and therefore obtain competitive profits in this period. It
seems unreasonable to me that customers of the cartel are harmed by the cartel even though
the cartelists only agreed upon colluding but in no period actually colluded (or obtained
collusive profits). The timing of the game in my model is so that firms which agree on the
strategy CR at least collude in one period and thereby harm consumers. See Section 1.3.4 for
details on the timing of the game.
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1.3.4 Timing of the Game
The timing of the game is as follows (see Figure 1.1). First, the AA sets its
policy parameters and firms observe these parameters as well as the private
enforcement parameters. In period t firms choose their strategy and decide
whether or not they deviate from the market action. The AA observes the
economy. If firms collude, the AA reviews each industry with probability α
in period t+ 1. It at least one firm makes use of the leniency programme and
reveals the cartel, the AA forces all firms of the leniency applicant’s industry
to compete in this period. The cartel is found guilty and the revealing firm(s)
has (have) to pay the reduced fine rF to the AA and the damages payments
βLPD to the claimants. The game restarts at period t.
If no firm reveals the cartel in period t + 1, the AA continues its work
in the reviewed industry and tries to prove the cartel in period t+ 2. With
probability p the AA is successful, in this case each firm of the industry is
found guilty and has to pay the fine F to the AA and the damages payments
βNLP2D to the claimants. The AA forces these firms firms to compete in
period t+ 2. With probability 1− p the AA fails to prove the cartel. In this
case firms obtain collusive profits in period t+ 2. The game restarts at period
t.34
Remember that all firms and all industries are symmetric. The Pareto-
dominating equilibrium strategy is the same for each firm given the policy
and enforcement parameters. In equilibrium no firm has an incentive to de-
viate from the agreed strategy. Therefore the duration of the game depends
on the equilibrium strategy. If firms choose the strategy CR, the game re-
starts after period t+ 1 whereas its restarts after period t+ 2 if firms choose
the strategy CNR. Note that the AA reviews one industry each time in case
there is collusion. In case one colluding industry is not reviewed, another
industry is reviewed. In case the AA started a review and no firm reveals,
it takes the AA another period to try proving the cartel before the game
34 In my model, firms decide whether or not to reveal information to the AA after the AA has
reviewed the industry of the firm. According to EU rules, it is not possible to gain immunity
or reductions from fines after the EC has submitted its statement of objections to the alleged
firms (European Union, 2006, para. 14 and para. 29). A statement of objections is a formal
step in the antitrust investigation and is not issued unless the EC believes that it can make
out the case and justify a prohibition. Hence, the statement of objections is a product of
considerable earlier investigative work. According the EU law, an application for leniency is
not possible after the EC has send out its statement of objection. In my model, the ’review’
should therefore not be interpreted as the issue of a statement of objection. If the AA reviews
an industry this should rather be interpreted as an event that makes it more likely that the
AA has concerns about that industry. For example, this event can be an investigation in an
industry close by the relevant industry or the involvement of one cartel participant in another
illegal conduct. See also Miller (2009, fn 11).
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Figure 1.1: Timing of the game
restarts.35 If there was no deviation from the agreed strategy, firms start col-
luding in the period following the proof by self-reporting or by the AA. If
a deviation occurred, firms behave competitively forever from the following
period onwards.
1.3.5 Equilibria of the Game
Whereas in the NC equilibrium a cartel never occurs, in the CR and the
CNR equilibria firms agree to collude. Two conditions need to hold for CNR
and CR to be equilibria: First, firms choose their agreed market action and
collude. Second, firms choose their agreed revelation action if the AA starts
to review their industry. The applied equilibrium concept is subgame per-
fection. In case of two subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), firms choose the
strategy that maximizes their profit.
In the NC equilibrium a deviation to collusion is not profitable because
each firm’s payoff from no collusion is higher than the expected payoff from
collusion. From period t on, there is full cartel deterrence. In the CR equilib-
rium a firm’s profit is highest if it colludes and reveals once the AA starts a
review whereas in the CNR equilibrium it is more profitable for a colluding
firm not to reveal once the AA reviews the industry.
35 If firms choose the strategy CNR and an industry is not reviewed in period t+1, this industry
may be reviewed at earliest in period t+ 3.
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Collude and Reveal (CR)
The strategy CR is an SPE if each firm does not have an incentive to deviate
from the strategy. Neither a deviation in period t from the market action
to no collusion nor a deviation after being reviewed in period t+ 1 from the
revelation action to not reveal must be profitable. The value of the CR strategy
for a firm is
VCR = piM + δ [α(piN − rF−βLPD) + (1−α)piM] + δ
2VCR (1)
which can be rewritten to
VCR =
piM − δ [α(rF+βLPD+ piM − piN) − piM]
1− δ2
. (2)
The value of the strategy CR consist of the collusive profit in period t plus
the expected profit from period t+ 1 discounted by the factor δ ∈ (0, 1). In
period t+ 2 the value of the strategy CR has to be added to the expected
profit of periods t and t+ 1, because in period t+ 2 the firm continues to
play CR.36
A firm does not have an incentive to deviate after a review took place
in period t+ 1 from its revelation action reveal to not reveal because not re-
vealing if all other firms reveal increases the fine from rF to F and leads to
competitive payoffs forever on.37 Deviating in period t from the market ac-
tion of collusion to no collusion can be profitable because firms obtain a high
deviation profit and do not expose themselves to fines and damages pay-
ments if they behave competitively. A firm’s value of a deviation from CR to
NC is
VD = piD + δ
piN
1− δ
. (3)
The strategy CR is an SPE if VCR > VD, or, expressed in terms of α, if
α < αCR =
(1− δ)(piM − δpiN − (1− δ)piD)
δ(piM − piN + rF+βLPD)
. (4)
Lemma 1.1. For given policy parameters (F, r,α) and the private enforcement para-
meter (βLP), the strategy CR is an SPE if α < αCR.
36 If the strategy CR is profitable in period t it is also profitable in period t+ 2. In period t+ 2
the game restarts if CR is the dominant equilibrium strategy.
37 See 29 for the assumption on differences in damages payments in order to exclude the case
that a deviation pays off just because the damages payments in case of revealing are much
higher than the damages payments from not revealing.
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Lemma 1.1 follows from the inequality VCR > VD and shows that if the re-
view probability is below αCR it is profitable for firms to choose CR, whereas
a deviation from collusion is profitable if α > αCR. Intuitively, it is profitable
for firms to collude and reveal once reviewed if the probability of a review
is low because firms obtain a high profit from collusion but the probability
of having to pay the reduced fine is low. The threshold αCR is independent
of the proof probability p because firms always reveal before the AA tries to
prove the cartel when playing the strategy CR. A CR-SPE exists if αCR > 0,
or δ > piD−piMpiD−piN . To focus on the interesting case in which CR can be an
equilibrium strategy, I assume αCR > 0. An increase in the costs in case
of a proof of the collusive behaviour (r, F,βLP,D) as well as an increase of
the alternative profits (piD,piN) decrease the threshold αCR. CR becomes an
equilibrium strategy for higher review probabilities if piM increases.
Collude and Not Reveal (CNR)
The strategy CNR is an SPE if neither a deviation in period t from the market
action of collusion to no collusion nor a deviation in period t + 1 from the
revelation action of not reveal to reveal is profitable. The value of the strategy
CNR is
VCNR =piM + δpiM + δ
2α [p(piN − F−βNLP2D) + (1− p)piM]
+ δ2(1−α)piM + δ
3VCNR (5)
which can be rewritten to
VCNR =
piM(1+ δ) + δ
2 [piM − pα(piM − piN + F+βNLP2D)]
1− δ3
. (6)
If all firms play CNR, each firm obtains the collusive profit in period t and
t+ 1 because no firm reveals. In case the AA reviews the industry of a firm,
this firm’s expected profit in period t+ 2 depends on whether or not the AA
proves the cartel guilty. In case the AA reviews another industry, the firm
continues to obtain the collusive profit in period t+ 2. In period t+ 3 the
game restarts.38
Two constraints must be satisfied for a CNR-SPE. First, a deviation in
period t from the market action collude to not collude is never profitable.
Second, a deviation after being reviewed in period t+ 1 from the revelation
38 If the strategy CNR is a dominant SPE, firms collude and the AA reviews one industry for
sure. If CNR is a dominant SPE, firms do not reveal and the AA tries to prove the cartel in
period t+ 2. The game then restarts in period t+ 3, different to the case if CR is a dominant
SPE, in which case the game stops with the revelation of the cartel in t+ 1 and restarts in
period t+ 2.
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action not reveal to reveal is never profitable. In the following I will derive the
conditions for both constraints.
Collude and not reveal is preferred over deviating in period t to no collu-
sion if VCNR > VD, or, expressed in terms of α, if
α < αNC =
(1+ δ+ δ2)(piM − (1− δ)piD − δpiN)
δ2p(piM − piN + F+βNLP2D)
. (7)
The threshold αNC is a downward sloping curve in the (α − p)-space as
shown in the example of Figure 1.2. If either the proof probability p or the
review probability α or both are low, it is more profitable to collude and not
reveal than to behave competitively in period t. If the review probability is
high (or even 100%) it may still be profitable to collude and not reveal if it is
very unlikely that the AA is able to proof the illegal behaviour (p low). The
same holds true for high values of the proof probability. Even though the AA
proves the cartel with a high probability, the strategy CNR may still yield a
higher payoff than deviating from collusion if the probability of a review
(which initiates the prosecution) is low. If the costs in case of proof of the
cartel (F,βNLP,D) increase or if the competitive profit increases, the thresh-
old αNC decreases. If the profit from collusion increases, it is profitable for
higher α and p to choose the strategy CNR.
For the second constraint to hold, a firm must prefer not to reveal after the
AA has started to review the industry in period t+ 1. The value of deviating
from the revelation action not reveal to reveal once the AA has reviewed the
industry is given by
VR|review =
piN
1− δ
− rF−βLPD . (8)
The value of playing the action not reveal once reviewed is given by
VNR|review = piM + δ [p(piN − F−βNLP2D) + (1− p)piM] + δ
2VCNR . (9)
If firms do not reveal the cartel, each firm continues to have the collusive
profit in period t+ 1. The expected profit of the following period t+ 2 de-
pends on whether or not the AA proves the cartel guilty. In period t + 3
firms continue to play CNR. Equation (9) can be rewritten to
VNR|review =piM + δ [p(piN − F−βNLP2D) + (1− p)piM] +
δ2
1− δ3[
piM(1+ δ) + δ
2 [piM − pα(piM − piN + F+βNLP2D)]
]
. (10)
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Not revealing after the AA reviews the industry is optimal if
VNR|review > VR|review or
α <αR
=
(1+ δ+ δ2) [piM − piN + (1− δ)(rF+βLPD)
−δp(1− δ)(piM − piN + F+βNLP2D)]
δ4p(piM − piN + F+βNLP2D)
. (11)
The threshold αR is downward sloping in the (α− p)-space as shown in the
example of Figure 1.2. If α < αR, it is not profitable to reveal the cartel once
the AA has started to review the industry. If either the proof probability
p or the review probability α or both are low, not revealing the cartel is
more profitable than a deviation to revealing. If the costs in case of proof
of the cartel (r, F,βNLP,D) increase or the competitive profit increases, the
threshold αR decreases.
Both constraints (α < αNC and α < αR) have to be satisfied for CNR to be
an SPE. A firm will only choose the strategy CNR if the review probability α
is lower than the review probability that makes the firm indifferent between
colluding and deviating in period t and between revealing and not revealing
once it is under review in period t+ 1. The following Lemma summarizes
the results from Equations (7) and (11):
Lemma 1.2. For given policy parameters (F, r,p,α) and enforcement parameters
(βLP,βNLP), the strategy CNR is an SPE if α < min {αNC,αR}.
Figure 1.2 shows a possible example of the position of the downward-
sloping functions αR and αNC. αR and αNC intersect at most once in p ∈
[0, 1]. Let pB define the intersection of αR and αNC. For high α (or low p),
αNC is always to the left of αR. Intuitively, if α = 1, firms know for sure
in period t already that they will get reviewed in period t+ 1. For CNR to
be an SPE, αNC has to bind. The incentive constraint to choose not revealing
after a review in period t+ 1 cannot be stricter than αNC because firms knew
already in period t that they will be reviewed for sure.
The constraint to reveal once under review can only be binding if αR and
αNC intersect in p ∈ [0, 1], which is the case if pB < 1 or r < rB.39 If the
reduction in the fine is too little (r > rB), αR is never binding and once a
firm decided for CNR in period t, a deviation to reveal in period t + 1 is
never profitable.
39 See Appendix for the derivation of rB.
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CNR and CR: Dominant Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Lemmata 1.1 and 1.2 define the conditions for a CR-SPE and a CNR-SPE.
Figure 1.2 shows an example of the SPE, depending on α and p. For all
(α,p)-combinations in the white area, NC is the equilibrium. For all (α,p)-
combinations in the dotted area, CR is an SPE. The grey area shows all
(α,p)-combinations for which CNR is an SPE. The grey and the dotted area
overlap so that for some α, p both CNR and CR are SPE. In this case firms
are assumed to choose the revelation action that maximizes their profit. The
strategy CNR dominates the strategy CR if VCNR > VCR or
p < pCNR =
(1+ δ+ δ2)(piM − piN + rF+βLPD)
δ(1+ δ)(piM − piN + F+βNLP2D)
. (12)
Lemma 1.3. If both strategies CR and CNR are subgame perfect equilibria, CNR
dominates CR if p < pCNR .
Figure 1.2: CR and CNR equilibria
Not revealing is more profitable than revealing if the probability of proof
is low. pCNR is the cut-off value of the proof probability p at which not re-
vealing is equally profitable as revealing once reviewed. Figure 1.2 shows
the intersection of the horizontal line αCR (below which CR is an SPE) with
the downward sloping curve αNC (below which CNR is preferred to devi-
ating from collusion) at pCNR. The following proposition summarizes the
dominant SPE of the game. Figure 1.A1 in the Appendix shows examples of
SPE, depending on the position of the threshold-curves.
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Proposition 1.1. Given the policy parameters (F, r,α,p) and the enforcement para-
meters (βLP,βNLP), the dominant SPE in the repeated game are defined as follows
in the (α− p)-space.
(i) The strategy not collude (NC) is the unique equilibrium strategy for
α > min {αNC,αR} ∧α > αCR.
(ii) The strategy collude and reveal (CR) is the dominant SPE for
α > min {αNC,αR}∧α < αCR and for α < min {αNC,αR}∧p ∈ [pCNR, 1].
(iii) The strategy collude and not reveal (CNR) is the dominant SPE for
α < min {αNC,αR} ∧ p ∈ [0,pCNR].
Proof. Follows from Lemmata 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.
Leniency programmes can have an anti-competitive and a pro-competitive
effect as shown by Motta and Polo (2003). CR can be an equilibrium for
values of α and p at which firms would not collude absent a leniency pro-
gramme (dotted white area in Figure 1.2). In these cases collusion would
not be profitable without the possibility to reveal and to receive a reduction
in fines. Only the reduction in fine makes it profitable to collude and to
reveal the cartel once reviewed by the AA. On the other hand, a leniency
programme can have a pro-competitive effect. If p > pCNR, the leniency
programme induces firms to choose CR instead of CNR for some values of
α,p and thereby increases cartel detection (dotted grey area to the right of
pCNR).
1.4 the impact of the private enforcement regime on
deterrence and disclosure
Depending on the private enforcement regime, firms in my model can be
more or less exposed to damages payments.40 The exposure to damages in-
fluences the values of the strategies CR and CNR and the threshold values
αCR, αR, αNC and pCNR which determine the equilibria. The following Lem-
mata 1.4 to 1.7 summarize the results of the comparative statics analysis of
changes in the private enforcement parameters βNLP and βLP. The intuition
of the results is given in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2.
Lemma 1.4 (αCR). An increase in the exposure to damages for revealing firms βLP
decreases the threshold αCR, below which CR is more profitable than a deviation to
not collude.
40 See 28 on partial exclusions from damages payments by law and effectively and 30 on the
relationship between the exposure to damages and the disclosure of leniency statements.
32 leniency programmes and private actions for damages
Lemma 1.5 (αNC). An increase in the exposure to damages for non-revealing firms
βNLP decreases the threshold αNC, below which CNR is more profitable than a
deviation to not collude in period t.
Lemma 1.6 (αR). An increase in the exposure to damages for non-revealing firms
βNLP decreases the threshold αR, below which CR is more profitable than a deviation
to reveal in period t+ 1. An increase in the exposure to damages for revealing firms
βLP increases the threshold αCR.
Lemma 1.7 (pCNR). An increase in the exposure to damages for non-revealing
firms βNLP decreases the threshold pCNR, below which CNR Pareto-dominates
CR. An increase in the exposure to damages for revealing firms βLP increases the
threshold pCNR.
Proof. ∂αCR∂βLP < 0,
∂αNC
∂βNLP
< 0, ∂αR∂βNLP < 0,
∂αR
∂βLP
> 0, ∂pCNR∂βNLP < 0,
∂pCNR
∂βLP
> 0.
1.4.1 Exposure to Damages for Non-revealing Firms
An increase in the exposure to damages for firms which do not cooperate
with the AA has three effects. Figure 1.3 shows on an example the changes
on the thresholds which define the equilibria of the game.
First, a ceteris paribus increase in the exposure to damages payments for
non-revealing firms (βNLP) decreases the value of the strategy CNR because
the expected costs from collusion increase. Below the threshold αNC, the
Figure 1.3: Increase in the exposure to damages claims for non-revealing firms
value of the CNR strategy is higher than the profit of a deviating from collu-
sion. If the exposure βNLP increases, the threshold αNC decreases (Lemma
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1.5). Second, the increase in the exposure to damages payments for non-
revealing firms decreases the value of sticking to the strategy of not reveal
once the AA has started a review. Revealing once the AA has reviewed
the industry becomes more profitable for firms because it prevents the in-
creased exposure to damages claims of non-revealing firms. The threshold
αR decreases (Lemma 1.6). The third effect of a higher exposure to damages
claims for non-revealing firms concerns the threshold pCNR above which CR
Pareto-dominates CNR if both strategies are SPE. The strategy CR yields a
higher profit than the strategy CNR if expected costs of the strategy CNR
increase (Lemma 1.7). The following proposition summarizes the effects:
Proposition 1.2. A ceteris paribus increase in the exposure to damages claims for
non-revealing firms decreases the value of the strategy CNR and the value of sticking
to the strategy CNR once reviewed by the AA. It follows that:
(i) The number of policy parameter combinations (α,p) for which NC is an SPE
increases.
(ii) The number of policy parameter combinations (α,p) for which a CR-SPE
Pareto-dominates a CNR-SPE increases if r < r.
(iii) The number of policy parameter combinations (α,p) for which CR is an SPE
instead of CNR increases if r < min {r, r̂}.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the exposure to damages for non-revealing firms increases, no collu-
sion can be an SPE for review and proof probabilities at which we had an
SPE with collusion before the increase in damages payments. Similar, CR
can become a dominant SPE for review and proof probabilities at which
the dominant SPE would be CNR without the increase of the damages pay-
ments. To summarize, the strategy CNR becomes less profitable compared to
NC as well as to CR. An increase in the exposure to damages payments for
non-revealing firms decreases collusion and increases the participation in
the leniency programme. Encouraging private enforcement of competition
law with the effect of higher exposure to damages for non-leniency firms
supports the objectives of the public enforcement of competition law by mak-
ing collusion without revealing less profitable compared to competition and
compared to collusion with revealing.
1.4.2 Exposure to Damages for Revealing Firms
A ceteris paribus increase in the exposure to damages for revealing firms
has three effects on the SPE of the game. Figure 1.4 shows on an example
the changes of the thresholds which define the equilibria of the game.
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Figure 1.4: Increase in the exposure to damages claims for revealing firms
First, an increase of βLP decreases the value of the strategy CR and makes
a deviation from collusion more profitable. The value αCR, which defines
a threshold between the CR-SPE and the NC-SPE, decreases (Lemma 1.4).41
Second, the value of a deviation once reviewed from not reveal to reveal de-
creases. The threshold αR at which firms are indifferent between not reveal
and reveal once reviewed increases (Lemma 1.6). Third, the threshold below
which the strategy CNR Pareto-dominates CR increases. The strategy CR
yields a lower profit than the strategy CNR if expected costs of the strategy
CR increase (Lemma 1.7). Proposition 1.3 summarizes these results:
Proposition 1.3. A ceteris paribus increase in the exposure to damages claims for
revealing firms decreases the value of the strategy CR and the value of a deviation
from not revealing to revealing once reviewed by the AA. It follows that:
(i) The number of policy parameter combinations (α,p) for which NC is an SPE
instead of CR increases if r < min {r, r̂} (i.e. whenever a dominant CR-SPE
exists).
(ii) The number of policy parameter combinations (α,p) for which NC is an SPE
instead of CNR decreases if r < rB ∧ r < r˜ (i.e. whenever αR binding for a
dominant CNR-SPE).
(iii) The number of policy parameter combinations (α,p) for which CNR Pareto-
dominates CR increases if r < r.
41 The pro-collusive effect of the leniency programme can be reduced by the downward shift
of αCR. The region of parameters at which CR is an SPE, but NC would be an SPE in the
absence of a leniency programme lies below αCR and above min {αNC,αR}.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Increasing the exposure to damages claims for leniency firms does not
have such clear cut effects on collusion as the increase in the exposure to
damages claims for non-revealing firms. On the one hand, NC can become
an SPE for review and proof probabilities at which the dominant SPE would
be CR without higher damages payments. Higher total cost once a cartel
is revealed makes the market action of CR less profitable compared to no
collusion. On the other hand, CNR can become an SPE for some for review
and proof probabilities at which NC would be the SPE without the increase
in damages payments. Deviating from the revelation action not reveal once
reviewed becomes less profitable and thereby reduces the incentive to de-
viate from CNR (to no collusion). The total effect on the number of policy
parameter combinations (α,p) for which NC is an SPE is therefore not clear
cut. There is no deterring effect of an increase in the exposure to damages
for revealing firms if no dominant CR-SPE exists (αCR is not binding for a
dominant SPE, r < min {r, r̂}). There is no pro-collusive effect if the revela-
tion constraint αR is not binding (r > rB ∧ r > r˜). In all other cases, the total
effect on the NC-SPE is ambiguous.
The effect on disclosure is unique: The number of policy parameter com-
binations (α,p) for which CNR Pareto-dominates CR increases as long as
there are (α,p)-combinations for which both CNR and CR are SPE (pCNR <
1 or r < r).
To summarize, encouraging private enforcement of competition law with
the effect of higher exposure to damages for firms which applied for leniency
on the one hand is at odds with the objectives of the public enforcement
of competition law by making revealing less profitable. On the other hand,
higher exposure to damages for leniency firms can have a deterring effect on
collusion, in this case private enforcement supports the objective of public
enforcement of competition law.
1.5 conclusion
In this chapter I show in an economic model how private enforcement of
competition law interacts with the public enforcement of competition law.
Actions for damages affect the incentives to collude and the incentives to ap-
ply for leniency. The exposure to damages payments of a convicted member
of a cartel can be defined by law or effectively and can vary between cartel
members who applied for immunity and members who did not apply for
immunity. The exposure to damages payments affects the firms’ incentives
to collude and to reveal the cartel by changing the value of collusion and
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the value of reporting. In particular, an increase of the exposure to damages
claims for non-revealing firms decreases the value of the strategy collude
and not reveal and it decreases the value of sticking to this strategy after the
AA has started an review of the industry. Because the strategy collude and
not reveal becomes less profitable, deterrence of cartels as well as disclosure
of cartels increase.
An increase of the exposure to damages claims for firms which received
immunity from fines affects the incentives differently. Higher expected costs
of revealing the cartel decrease the value of the strategy collude and reveal
and the value of a deviation from not revealing to revealing once reviewed
by the AA. Because the strategy collude and reveal becomes less profitable,
firms can get deterred from colluding. But because a deviation from the
strategy collude and not reveal, which leads to competition in the industry,
becomes less profitable, it can also be the case that more firms collude in-
stead of compete. Whether the first positive effect on deterrence outweighs
the negative effect depends on the parameter of the model. If the reduction
in fine for revealing is so low that revealing is not profitable for any anti-
trust policy, there is no effect on deterrence. If the reduction in fine is very
generous, there is only the positive effect on deterrence. An increase of the
exposure to damages claims for revealing firms clearly decreases the incen-
tives of a cartel to cooperate with the AA.
The results of my model show that the exposure to damages payments and
exemptions for leniency applicants have to be considered carefully. Simpli-
fying damages claims against non-revealing firms increases disclosure and
has a deterring effect. Private enforcement in this case supports the objec-
tives of the public enforcement to deter and disclose cartels. Simplifying
damages claims against revealing firms requires the AA to increase its ef-
forts of review and proof in order to keep the leniency programme attractive,
because firms’ costs of revealing increase. Private enforcement in this case
works against the public enforcement objective of disclosure of cartels. On
the other hand, simplifying damages claims against revealing firms can have
a deterring effect. Private enforcement may or may not strengthen the public
enforcement objective of deterrence.
My results do not only apply to damages actions. Injunctive relief, decla-
ration of nullity of contractual provisions and consensual dispute resolution
mechanisms of competition litigation such as out-of-courts-settlements, ar-
bitration and mediation are other remedies of private enforcement. All rem-
edies decrease the expected profit from collusion. The disclosure of informa-
tion in settlement cases may raise similar problems with follow-on damages
claims as the disclosure of leniency documents. The acknowledgement of
the participation in a cartel and the cooperation with the AA in exchange
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for a simplified procedure and a reduction in fines may bring the settling
parties in a weaker position in follow-on damages claims if the settlement
documents are available for the claimants.42 Because of the similarity of the
mechanisms and problems of settlement and leniency cases, my model can
also be applied to settlement cases.
Finally, it would be interesting to extend my model by relaxing some as-
sumptions. If the AA may make errors such as convicting a firm that is
not guilty, follow-on actions for damages have to be paid by firms with a
higher probability. Additionally, including stand-alone actions and class ac-
tions for damages would provide relevant insights on the effect on firms’
incentives to collude and/or report the collusion. Private stand-alone ac-
tions allow private litigants to take action against infringements which the
EC or the national AA would not pursue (because of limited resources) or
have not pursued so far. The possibility of stand-alone private actions for
infringements of competition law increases the expected cost of collusion.
Allowing for stand-alone actions in my model would increase the expec-
ted damages payments which cartel members have to pay. Injunctive relief
would decrease the profit from collusion. Furthermore, stand-alone actions
may increase the probability that the AA is able to prove a cartel.
42 European Union (2008) provides a summary of settlement cases in the EU. Interestingly,
leniency participants who also commit to settle can expect an additional reduction in fine.
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appendix 1.a
Intersection of the Thresholds αR, αNC and αCR
I first define the intersections of the functions αR, αNC and αCR to simplify
the description of the examples of SPE (see Figure 1.A1) and of the proofs of
Propositions 1.2 and 1.3.
• αCR = αNC at pCNR, with pCNR < 1 for
r < r =
Fδ(1+ δ) −D
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• pCNR < pR for r > r˜ = [piM + δ(1− δ)(piD − piN) − piN − δβLPD] /Fδ .
• αR = αNC at pB, with pB < 1 for
r < rB =
[
δβNLP2D−βLPD− piM + piN + δF+ δ
2(piN − piD)
]
/F. (14)
Examples of SPE Depending on the Reduction in Fine
I discuss four examples of the position of the functions αR, αNC and αCR
which define the SPE to simplify the understanding of the propositions and
the proofs. Figure 1.A1 illustrates these examples.
Example (i) shows an equilibrium outcome if the reduction in fine r is
low. The horizontal line αCR does not intersect with the downward sloping
curves αNC and αR in p ∈ [0, 1], which means that pCNR > pR > 1 or
r > r̂ and r > r. CR is an SPE if α < αCR, but CR is dominated by CNR
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example (i) example (ii)
example (iii) example (iv)
Figure 1.A1: The SPE depending on the fine reduction
because p < 1 < pCNR. Because the reduction in fine for revealing firms is
low, the incentives to collude and reveal are too low for all values of α and p.
Therefore, cooperating with the AA is not an equilibrium action. In example
(i), αR is not binding (as discussed on page 29), which means that deviating
from the revelation action is never profitable. This is the case if r > rB.
In example (ii) the reduction in fine is higher as in example (i) such that
0 < pR < 1 < pCNR or r̂ < r < r. The horizontal curve αCR intersects αR
at pR. CNR is the SPE below min {αNC,αR}. CR is preferred to NC for all
(α,p)-combinations below αCR. CNR dominates CR for all values at which
both strategies are SPE. The revelation constraint is binding, hence r < rB.
For high proof probabilities (p > pCNR) and review probabilities below αCR,
collusion with revealing once reviewed is optimal. For lower proof probabil-
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ities the reduction in the fine is too low to make it profitable to reveal once
reviewed compared to not revealing.
In example (iii) the reduction in fine is higher than in the previous ex-
amples such that we get 0 < pR < pCNR < 1. αCR intersects both αR and
αNC. Because the reduction in fine for revealing firms is higher than in ex-
amples (i) and (ii), the CR-SPE yields higher profits than the CNR-SPE for
proof probabilities p > pCNR.
In example (iv) the reduction in fine is even higher, such that 0 < pCNR <
pR < 1. Therefore, revealing dominates not-revealing for lower values of
the review and the proof probability than in the previous examples because
the low fine for revealing firms makes it profitable for firms to reveal after
colluding even if the proof and review probabilities are low.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Lemmata 1.5 and 1.6 show that both functions αNC and αR decrease if βNLP
increases. min {αNC,αR} defines the threshold below which CNR is more
profitable than NC for p < min {pR,pCNR}. (For p > min {pR,pCNR}, αCR >
min {αNC,αR} and min {αNC,αR} does not define the threshold between the
CNR-SPE and the NC-SPE. For an illustration of this case see Figure 1.A1,
examples (ii)–(iv).) Hence, by the downward shift of αNC and αR, there are
more (α,p)-combinations for which NC is an SPE.
By the downward shift of αR, the number of (α,p)-combinations for which
CR is an SPE instead of CNR increases if αR defines a threshold between the
CR-SPE and the CNR-SPE. min {αNC,αR} defines a lower bound for reveal-
ing for p > pR ∧ pR < pCNR, which is the same as r < min {r, r̂}. (See Figure
1.A1, examples (i) and (iv), for cases in which αR does not define a lower
bound for a dominant CR-SPE, because CR is never a dominant SPE or be-
cause CR dominates CNR for all p > pCNR > pR.)
Lemma 1.7 shows that pCNR, which defines the threshold below which the
CNR-SPE Pareto-dominates the CR-SPE, decreases with βNLP. Therefore, if
pCNR < 1 (or r < r), an increase of βNLP increases the number of (α,p)-
combinations for which CR is a dominant SPE instead of CNR.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
αCR is the threshold between the NC-SPE and the dominant CR-SPE if
αCR > min {αNC,αR} (or p > min {pR,pCNR} or r < min {r, r̂}). Lemma
1.4 shows that αCR decreases with βLP. A downward shift of the threshold
between the SPE of CR and NC increases the number of (α,p)-combinations
for which NC is an SPE instead of CR.
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Lemma 1.6 shows that αR increases with βLP. αR defines the threshold
between the CNR and the NC-SPE if αR is binding for a CNR-SPE, which is
the case for r < rB. For αCR > αR (or r > r˜), αR does not define the threshold
between the CNR-SPE and the NC-SPE. Therefore, the upward shift of the
threshold αR decreases the number of (α,p)-combinations for which NC is
an SPE instead of CNR if r < rB ∧ r < r˜ (see Figure 1.A1, examples (ii) and
(iii)).
Lemma 1.7 shows that pCNR, which defines the threshold below which
the CNR-SPE Pareto-dominates the CR-SPE, increases with βLP. Therefore,
if pCNR < 1 (or r < r), an increase of βLP increases the number of (α,p)-
combinations for which CNR is a dominant SPE instead of CR.

2
O N T H E S TA B I L I T Y O F PAT E N T P O O L S
2.1 introduction
The number of patents declared essential and incorporated in a technolo-
gical standard has increased extremely during the past few decades. Because
standards play a key role for the adoption and interoperability of technology,
also mechanisms to make the patent inflation around standardization tracta-
ble gain importance.1
A patent pool is one of these mechanisms to coordinate the strategies of
patent owners with respect to their licensing. A patent pool of standard-
essential patents bundles the patents that are essential for the implementa-
tion of a standard and jointly markets these patents.2 First, a patent pool
addresses the need for transactional manageability if individual licensing is
too costly. Because producers otherwise have to deal with a high number
of patents to manufacture a good without infringing IP rights, the pool can
work as a ’one-stop-shop’ to access a technology’s IP rights and thereby re-
duces transaction cost. Second, a patent pool reduces total royalties. If patent
owners set their royalty independently of each other, the market is horizon-
tally disintegrated and royalties are excessively high. By bundling and jointly
licensing essential patents in a patent pool, the so called ’complements prob-
lem’ can be reduced or even solved and the royalty can be efficiently low.
The multiple interaction of patent owners and licensees in order to produce
one product also leads to a double mark-up effect due to the disintegrated
market from patent owners to producers to consumers.
Even though a patent pool reduces or even solves the complements prob-
lem and thereby increases profits for the patent owners as well as it decreases
total royalties, patent owners may have an incentive not to join a patent pool.
Participation in a patent pool is voluntary. I analyse the incentive compat-
1 Standards incorporate more and more inventions, each of them being subject to several pat-
ents. There are also extreme cases: The standard UMTS accounts for 11,000 and the standard
3GPP for 15,000 patent declarations (Baron and Pohlman, 2012). One of the standard setting
organizations, the International Organization for Standardization, has published more than
19,500 international standards covering almost all aspects of technology and business since
1947.
2 Different definitions of essentiality exist: A patent is seen as legally essential to a standard if
the standard cannot be implemented without infringing on this patent. If a patent is commer-
cially essential the standard is refused by the consumers without this patent (Layne-Farrar
and Lerner, 2011).
43
44 on the stability of patent pools
ibility of the membership in a patent pool and show how the incentives to
free-ride on a patent pool depend on the fraction of patent owners included
in a patent pool.
One of the first modern patent pools established around the widely adopted
standard for digital video compression, the MPEG-2 standard. In the 1990s
the standard faced a patent thicket and in 1997 the MPEG-2 patent pool was
formed, including 880 essential patents in 57 countries owned by 25 patent
owners. The prevalence of patent pools has significantly increased after the
approval of the MPEG-2 and the following DVD patent pools by the U.S.
Department of Justice in 1997 and 1999. Figure 2.1 gives a non-exhaustive
overview of the development of patent pools by industries. Barnett (2014)
finds 38 patent pools or similar joint patent agreements in the information
and telecommunication industry from 1995 to 2013 and the data by Baron
and Pohlman’s (2012) on the declaration of essential patents from 1992-2010
to the main formal standard setting organizations includes 48 patent pools.
Baron and Pohlman (2011) dataset includes 43 patent pools but also 11 failed
attempts to form a patent pool.
Even though the number of patent pools is increasing, for many standards
we observe no attempt to form a pool, the existence of incomplete pools or
failed attempts to form a pool.3
Figure 2.1: Number of patent pools established from 1995-2012 (Source: den Uijl et
al., 2013, p.2)4
3 For example, in the case of the DVD standard or the Blu-ray Disc standards, several pat-
ent pools formed. No patent pool formed after discussions for IEEE802.3af and IEEE802.3at
Power Over Ethernet standards and also for WiMAX technology. In another case, five com-
patibility standards for 3G mobile telecommunication tried to form a patent pool each, in the
end only a pool on one standard formed.
4 This figure provides a non-exhaustive overview of data which is derived from multiple
sources: Serafino (2007) and websites from various licence administrators such as MPEG
LA, SISVEL, Via Licensing and SIPRO LAB.
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I focus on these problems in establishing patent pools including (all) pat-
ents that are essential for a given standard. The incentive compatibility of the
membership in a patent pool and therefore the stability of a patent pool is de-
termined by the number of patent owners inside the pool and the number of
patent owners who license their patent individually outside the patent pool.
I apply a farsighted stability concept that has not been used in other models
of patent pools to analyse stability. According to this concept, patent owners
foresee not only changes in royalties and in profits but also changes in the
size of the patent pool following a deviation. I provide a general algorithm
to define the farsighted stable set of patent pool outcomes and apply the
algorithm to a model of linear demand and price leadership of the patent
pool.
I find that in equilibrium patent pools can be farsightedly stable including
all or a fraction of all patents, depending on the number of patents. Assum-
ing farsighted rather than myopic patent owners results in a set of stable
outcomes rather than a unique stable outcome. In farsightedly stable out-
comes, the fraction of patent owners who join the patent pool can be higher
as in the unique myopically stable outcome if the number of patent owners
is at least six. My analysis shows that a complete break-up of a patent pool
is never a farsightedly stable outcome and a grand patent pool including
all patents can be farsightedly stable even if the number of patent owners is
high.
Much of the economic literature on patent pools focuses on the interac-
tion with standards, the effect on innovation and the role in competition
policy. I focus on the incentive compatibility of patent pools. Not many at-
tempts have been made to examine the incentives to participate in a patent
pool. Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) empirically investigate which factors
influence patent pool participation rates. In their data, the participation rate
ranges from 30-60%. They find that vertical integration and symmetry in pat-
ent quality have a positive effect on the participation rate, whereas a numeric
proportional sharing rule of pool profits slightly decreases the participation
rate.
Several models show how standard setting rules affect the formation of
patent pools. In Lévêque and Ménière (2011), the formation of a stable patent
pool fails if firms decide on their licensing strategy after the standard is
set. A stable patent pool is possible if firms commit to join the patent pool
before the standard is set.5 Llanes and Poblete (2014) analyse the interaction
of standard setting and patent pool formation if the standard has not yet
5 Lévêque and Ménière (2011) apply the myopic stability concept, which is discussed in detail
in Section 2.3. They find that a grand pool is only stable if there are at most three firms which
hold essential patents.
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developed and show that an ex ante agreement on patent pool formation is
welfare increasing compared to ex post negotiations.6
Brenner (2009) describes the patent pool formation as a coalition formation
with sequential proposals and acceptance/rejection decisions and shows
that compulsory individual licensing and exclusive pool membership sta-
bilize welfare enhancing pools. Aoki and Nagaoka (2005) also analyse the
formation process of a patent pool in a coalition formation model based on
Maskin (2003). Patent owners sequentially decide on their participation by
negotiating with the pool members. A grand coalition can only form if the
number of agents is small, otherwise an outsider exists even though the re-
maining firms prefer a grand coalition. Aoki (2005) shows in a theoretical
analysis that free-riding of outsiders on the patent pool and heterogeneous
firms are two obstacles to the stability of a grand patent pool which bundles
essential patents. By assuming that a patent pool exists in any case, Aoki
(2005) shows that a single patent owner can always increase his profit by
licensing his patent independently. Schmidt (2010) points out that in Aoki’s
(2005) model a patent pool must not always exist. By allowing more than one
patent owner to licence his patent outside the pool, it might be that a grand
patent pool exists because being one of several outsiders is not profitable or
that the patent pool dissolves completely if a patent owner deviates from the
grand pool.
The interaction of a group of firms, which sets prices and acts as a leader,
and other firms that do not belong to the group and react to the group’s be-
haviour does also exist in cartels. A cartel offers similar free-riding incentives
as a patent pool. Contrary to essential patent owners in a patent pool, firms
in a cartel produce substitutable goods and therefore cooperation decreases
consumer welfare and increases prices. D’Aspremont et al. (1983) provide a
theoretical model in which an industry is characterized by a price-leading
cartel and fringe firms, which take the price of the cartel as given. They show
that for a finite number of firms a stable cartel always exists, despite the free-
riding of the firms which do not join the cartel. Several studies built on this
model. Donsimoni et al. (1986) show the uniqueness of a stable cartel under
particular cost parameters and find that the relative size of stable cartels is
decreasing in the number of firms in the market. Prokop (1999) focuses on
the process of cartel formation rather than the stability of cartels. The se-
quential move game supports the findings of D’Aspremont et al. (1983) but
with simultaneous moves it can be impossible to form a stable cartel. Shaffer
(1995) assumes that the cartel behaves as a Stackelberg leader and the com-
6 Llanes and Poblete (2014) define a patent pool as incentive compatible also applying the
concept of myopic stability. If several pools are incentive compatible they assume that the
largest pool forms.
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petitive fringe firms react strategically to the cartel. In his model with linear
demand and constant marginal costs, firms only form a grand coalition if
the number of firms in the market is below five. If the number of firms is
larger, a bare majority of firms join the cartel.7
Diamantoudi (2005) criticizes the cartel stability definition used by D’Aspre-
mont et al. (1983) because it misses the farsightedness in the consequences
of a firm’s decision.8 She points out that in the model by D’Aspremont et al.
(1983), firms are able to anticipate changes in profits due to price changes
of an entry/exit. But firms do not anticipate that the change in cartel and
outsider profits due to their action can induce other firms to change their
status as cartelist or fringe firm. Diamantoudi (2005) proposes a notion of
farsighted stability and shows that there always exists a unique, non-empty
farsightedly stable set.
Apart from Diamantoudi’s (2005) short example to illustrate the concept
of farsighted stability, the concept of farsighted stability has not been applied
to models of cartel or patent pool stability. Also other strands of economic
research that deal with coalition stability such as environmental agreements
or network and team formation have rarely applied the farsighted stabil-
ity concept. Because farsighted behaviour of patent owners has not been as-
sumed so far in models of patent pool stability, the application of the concept
of farsighted behaviour provides an interesting and new approach to analyse
patent pool stability. I apply Diamantoudi’s (2005) definition of farsighted
stability to a model of patent pool stability and define an algorithm to de-
rive the set of farsightedly stable patent pool outcomes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I
introduce a model of licensing of essential patents and compare royalties
and profits in the cases of no integration, partial integration and full integ-
ration in a patent pool. I also analyse the effects that drive a deviation from
the patent pool. Section 2.3 discusses the concepts of myopic and farsighted
stability. I define an algorithm to solve for the set of farsightedly stable out-
comes. In Section 2.4, I apply the algorithm to my model, assuming linear
demand and price leadership of the patent pool. Section 2.5 concludes.
7 Konishi and Lin (1999) built on the model by Shaffer (1995) and proof the existence of a stable
cartel under fairly general demand and cost condition. They also show that the size of the
stable cartel is smaller with a price-taking fringe a la D’Aspremont et al. (1983) compared to
the situation when fringe firms play a Cournot game, anticipating the price of the cartel. Zu
et al. (2012) provide an analytical approach to determine the size of the stable cartel assuming
a Cournot fringe with linear demand and quadratic cost functions.
8 The definition of myopic stability has already been criticized by Fisher (1898).
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2.2 the model
In order to study the incentives of patent owners to become a member of
a patent pool, I consider a model with two stages. At the first stage, patent
owners decide individually whether or not they license their patent in a
patent pool. I assume that only one patent pool is allowed. At the second
stage, patent owners license their patents to producers, which pay a royalty
in exchange for using the patented technology.
At the second stage, there are n firms in the upstream market, each of
them having one patent that is essential to produce the same product on the
downstream market. The patents are perfect complements, i.e. each of the n
patents is needed to produce the product without infringing on some patent.
Let ri be the royalty charged by firm i for the licence to use its patent for the
production of one product. I assume that the downstream market is perfectly
competitive and each producer pays the same (cumulative) royalties. Produ-
cers are symmetric and have the same production cost. Producers charge a
price for the product which is equal to their perceived marginal cost c plus
their licensing costs: p = c+
∑n
i=1 ri. The demand for the product is given
by the function Q(p) which is decreasing in the market price p.
At the first stage, firms decide how to license their patent. I differentiate
between three ways of licensing. In the case of no integration (NI), each firm
licenses its patent independently and non-cooperatively. Each firm chooses
a royalty rNIi which maximizes its profit. Each producer has to pay royalties
n rNIi for the production of one product. In the case of full integration (FI)
all firms license their patents in a single grand patent pool. The pool royalty
rFI for the whole portfolio of essential patents maximizes joint profits of all
firms. I assume that the joint pool royalty is shared by a numeric propor-
tional rule among the participating firms and each firm receives rFI/n per
licence bundle sold.9 In the case of partial integration (PI) only k out of n
firms license their patents in a bundle and n− k firms license their patent
outside the pool and choose their royalty non-cooperatively.10 The pool roy-
alty rPI for the portfolio of patents included in the patent pool is shared by
a numeric proportional rule among the participating firms and each firm
9 A numeric proportional sharing rule is often observed, e.g. in patent pools such as 1394,
AVC, DVB-T, MPEG-2, MPEG-4 and WCDMA. See Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) for an
overview of existing profit sharing rules and a discussion about the effects of the different
sharing rules on patent pool participation.
10 I do not differentiate which k out of n firms will join the pool, because firms are assumed
to be symmetric. It is also common in models on cartel stability not to differentiate between
firms in case they are symmetric. Boyer and Moreaux (1987) and Gal-Or (1985) discuss the
roles of leader and follower and their implications on the outcome.
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receives rPI/k per licence bundle sold. Each of the firms outside the pool
requests a royalty of rPIi .
2.2.1 The Complements Problem
Shapiro (2001) identified the similarities between the classical complements
problem analysed by Cournot (1838) and the situation when several firms
hold essential patents. He concludes that the bundling of complementary
patents reduces consumer prices as well as it increases patent owners’ profits.
Amongst others, the U.S. Department of Justice & the Federal Trade Com-
mission (1995), the Japan Fair Trade Commission (2007) and the European
Union (2014a) adopted in their guidelines on patent pools that patent pools
consisting of complementary patents may provide pro-competitive benefits
because these pools can be effective in reducing total royalties and decreas-
ing consumer prices compared to independent licensing. In contrast, pools
of substitute patents rather harm consumer welfare.11
Because the focus of this model is on the stability of patent pools and
not on antitrust issues, I assume that all patents are clearly identified to be
complements. The essentiality makes each patent owner a monopolist for
the licence of his patent. Independent licensing results in higher cumulated
royalties compared to the royalty of jointly licensing.
Lemma 2.1. The cumulative royalty of all patents is lower if firms license their
patents as a bundle compared to independent licensing:
rFI < rPI +
n−k∑
i=1
rPIi <
n∑
i=1
rNIi .
Proof. See Appendix.
Each firm that prices its patent non-cooperatively increases the cumulative
royalty and the price of the product. In the PI case, the firms in the pool set
their royalty jointly and partly internalize the externality of their royalty on
the profit of the other firms inside the pool. Firms outside the pool set their
royalties non-cooperatively, therefore the cumulative royalty of the pool and
of the outsider firms is in between the pool royalty rFI and the cumulative
11 Legislative authorities as well as academic scholars are aware of the problems that come with
the categorization of patents. Different tests for essentiality and complementarity are known
and in practice. If the patent pool is built upon an existing standard, evaluation of essentiality
is easier to conduct. Usually the standard setting organization (SSO) decides for one out of
several substitute technologies to be included in the standard, therefore patents within the
standard are supposed to be complements. After the standard is set, all patents included in
the standard are essential to produce a good based on the specific standard. Because of the
difficulties of categorization the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it will review the
inclusion of patents in a patent pool according to the rule of reason.
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royalty in the NI case. Because the royalty in the FI case is always lower
than the royalty in the NI case, the product price is lower and the demand
for the product and for the patent bundle increases. The internalization of
the royalty interdependence leads to higher cumulative profits if patents are
bundled:
Lemma 2.2. Cumulative profits of all firms are higher with patent bundling than
with independent licensing:
n∑
i=1
piFIi >
k∑
i=1
pi
PIp
i +
n−k∑
i=1
piPIoi >
n∑
i=1
piNIi .
Lemma 2.2 follows from Lemma 2.1 and from the assumptions on the
demand and the downstream market. Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 show that
not only consumers benefit from the bundling of patents in a pool through
lower prices (due to a lower cumulative royalty). Also firms’ profits increase
through bundling. This raises the question why many patent pools fail to
form even though they provide benefits for the patent owners. I will address
this question in the following section.
2.2.2 Firms’ Licensing Strategies and Free-Riding
The formation of a patent pool reduces the cumulative royalty that has to
be paid by the producers in order to comply with the standard. With a com-
petitive product market this decrease in costs leads to a decrease in product
price and to an increase in the demand for the product. A patent pool creates
a free-rider incentive because even though a firm does not join the patent
pool, it benefits if other firms reduce the cumulative royalty by bundling.
Each firm can decide not to join the pool and to free-ride on the pool’s effect
of increased demand through a lower cumulative royalty. Because producers
have no other choice but to buy both the pool’s licence and the outsider’s(s’)
licence(s) in order to produce the product, each outsider firm can license its
patent at a royalty that is higher than the per firm royalty in the pool.
When deciding whether to join the pool, firms compare their profit from
licensing independently with the profit from licensing their patent in a pat-
ent pool. As shown in Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2, an exit from the grand
pool does not only increase the cumulative royalty but also reduces the cu-
mulative profit of the firms. Two effects influence a firm’s decision to join
the patent pool. A firm can increase its profit by licensing independently
rather than licensing in the pool. But since the cumulative royalty increases,
the demand for all patents and the profit of all firms decrease.
In order to discuss the incentives for firms to join a pool or to remain as
an outsider in more detail I introduce two assumptions. In the following
these assumptions always hold unless mentioned otherwise. I assume the
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market demand function to be of linear form Q(p) = A− bp with A,b > 0.
This assumption simplifies the analysis and allows comparisons with related
models of cartel stability. Furthermore, I assume that the pool behaves as a
price leader compared to the outsiders when it sets its pool royalty. Each
outsider firm maximizes its profit by licensing independently, taking the
pool royalty as given. In the following I describe the equilibrium royalties
and profits in the cases of NI, FI and PI.
No Integration
Each firm i = 1, ...,n sets its royalty to maximize its profit:
max
ri
pii = (A− b(c+
n∑
i=1
ri))ri yields the patent royalty
rNIi =
A− bc
b(n+ 1)
(1)
and the firm profit
piNIi =
(A− bc)2
b(n+ 1)2
. (2)
Full Integration
The patent pool sets its royalty to maximize its profit:
max
r
pi = (A− b(c+ r))r yields the pool royalty
rFI =
A− bc
2b
, (3)
the pool profit
piFI =
(A− bc)2
4b
(4)
and the per firm profit piFIi =
piFI
n , i = 1, ...,n.
Partial Integration
The pool as a Stackelberg leader sets its royalty to maximize profits:
max
rPIp
piPIp = (A− b(c+ rPIp − (n− k)rPIoi ))r
PIp with i = 1, ...,n− k
yields the pool royalty
rPIp =
A− bc
2b
. (5)
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Each outsider firm i = 1, ...,n− k maximizes its profits by taking the pool
royalty as given:
max
rPIi
pi
PIp
i = (A− b(c+ r
PIo
i + (n− k− 1)r
PIo
j − r
PIp))rPIi with j 6= i
yields the outsider royalty
rPIoi =
A− bc
2b(n− k+ 1)
. (6)
The profit of the pool is given by
piPIp =
(A− bc)2
4b(n− k+ 1)
(7)
with a profit piPIpi =
piPIp
k per firm i = 1, ...,k in the pool.
The profit of each outsider firm i = 1, ...,n− k is
piPIoi =
(A− bc)2
4b(n− k+ 1)2
. (8)
As shown in Lemma 2.2, total profits of the firms are maximized by bun-
dling all patents in one grand pool. But a single firm can increase its profit
by not joining the pool:
Proposition 2.1. A unilateral deviation from the grand pool increases profits for a
single firm if more than four firms exist: piFIi (n) < pi
PIo
i (n− 1) for n > 4.
pili(n) denotes the profit of a firm i in case l = {FI,NI,PI} with n firms in
the patent pool. Proposition 2.1 shows that it is profitable for firm i to be the
single outsider that licenses its patent independently if more than four firms
exist. Because of the essentiality of each patent, the demand for the pool
bundle and for each individually licensed patent is the same. The demand
for all licences of the product is Q(
∑n
i=1 ri).
12 Because the producers have
to buy all licences, Q(
∑n
i=1 ri) is the demand for the whole bundle and
also the demand for any of the patents if they are sold independently. For
example, if there is one pool and one outsider, the demand for each patent
is Q(rPI + rPIo).
Because the patent pool sets its royalty first and the outsider follows, the
profit of the patent pool is larger than the profit of the outsider firm. This
means that although the pool and the outsider are faced with the same de-
mand, they do not share total profits equally. But the outsider owns a larger
share of total profits compared to one of the pool members.
12 Q is the demand for the product as well as for the bundle of essential patents because each
product requires one bundle of all patents.
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The effect on demand and the effect on the share of total profits determine
whether a firm licenses its patent in a bundle or independently. These effects
are described in more detail in the following.
Profit Share Effect
Independent licensing can increase a firm’s share of the cumulative profit
from the licence of all patents. Let Π(k) denote the cumulative profit of all
firms, k pool members and (n − k) outsiders. The share of an outsider’s
profit on cumulative profits with k frims in the patent poiol is given by:
pso(k) =
piPIoi (k)
Π(k) . Similar, a pool member’s share of profits on cumulative
profits is given by psp(k) = pi
PIp
i (k)
Π(k) . Inserting the profits derived in Section
2.2.2 we get the following result:
Proposition 2.2. Independent licensing increases a firm’s share on total profits
compared to licensing in the pool, if k > n2 + 2 for k even and k >
n
2 + 2.5 for k
odd. The difference in the profit shares decreases with the number of outsider firms.
Proof. pso(k− 1) − psp(k) = pi
o
i (k−1)
Π(k−1) −
pi
p
i (k)
Π(k) =
1
2n−2k+3 −
n−k+1
k(2n−2k−1) > 0
for k > (3+ 3n−
√
(n− 3)(n+ 1))/4. Restricting k to the domain of natural
numbers gives k > n2 + 2 for k even and k >
n
2 + 2.5 for k odd. The difference
is decreasing in (n− k) because ∂(ps
o(k−1)−psp(k))
∂k > 0.
The profit share of an outsider is higher than the profit share of a pool
member if the number of outsiders is low enough/the number of firms in the
pool is high enough. In the patent pool, each firm receives a share of 1k of the
pool’s profits, which is a share of n−k+1k(2n−2k−1) of total profits. Each outsider
earns a share of 12n−2k−1 of total profits. The increase in the profit share due
to an exit decreases with the number of firms licensing individually.
Demand Effect
Lemma 2.1 shows that the cumulative royalty increases with the number of
patents licensed independently. Because consumers’ demand for the product
decreases as the cumulative royalty for producers increases, each firm which
licenses its patent as an outsider of the pool has a negative effect on the
demand for the patents.13
Proposition 2.3. Licensing as an outsider compared to licensing in the pool de-
creases the demand for all patents. This negative effect on the demand decreases with
the number of firms who license their patents individually.
13 The effect on demand is the same for all patents because all patents are requested equally by
producers.
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Proof. ∂Q
∂
∑
r
∂
∑
r
∂k > 0 ,
∂Q
∂
∑
r
∂
∑
r
∂k
∂
∂k > 0
If the profit share of a firm ceteris paribus increases, its profit increases. If
demand ceteris paribus decreases, an outsider’s and a pool member’s profit
decrease. As shown in Proposition 2.1, a single deviation from a grand patent
pool can be profitable. This means that the profit share effect might outweigh
the demand effect. Because the profit share effect decreases with the number
of outsiders and the demand effect always has a negative impact on profits,
it is not profitable to license individually if too many firms license outside
the pool. This leads us to the concept of stability.
2.3 stability concepts and stable patent pools
2.3.1 Comparison of Myopic and Farsighted Stability
Most models on the stability of cartels use the notion of internal and external
stability. Internal and external stability can be defined in a farsighted or
in a myopic concept. Myopic stability (as applied in D’Aspremont et al.,
1983)) and farsighted stability differ in the way how agents compare profits
at the status quo to profits after a deviation. Applying the myopic stability
approach, agents compare their profit at the status quo outcome with their
profit after their deviation, thereby taking into account the changes in prices,
quantities and profits, but not taking into account any subsequent deviations
by other agents.
Applying the myopic stability concept to my model of patent pools gives
the following definition:
Definition 2.1. An outcome is defined as myopically stable if it satisfies internal
myopic stability (IMS) and external myopic stability (EMS). Internal myopic stabil-
ity is satisfied if piPIpi (k) > pi
PIo
i (k− 1) and external myopic stability is satisfied if
piPIoi (k) > pi
PIp
i (k+ 1).
A patent pool satisfies IMS if a firm’s profit as one out of k members of
the pool is higher than its royalty-adjusted profit as an outsider with k− 1
members in the pool. Staying inside the pool is more profitable than leaving
the pool. The pool fulfils EMS if a firm’s profit as an outsider to the pool
with k firms in the pool is higher than its royalty-adjusted profit as one out
of k+ 1 pool members. A firm compares its status quo profit with the de-
viation profit, thereby taking into account the adjustments in royalties but
not considering a change in the size of the coalition due to a subsequent
deviation. Firms in this stability concept are myopic in the sense that they ig-
nore reactions by other firms. As a consequence, the outcome they compare
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their status quo with may not be the final outcome that prevails after their
deviation.
In the farsighted stability concept, each agent fully anticipates the reac-
tions of all other agents. If an agent considers deviating, he compares his
status quo profit to his profit in the stable outcome after his deviation.
Diamantoudi’s (2005) definition of a farsightedly stable outcome is based on
the stable set defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). The stable
set is a solution set, i.e. a collection of outcomes which are stable, while
those excluded from the solution set are unstable. Agents are farsighted and
compare their outcome only with outcomes included in the stable set when
considering a deviation, because all other unstable outcomes will result in
additional deviations until a new stable outcome is reached. Any stable out-
come cannot be dominated by any other stable outcome. It can be dominated
by an unstable outcome, but the deviation from a stable to a dominating un-
stable outcome is never credible. Any unstable outcome is dominated by a
stable outcome.
To illustrate the definition of dominance, consider the following example.
An outcome A is dominated by an outcome B, if profits in outcome B are
higher, given that outcome B can actually be reached from outcome A. In-
direct dominance is thereby sufficient, meaning that if an outcome B is pre-
ferred to an outcome A, but B cannot directly be reached from A but via
outcome C, which is also dominated by B, than outcome B can be reached
indirectly from outcome A. Hence B indirectly dominates A.14 Figure 2.2
illustrates this concept of indirect dominance.
Figure 2.2: Dominance criterion of the farsightedly stable set
Assuming that each agent acts independently and only one coalition can
be formed, Diamantoudi (2005) shows the existence of a unique stable set,
containing one or several stable outcomes. This means that there is only one
set of stable outcomes with one or more stable outcomes but no other set con-
taining different stable outcomes. My definition of patent pool stability and
14 Harsanyi (1974) remarked on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1953) stable set approach
that for forward looking agents indirect dominance suffices to reach an outcome. Diaman-
toudi (2005) replaces the requirement of direct dominance used by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1953) with indirect dominance.
56 on the stability of patent pools
the farsightedly stable set follows from Diamantoudi’s (2005) application of
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1953) stable set approach.
Definition 2.2. An outcome is defined as farsightedly stable if it satisfies internal
farsighted stability (IFS) and external farsighted stability (EFS). IFS is satisfied if no
firm inside the pool wants to exit, comparing its status quo with the stable outcome
that is reached after its deviation. EFS is satisfied if no firm outside the pool wants
to enter the pool, comparing its status quo with the stable outcome that is reached
after its deviation.
Definition 2.3. All stable patent pool outcomes included in the farsightedly stable
set are farsightedly stable, whereas all outcomes excluded from the farsightedly stable
set are unstable. Any outcome in the farsightedly stable set cannot be dominated by
any other outcome in the farsightedly stable set (IFS). Any outcome excluded from
the farsightedly stable set is dominated by an outcome in the farsightedly stable set
(EFS). Dominance requires preference and feasibility, meaning that the dominance
of outcome a over outcome b requires that a is preferred over b and that a can (at
least indirectly) be induced from b.
Diamantoudi (2005) also shows that the myopically stable outcome is al-
ways contained in the farsightedly stable set. The unique myopically stable
outcome is always the outcome in the farsightedly stable set with the small-
est coalition size. This outcome satisfies IFS and EFS. EFS is satisfied because
if it is unprofitable for one agent to exit the coalition, it cannot be profitable
for more than one agent to exit the coalition because the surplus from leav-
ing the coalition decreases with every outsider (see Propositions 2.2 and 2.3).
It satisfies IFS, because any exit will be followed by an entry that restores
the outcome. The stable outcome to compare the status quo with when con-
sidering an entry or exit is the status quo itself.
As shown in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, the more firms license their patent
independently, the lower is the gain from independent licensing. Leaving
the pool might be profitable for a firm if no or just some other firms sub-
sequently exit the pool, but it becomes unprofitable if too many other firms
follow the exit.
The following example applies the farsighted and the myopic stability
concept to point out the difference in the concepts. Table 2.1 shows the
profits of an firm outside the pool (piPIoi ) and the profits of a firm inside
the pool (piPIpi ), depending on the number of firms (n) and the number of
firms in the pool (k). The examples use b, c = 1,A = 10. In example A, n = 5,
in example B, n = 7.
First, we derive the stable patent pool outcome applying the myopic sta-
bility concept (Definition 2.1). The grand pool does not satisfy IMS, because
the profit of firm i is higher if it leaves the pool compared to the profit of
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Profits per patent owner
example A: n = 5 example B: n = 7
k piPIoi pi
PIp
i pi
PIo pi
PIp
i
n – 4.05 – 2.89
n-1 5.06 2.53 5.06 1.69
n-2 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.35
n-3 1.26 2.53 1.27 1.27
n-4 0.81 4.05 0.81 1.35
n-5 0.56 1.69
n-6 0.41 2.89
Table 2.1: Example of myopic and farsighted stability
being one out of five pool members: piPIoi (4) = 5.06 > pi
PIp
i (5) = 4.05. A pool
with four members and one outsider satisfies IMS. No firm has an incentive
to leave the pool because the profit of being a pool member is higher than
the profit of being one out of two outsiders: piPIpi (4) = 2.53 > 2.25 = pi
PIo
i (3).
This outcome also satisfies EMS, because the single outsider has higher
profits outside the pool and therefore does not want to enter the pool. The
outcome with one outsider satisfies EMS and IMS, therefore it is myopically
stable. The profits of this outcome are double-underlined in Table 2.1.
In example B with n = 7, the grand patent pool does not satisfy IMS:
pi
PIp
i (7) = 2.89 < 5.06 = pi
PIo
i (6). A pool with six firms in the pool does also
not satisfy IMS: piPIpi (6) = 1.69 < 2.25 = pi
PIo
i (5). The outcome with five
firms in the patent pool satisfies IMS, because none of the firms inside the
pool can gain higher profits by setting its royalty independently: piPIpi (5) =
1.35 > 1.27 = piPIoi (4). It satisfies EMS because none of the outsiders can
gain higher profits by joining the pool: piPIpi (6) = 1.69 < 2.25 = pi
PIo
i (5). The
outcome with two outsiders is the unique myopically stable outcome.
In the following I apply the farsighted stability concept as defined in Def-
inition 2.2 to example A and B. In example A, the outcome with four firms
in the pool and one outsider is myopically stable. The myopically stable out-
come is also farsightedly stable. There are no subsequent reactions to the
deviation of one firm from the patent pool, because it is not profitable for
any firm to react. The grand pool does not satisfy IFS because comparing a
firm’s profit inside the grand patent pool with the final outcome after a de-
viation from the grand pool shows that the outcome with one outsider and
four firms in the pool yields higher profits: piPIoi (4) = 5.06 > pi
PIp
i (5) = 4.05.
58 on the stability of patent pools
This is different in example B, in which subsequent reactions to a devi-
ation are profitable. The unique myopically stable outcome is as always
also farsightedly stable. The outcome satisfies IFS because no firm inside
the pool has an incentive to deviate from the pool. The outcome also sat-
isfies EFS because no outsider has an incentive to join the pool. Starting
from a grand pool, a firm thinking of deviating has to compare its status
quo profit with the outcome that is reached after its deviation. If one firms
deviates, another firm will also leave the pool, therefore the outcome with
one outsider and profits of piPIoi (6) = 5.06 is not farsightedly stable and
does not serve as a comparison outcome to the status quo. Comparing the
profit of in the grand patent pool with the farsightedly stable outcome with
two outsiders shows that a deviation from the grand pool is not profitable:
pi
PIp
i (7) = 2.89 > 2.25 = pi
PIo
i (5). A grand pool satisfies IFS and therefore
is farsightedly stable. The profits of the farsightedly stable outcomes which
are not myopically stable are single-underlined in Table 2.1.
Both farsightedly stable outcomes are included in the farsightedly stable
set, even though the outcome with the grand pool Pareto dominates the
outcome with two outsiders. A single firm cannot induce the grand pool
from the outcome with two outsiders. If one outsider enters the patent pool
in order to form a grand pool, it is profitable for another firm to leave the
pool. Only a combined action of two firms would make the grand pool pos-
sible, but firms are assumed to act non-cooperatively. Figure 2.A1 in the Ap-
pendix extends the example for n = 4, ..., 15 to further illustrate the circular
approach of the definition of farsighted stability.
2.3.2 The Farsightedly Stable Set of Patent Pool Outcomes
In the following I define a general algorithm to derive the unique farsightedly
stable set of patent pool outcomes. First, I describe the procedure in general
and afterwards explain the intuition of each step. In Section 2.4, I apply the
algorithm to my model, assuming price leadership of the patent pool and
linear demand.
Let Ps denote the farsightedly stable set of patent pool outcomes. The
farsightedly stable set consists of one or several farsightedly stable patent
pool outcome(s). Each outcome included in the set is denoted by ksj ∈ Ps,
with j = 1, 2, ...,n/2 for n even or j = 1, 2, ...,n/2 + 1 for n odd or until
the algorithm stops.15 For example, if Ps =
{
ks1,k
s
2
}
= {4, 6}, there are two
outcomes in the farsightedly stable set, a patent pool with 4 firms in the pool
15 The maximal number of farsightedly stable outcomes is restricted to n/2 for n even and
n/2 + 1 for n odd, because the number of coalition members in each farsightedly stable
outcome has to differ at least by 2, otherwise the outcome does not satisfy IFS and EFS.
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and one with 6 firms in the pool. The application of the algorithm defines
the farsightedly stable set. Each step of the algorithm either ends with the
definition of the farsightedly stable set or with the order to continue with
the next step.
1. If piFIi > piPIoi (n− 1) ⇒ Ps =
{
ks1
}
= {n}.
If piFIi < pi
PIo
i (n− 1), continue with next step.
2. Set piPIpi (k1) = pi
PIo
i (k1 − 1) and solve for k1 ∈ R+. Define ks1 = bk1c.
3. Following Step 2, for j = 2, 3, ...,n/2 if n even or j = 2, 3, ...,n/2+ 1 if n
odd or until the algorithm stops, set piPIpi (kj) = pi
PIo
i (k
s
j−1) and solve
for kj > kj−1. Define ksj =
⌈
kj
⌉
.
If ksj > n ⇒ Ps =
{
ks1, ...k
s
j−1
}
.
If ksj = n ⇒ Ps =
{
ks1, ...,k
s
j−1,k
s
j
}
.
If ksj < n, repeat Step 3 with j+ 1.
For example, applying Step 3 for j = 2 gives the following:
Set piPIpi (k2) = pi
PIo
i (k
s
1) and solve for k2 > k
s
1. Define k
s
2 = dk2e.
If ks2 > n ⇒ Ps =
{
ks1
}
.
If ks2 = n ⇒ Ps =
{
ks1,k
s
2
}
.
If ks2 < n, continue Step 3 with j = 3.
The farsightedly stable set of outcomes is fully defined by applying Steps
1,2,3. The intuition of the steps is as follows:
1. If piFIi > pi
PIo
i (n − 1) holds, the grand pool is the only farsightedly
stable outcome (and also the unique myopically stable outcome) and
the analysis stops. The grand patent pool satisfies IFS, because a first
outsider has the highest profits from exiting the pool and if it is not
profitable for a single firm to leave the pool, it is also not profitable for
an additional firm to leave the pool. If piFIi < pi
PIo
i (n− 1), the grand
pool is neither myopically nor farsightedly stable.
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2. Solving piPIpi (k1) > piPIoi (k1 − 1) for k1 yields the unique myopically
stable outcome, which is also the farsightedly stable outcome with the
smallest coalition.16 This farsightedly stable outcome with ks1 firms in
the pool is the farsightedly stable outcome with the lowest number of
firms inside the pool. When comparing outcomes with higher number
of firms in the pool, this outcome serves as a comparison to the status
quo (as in example B of Table 2.1).
3. The procedure repeats after Step 2 (after the definition of the farsightedly
stable outcome ks1 with the lowest number of firms inside the pool) un-
til the farsightedly stable set is fully defined. Setting j = 2, we test
whether another farsightedly stable outcome exists with more firms
in the patent pool than in the outcome ks1. We search for the number
of firms in the patent pool, for which the profit of a pool member is
as least as high as the profit of an outsider in the farsightedly stable
outcome with ks1 firms in the pool. k
s
2 has to be a natural number lar-
ger than ks1 and smaller or equal than n to be another farsightedly
stable outcome.17 If ks2 > n, the farsightedly stable set is defined, in-
cluding only ks1, because k 6 n has to hold. If ks2 = n, the grand pool
is another stable outcome and the farsightedly stable set is defined.
If ks1 < k
s
2 < n, k
s
2 is another farsightedly stable outcome and addi-
tional stable outcomes might exist. The procedure continues with j = 3.
We test whether another farsightedly stable outcome exists with more
firms in the patent pool than in the outcome ks2. We search for the num-
ber of firms in the patent pool, for which the profit of a pool member
is as least as high as the profit of an outsider in the farsightedly stable
outcome with ks2 firms in the pool. k
s
3 has to be a natural number larger
than ks2 and smaller or equal than n to be another farsightedly stable
outcome. If ks3 > n, the farsightedly stable set is defined, with k
s
1 and
ks2 included in the set. The outcome k
s
3 is not included because k 6 n
has to hold. If ks3 = n, the grand pool is a third stable outcome and
the farsightedly stable set is defined. If ks2 < k
3
2 < n, k
s
3 is the third
farsightedly stable outcome and additional stable outcomes might ex-
16 Because the number of firms (inside the pool ks1) is restricted to natural numbers, k1 has to
be brought down to the next natural number; the number that still solves the inequality.
17 Again, because of the restriction to natural numbers for k, ks2 = dk2e, so that the inequality
holds.
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ist. The procedure continues with j = 4. By applying Step 1, 2 and 3,
we define all farsightedly stable outcomes from ks1 to maximal k
s
n/2 for
n even or ksn/2+1 for n odd.
2.4 an application of the farsighted stability concept to lin-
ear demand and price leadership of the
patent pool
Section 2.3.2 derives the algorithm to define the farsightedly stable set in
general form. In this section, I apply the algorithm to the model of linear
demand and price leadership of the patent pool introduced in Section 2.2.2.
The definition of the farsightedly stable set of patent pool outcomes makes it
possible to analyse the properties of the farsightedly stable set under linear
demand and price leadership of the patent pool in more detail. For details
on the derivation of ks1, k
s
2, k
s
3,... see Appendix.
1. piFIi > piPIoi (n− 1) for n 6 4 ⇒ ks1 = n and Ps =
{
ks1
}
.
If n > 4, then piFIi < pi
PIo
i (n− 1) holds. Continue.
2. ks1 = bk1c =
⌊
1
4(5+ 3n−
√
n2 − 2n− 7)
⌋
, which can be simplified to
ks1 =
n
2 + 1 for n even and k
s
1 =
n+1
2 + 1 for n odd.
3. For j = 2, 3, ...,n/2 if n even or j = 2, 3, ...,n/2+ 1 if n odd or until the
algorithm stops:
ksj =
⌈
1
2(1+n+
√
(1+n− 2ksj−1)(2k
s
j−1 − 3− 3n))
⌉
If ksj > n⇒ Ps =
{
ks1, ...,k
s
j−1
}
.
If ksj = n⇒ Ps =
{
ks1, ...,k
s
j−1,k
s
j
}
.
If ksj < n, repeat Step 3 with j+ 1.
Proposition 2.4. For linear demand and price leadership of the patent pool
(i) the outcome ks1 is a grand patent pool and the single outcome of the farsighted
stable set if n 6 4,
(ii) the fraction of firms included in a farsightedly stable patent pool is always
larger than 50% (n+22n for n even,
n+3
2n for n odd),
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(iii) an outcome in which the patent pool dissolves completely is never a farsightedly
stable outcome.
(iv) the farsightedly stable set contains a second outcome ks2 with larger coalition
size compared to ks1 if n > 6.
Proof. piFIi > piPIoi (n− 1) for n 6 4 ⇒ Ps =
{
ks1
}
= {n} if n 6 4; k
s
1
n =
n/2+1
n
for n even and k
s
1
n =
n+1/2+1
n for n odd; ∃ ks2 6 n if n > 6.
Proposition 2.5. For linear demand and price leadership of the patent pool, the
smallest stable patent pool ks1 is strictly increasing in n whereas k
s
j ⊆ Ps with
j > 1 weakly increases with n.
Proof. ∂k
s
1
∂n > 0,
∂ksj
∂n > 0 for j > 1 if k
s
1 is even,
∂ksj
∂n = 0 for j > 1 if k
s
1 is
odd.
Proposition 2.6. For linear demand and price leadership of the patent pool, each
outcome ksj ⊆ Ps Pareto dominates all other outcomes ksl ⊆ Ps with j > l. For n >
6, there is at least one outcome in the farsightedly stable set that Pareto dominates
the outcome ks1.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2.4(iv) and ∂pi
PIo
i
∂k > 0,
∂
∑k
i=1 pi
PIp
i
∂k > 0.
No outcome included in the farsightedly stable set dominates another out-
come included in the set as defined in Definition 2.3. But each of the out-
comes included in the set Pareto dominates each outcome with less firms
inside the patent pool (lower index of the farsightedly stable outcome). The
profit of an outsider as well as the profit of an insider ceteris paribus increase
with the number of firms inside the pool.
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between the number of firms in the
market and the number of firms inside the patent pool for all farsightedly
stable outcomes. To increase the readability, a line is added. All points on
the line are farsightedly stable grand patent pools (100% participation rate).
As shown in Proposition 2.4(i), if there are less than five firms in the market,
the only farsightedly stable patent pool includes all firms. If the number of
firms in the market increases, grand pools can still be farsightedly stable. As
shown by Proposition 2.4(iv), if the number of firms in the market is larger
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Figure 2.3: Farsightedly stable outcomes
than six, the farsightedly stable set contains at least two outcomes and the
number of additional outcomes follows a non-monotonic upward trend.18
The application of the algorithm defines the farsightedly stable set for
a given market size, which may contain several outcomes. This is different
from the result of the application of the myopic stability concept. D’Aspremont
et al. (1983) show that a unique myopically stable cartel always exists. In their
model of price-leadership of the pool and price-taking fringe firms, they find
that if the number of firms approaches infinity, the fraction of firms in the car-
tel approaches zero. Assuming myopic stability and fringe firms that react
strategically to the cartel, Shaffer (1995) finds a unique stable outcome with
a constant fraction of firms inside the coalition if n grows. In my model, the
outcome included in the farsightedly stable set with the smallest coalition
size (which is also the unique myopically stable outcome) has a constant
fraction of firms in the patent pool (n+22n for n even,
n+3
2n for n odd). In
Aoki’s (2005) model, the disincentive to join the patent pool increases with
the number of firms in the market. Similarly, in Aoki and Nagaoka (2005),
a grand patent pool only forms if the number of firms is small. I show that
under the assumption of farsighted agents which anticipate adjustments in
18 The number of outcomes included in the farsightedly stable set does not monotonically in-
crease because k is restricted to natural numbers.
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prices and coalition size, higher participation rates in stable patent pools are
possible than under the assumption of myopic agents.
The stable set approach by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) does
not define each outcome individually but defines a collection of stable out-
comes. The farsightedly stable set of my model builds upon von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s (1953) definition and also defines a collection of farsighted-
ly stable outcomes. Even though outcomes in the set Pareto dominate each
other, no outcome included in the set dominates another outcome in the set
as defined in Definition 2.3, because a dominating outcome A must not only
be preferred to the dominated outcome B, A must also be (at least indirectly)
be reached by B.
Which of the stable patent pools included in the farsightedly stable set
defined by my algorithm actually establishes, depends on the status quo
before the kick-off of the patent pool. If no patent pool exists and firms then
consider forming a patent pool, the farsightedly stable patent pool with the
lowest number of participants forms, because firms cannot induce another,
preferred farsightedly stable outcome with more firms in a pool by unilateral
moves. On the other hand, if firms are for example forced by the government
to form one patent pool and after some time are able to decide on their own
whether or not they continue the cooperation, the farsightedly stable patent
pool with the largest number of participants out of the farsightedly stable
set forms, because no firm in this outcome has an incentive to enter or exit
the pool.
2.5 conclusion
Even though a grand patent pool is profitable for all patent owners as well as
consumers, the formation of a patent pool can be difficult. Free-riding incen-
tives exist, because outsiders to the patent pool profit from the pool’s effect
of reducing total royalties without joining the patent pool. The free-rider
effect has been identified by previous work on stability issues of coalitions
and especially of patent pools as the main problem of forming a stable agree-
ment. I further analyse the free-rider incentive on the patent pool and show
that the incentive depends on the increase in the share of total profits and
the decrease in demand due to individual licensing.
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So far, models on the stability of patent pools assumed that patent owners
are myopic when deciding whether to become a member of a patent pool. As-
suming that patent owners foresee reactions by other patent owners changes
the results on stability. I derive a general algorithm that defines the farsighted-
ly stable set of patent pool outcomes. Assuming farsighted patent owners
can lead to stable outcomes that include at least as many patent owners in
the patent pool than when assuming myopic patent owners. The applica-
tion of the algorithm to linear demand and price-leadership of the patent
pools identifies interesting characteristics of the farsightedly stable set. I
show that a complete break-up of the patent pool is never profitable. The
smallest farsightedly stable patent pool includes at least 50% of all patent
owners. For more than six firms, outcomes with higher participation rates
exist. Grand pools can be farsightedly stable, even for high number of pat-
ent owners. Free-riding might also exist with farsighted patent owners, but
farsighted behaviour reduces the incentives to free-ride on the low patent
pool royalty. This model contrasts the results on the stability by other mod-
els on the stability of patent pools such as Aoki (2005); Aoki and Nagaoka
(2005); Lévêque and Ménière (2011); Llanes and Poblete (2014), which as-
sume myopic behaviour.
These results are not restricted to the analysis of patent pools but can
also be applied to other coalition formation problems such as cartels, patent
pools, team formation or group agreements.
Previous successful and unsuccessful attempts to form a patent pool have
shown that patent owners react and act very strategically when deciding
whether to join a patent pool. The process of patent pool formation is tedi-
ous especially because no patent owner promises to definitely join the pool
until the last minute of the negotiation. It happened that patent owners left
the room at the moment of signing the contracts. These incidences and meth-
ods demonstrate that the model’s assumption about foresight and strategic
behaviour of the patent owners describes reality well.
Because the application of farsighted stability results in a set of possible
outcomes, all being farsightedly stable, patent owners can be caught in an
outcome with a low participation rate, unable to agree on a Pareto improv-
ing higher participation. Otherwise, if negotiations about the formation of
a patent pool start at a point where all patent owners are already in one
coalition and single patent owners then debate about leaving the coalition,
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a patent pool with high participation is possible. This raises the question if
policies by the standard setting organizations concerning the formation of
patent pools that build upon a given standard can improve the problem of
the difficult and time-consuming process of patent pool formation.
Patent owners in my model are assumed to behave non-cooperatively,
with unilateral moves. For future research it would be interesting to ana-
lyse patent pool stability if patent owners are able to coordinate their moves.
Another interesting extension is to allow several patent pools to form. If in
my model the outsider firms form a second patent pool, this would further
reduce cumulative royalties. But the possibility of a second patent pool also
affects the incentive to join a patent pool. The overall effect on cumulative
royalties and patent owner profit depends on whether allowing for more
than one patent pool leads to a dissolution of the single patent pool derived
in this model or whether addition pool(s) form that include only the patent
owners which did not join the pool in my model.
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appendix 2.a
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Similar to Shapiro (2001) it can be shown that the royalties in the integrated
pool are lower than the royalties if firms license their patents independently.
The demand for the product isQ(p) and the price p = c+
∑n
i=1 ri. The price
elasticity of demand for the product is defined by  = −Q
′(p)p
Q(p) . The profit
of each firm i = {1, ...,n} is given by
pii = Q(p)ri . (9)
If each firm sets its royalty independently and non-cooperatively, the FOC
for firm i is
∂pii
∂ri
= Q(p) +Q ′(p)ri = 0 . (10)
Adding up across all n firms gives
nQ(p) +Q ′(p)
n∑
i=1
ri = 0 , (11)
which can be rewritten to
n∑
i=1
ri
p
= −
Q(p)
Q ′(p)p
n . (12)
Using the definition of elasticity, we have
n∑
i=1
ri
p
= −
n

. (13)
If n firms set their royalty independently and non-cooperatively, the percent-
age of the sum of royalties relative to the product price is n times the inverse
elasticity of demand for every price. In contrast, the percentage of the pool
royalty relative to the product price if firms price and license their patents
as a bundle is only the inverse elasticity of demand. To see this, define the
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profit of the pool when licensing jointly and selling the bundle of licences
for a royalty of rFI by
pi = Q(p)rFI with p = rFI + c . (14)
The FOC for profit maximising of the pool is
∂pi
∂rFI
= Q(p) +Q ′(p)rFI = 0 , (15)
which can be rewritten to
rFI
p
= −
Q(p)
Q ′(p)p
. (16)
Using the definition of the elasticity, we have
rFI
p
= −
1

. (17)
For the cumulative royalty in the NI case we have
∑n
i=1 ri =
np
 , whereas
we have rFI = p in the FI case. r
FI = p <
∑n
1 ri =
np
 ∀n > 1. The cumula-
tive royalty in case of PI is in between the cumulative royalty of the NI case
and the FI case because some firms bundle their patents and others set their
royalty non-cooperatively.
Derivation of ks1 and k
s
2 (Section 2.4)
Setting pipi (k1) = pi
o
i (k1 − 1) and solving for k1 yields k
±
1 =
1
4(5 + 3n ±√
n2 − 2n− 7). k+1 is not relevant because k
+
1 > n but k 6 n always has to
hold. ks1 =
⌊
k−1
⌋
because we search for the number of firms ks1 such that
pi
p
i (k1) > pioi (k1 − 1), with k being a positive natural number.
Setting pip(k2) = pio(ks1) and solving for k2 yields
k±2 =
1
2(1+n+±
√
−(1+n− 2ks1)(3+ 3n− 2k
s
1)). k
−
2 is not relevant because
k−2 > n. k
s
2 =
⌈
k+2
⌉
because we search for the number of firms ks2 such that
pi
p
i (k2) > pioi (k1), with k being a positive natural number. The derivation of
ks3,k
s
4 etc. follows the same procedure as the derivation of k
s
2.
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T H E I N C E N T I V E E F F E C T O F C O M P E T I T I O N
3.1 introduction
It is often observed that individuals exert more effort when they are compet-
ing against each other. Also experiments on contests have shown that sub-
jects’ effort provision in contests is significantly higher than the risk-neutral
equilibrium prediction (Dechenaux et al., forthcoming). This incentive ef-
fect of competition also seems to be prevalent in the management of firms.
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that poor management practices are
more prevalent if product market competition is weak. Leibenstein’s (1966)
hypothesis of ‘X-inefficiency’ assumes that in the absence of strong competit-
ive pressure, firms have a weakened incentive to reduce costs. If monopolis-
tic firms exploit fewer profitable opportunities to reduce cost or to increase
profit than competitive firms, this contradicts the neoclassical model. This
model predicts that all profit-maximizing firms should have the same incen-
tive to minimize costs and to pursue profitable innovations.
In this chapter, we want to answer whether competition affects the provi-
sion of effort independent of the monetary incentives provided in markets
of differing degrees of competition. We therefore conduct a set of laboratory
experiments designed to understand whether competition has an effect on
investment decisions independent of monetary incentives.
There is by now a large body of theoretical and empirical literature on the
effect of competition on innovation and vice versa. Despite its vastness, the
literature has so far neglected the effect of competition on the incentives to
invest which cannot be explained by differing monetary incentives.
The experimental method allows us to vary the degree of product market
competition in a controlled manner as well as to observe the investments.
We conduct three treatments with different degrees of competition but with
the same Nash equilibrium (NE) investment to examine whether competi-
tion affects the investment choice. There are three main advantages of our
set-up compared to empirical studies. First, we can draw clear-cut interpre-
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tations of causality, whereas with field data the causality of competition and
innovation remains elusive. Second, we can control for the investment costs
and the innovation technology which are diverse across firms and difficult to
control for in an empirical analysis. Third, subjects are randomly assigned
to one of the treatments that differ in the degree of competition, whereby
we can circumvent self-selection of individuals in more or less competitive
markets.
In our experiment, a subject decides how much to invest in a risky R&D
project. The project’s probability of success increases with the investment of
the subject, but some uncertainty about the outcome of the project persists.
The project either succeeds or fails and the probability of success depends
only on the subject’s investment. In the monopoly treatment, a subject’s pay-
ment depends only on the outcome of its investment in the R&D project. In
the treatments with a competitive market, a subject’s payment depends on
its own and on the competitors’ project outcome. The experiment is designed
in such a way that in equilibrium the monetary incentives to invest in the
R&D project are independent of the degree of competition. This allows us to
directly compare the investments under different degrees of competition.
We find that subjects in the competitive treatments invest significantly
more than subjects in the monopoly treatment. We also observe that primar-
ily subjects of the competitive treatments choose to invest their whole en-
dowment in the risky project.
Why do subjects in the competitive treatments invest significantly more in
the risky project than subjects in the monopoly treatment? What aspect of
competition incentivizes the subjects to invest more? Subjects in the compet-
itive treatments are confronted with a more complex investment decision. In
the competitive treatments, subjects are exposed to the objectively assessable
risk of failure, as well as to the risk that arises from the strategic interaction
of the subject’s project outcomes. Since subjects invest simultaneously, they
do not know their competitor’s(s’) investment. One explanation for the dif-
ference in investments might be that subjects in the competitive treatments
have beliefs about the investment of the other subject(s) which justify the
observed investments. This explanation seems very implausible in our case
as only very low investments by the other subject(s) can justify the observed
investments.
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We conduct a second experiment in which we still have a competitive and
a monopoly treatment, but we control for some aspects of competition. Sub-
jects invest sequentially, this eliminates the differences in complexity and
uncertainty between the treatments. Subjects in the monopoly and the duo-
poly treatment are exposed to an exogenous uncertainty which is objectively
assessable. Furthermore, we design the experiment in such a way that the
monetary incentives to invest are always the same across treatments.
In this second experiment we find that there is no such clear effect of com-
petition on investments as in the experiment with simultaneous investments.
Our data show that subjects in the monopoly and duopoly treatments on
average invest the same amount. This result suggests that a higher degree
of complexity and the uncertainty about the competitor’s decision are pos-
sible drivers of the higher investment in the competitive treatments which
we observed in the first experiment. The experiment with sequential invest-
ment also shows that subjects in both treatments do not choose the optimal
strategy. We find a significant difference in subjects’ investment decisions
when controlling for the exogenous uncertainty. Subjects in the duopoly
treatment increase their investment if their expected payment decreases exo-
genously, subjects in the monopoly treatment decrease their investment if
their expected payment decreases exogenously. This difference—motivating
vs. discouraging investments—can only be explained by the incentive ef-
fect of competition, because the relationship between cost of investment and
probability of success is in both treatments unaffected by the exogenous
shock.
These results help to reconcile some of the seemingly conflicting and di-
verging findings in field evidence and provide controlled evidence that the
degree of competition has an effect on individuals’ investment incentives
that cannot be explained by monetary differences.
Our research question is closely related to three strands of literature—
the theoretical and empirical IO literature on competition and innovation,
the experimental literature on competition and innovation and experiments
on contests. The theoretical IO literature on competition, investments and
innovation goes back to Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962) and offers
mixed results, depending on the underlying model (Bertrand or Cournot
competition) and the characteristics of the market (the type of product dif-
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ferentiation, heterogeneity across firms, technological level of firms, etc.).1
Other models investigate the effect of competition on managerial incentives
(Martin, 1993; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003). Managerial practices may provide
an explanation for differences in productivity performances between firms
and industries. Schmidt (1997) provides a theoretical explanation for the
link between competitive pressure and managerial slack. In his model, com-
petition incentivizes the manager either to work harder in order to avoid
liquidation or to work less because the profit reduction renders his effort
unprofitable. The model shows that the optimal incentive scheme for the
manager depends on the competitive environment of the firm. Organiza-
tional slack and inefficient management due to the lack of competition was
already mentioned by Leibenstein (1966). Collecting management practice
data, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that poor management practices
are more prevalent when product market competition is weak. Although this
study provides an interesting insight, it cannot answer if variations in man-
agement practices result from the differences in competition or vice versa.
The same problem exists in the empirical literature on competition and
innovation. Using field data has the problem of mutual endogeneity when
analysing the relationship between competition and innovation. Besides, it
cannot be determined whether competition has an effect on innovation be-
cause of incentive or selection effects. Empirical studies find that either in-
novation increases linearly with competition (Geroski, 1994; Nickell, 1996;
Blundell et al., 1999) or there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between
competition and innovation (Scherer, 1967; Aghion et al., 2005).2 Aghion et al.
(2005) argue that the inverted U-shape emerges because the competitiveness
of an industry is endogenous and varies with innovative activity. Depending
on the innovation level, anti- or pro-competitive effects of an increase in the
innovation level dominate.
There are several existing experiments on the relationship between compe-
tition and innovation. Isaac and Reynolds (1992) find a positive correlation
between competition and cost-reducing R&D investments as well as Sacco
and Schmutzler (2011), who consider an increase in competition by a switch
from Cournot to Bertrand competition. Sacco and Schmutzler (2011) find
1 We refer to Vives (2008) and Schmutzler (2013) for an overview of the theoretical IO literature
on competition, investments and innovation.
2 Gilbert (2006) gives an overview of the empirical literature on competition and innovation.
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that an increase from two to four players in a Cournot setting leads to lower
average investments. In Schmutzler et al. (2010) the degree of competition
is varied by the degree of product differentiation. In a one-stage game, they
find weak experimental evidence for a U-shaped relationship between com-
petition and innovation. Aghion et al. (2014) test the effect of product mar-
ket competition on innovation in a dynamic step-by-step innovation model.
They find an encouraging effect of competition on innovation for neck-and-
neck firms and a weak discouraging effect for laggard firms. The results
of these experiments on competition and innovation are mixed because the
rewards for innovation depend on the definition of the product market com-
petition. Experiments on competition and innovation have so far focused on
the monetary incentives to invest, which is not the case with our experiment.
We do not explicitly model the market in which the subjects compete and
we design the experiment in such a way that the monetary incentives are in
equilibrium independent of the degree of competition.
Our experiments also reveal similarities to experiments on contest.3 Ex-
periments on Tullock (1980) contests (Millner and Pratt, 1989; Shogren and
Baik, 1991), in which several agents exert effort to increase the probability
of winning a prize, have shown that the dissipation rate4 is significantly
higher than predicted. We also find in our experiments that subjects over-
invest. Similar to these studies, we also find a high variation in individual
investments. In experiments on contests with negative spillovers from in-
vestments (Coughlan and Plott, 1997; Mancini and Dechenaux, 2008), the
payoff decreases if the competitor is successful. This also holds in our exper-
iment, but several features of our design are different from contests: In our
model, the probability of success does not depend on the investments of the
other subjects and there is more than one price. Unlike in experiments on
innovation tournaments (Fullerton et al., 1999), subjects’ participation in our
experiment is exogenous.5
While our experimental study is conducted in an artificial environment, it
offers several advantages over field studies. Among other problems, we can
eliminate a selection bias that may appear in empirical studies. Monopolized
3 See Dechenaux et al. (forthcoming) for an extensive overview of experiments on contests and
Baye and Hoppe (2003) for an overview of innovation tournaments and patent races.
4 total effort divided by total price
5 Even though the subjects in our experiment are allowed to invest zero points in the R&D
project, they always compete with each other.
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companies may attract different workers and managers than companies that
are under strong competitive pressure. Frequently, monopolies are or were
at some time related to state institutions, thus exhibiting different wage and
pension systems than privately owned companies. These aspects may cause
companies under less competitive pressure to have a different work force
than other companies. In addition, these companies may offer different in-
centives to their employees by their payment system.
Furthermore, in our experiment we are able observe investments under
different degrees of competition directly. By holding the degree of competi-
tion constant, we eliminate one of the biggest problems of empirical studies
on competition and innovation. Because innovative activity influences the
degree of competition and vice versa, causal relationships are hard to obtain.
In our experiment, the incentives to invest depend on the bonuses which the
subjects receive in case of success or failure of their investments, but the in-
vestments and the project outcomes do not affect the degree of competition.
We can control for the monetary incentives and are thus able to separate the
monetary effect from the incentive effect of competition.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains
our experimental design of the experiment with simultaneous investments.
Section 3.3 presents and discusses the results. We introduce the experiment
with sequential investments in Section 3.4 and provide our conclusion in
Section 3.5.
3.2 experimental design and hypotheses
3.2.1 Experimental Design
Consider a manager who can decide how to divide his endowment between
a project with safe return and a risky R&D project of his firm. The more he
invests in the firm’s R&D project, the higher is the probability of success of
the project. A successful project increases the firm’s profits and the manager
is rewarded with a bonus payment.
Our experimental design captures the trade-off between investing in a
risky project which might be successful and generate high profits and not
investing. Only the manager’s own investment in the R&D project has an
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effect on the success or failure of the R&D project. To investigate the effect
of competition on the manager’s investment, we conduct three treatments
that differ in the degree of competition in the market of the manager’s firm.
Each treatment involves 20 periods.
In the monopoly treatment, there is a single firm in the market and the
subject’s bonus payment in this treatment depends only on the outcome
of his investment.6 In the duopoly treatment, two firms compete with each
other. We therefore randomly matched two subjects in each of the 20 periods
of the experiment. The bonus payment of each subject depends not only on
the success of its own R&D project, but also on the other subject’s success
of the R&D project.7 In the oligopoly treatment, four firms compete with
each other. We therefore randomly matched four subjects in each of the 20
periods of the experiment. The bonus payment of each subject depends not
only on the success of its own R&D project, but also on the outcome of the
R&D project of the other three firms.
The timing of one period of the investment game is as follows. First, each
subject decides how much of its endowment it wants to invest in the R&D
project. The remainder is automatically invested in a risk-free project. Then a
random draw for each subject independently decides on the outcome of the
R&D projects. Each subject is informed about the outcome of its own R&D
project and its bonus payment, and in the competitive treatments subjects
are also informed about the outcome of R&D project of the other subject(s).
In all three treatments, the relationship between investment and probability
of success and the return on the risk-free project is the same.
3.2.2 Experimental Procedure
In all treatments, the investment game is repeated over 20 periods with re-
matching in the competitive treatments in each period. We conducted the ex-
periment with a between-subject design in which each participant attended
only one session. Prior to the investment game, subjects read the instruc-
6 The bonus payments are described in detail in Section 3.2.3.
7 The managers’ bonus payments of the investment are motivated as follows: A successful
innovation increases the profits of a firm. If the firm is the only firm with a successful inno-
vation, it can improve its position in the market and earn even higher profits. The bonus the
manager receives from the firm increases with the profit of the firm.
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tions and answered control questions.8 After the game, subjects answered
questions regarding their risk, loss and ambiguity aversion, and filled in a
standard form.
We conducted the experiments at MELESSA of the University of Munich
in 2012/13. We conducted two sessions per treatment, with 20–24 subjects in
each session, a total of 130 subjects participating in the experiments. In each
duopoly treatment session we had three matching groups with six subjects
each and one with four subjects. In each oligopoly treatment session we
had one matching group with 12 subjects and one with eight subjects. The
experiment was computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). About 61% of all participants were female and
the average age was 24.6 years. Sessions lasted about 75 minutes. Subjects
were paid their earnings of all periods plus the outcome of a test in which
we elicited subjects’ risk, loss and ambiguity aversion.9 On average, subjects
earned about EUR 19.64, including a show-up fee of EUR 4. During the
experiment, payments were expressed in points (500 points = 1 Euro).
3.2.3 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
The central question of this experiment is whether competition has an effect
on subjects’ investments which cannot be explained by monetary incentives.
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that people are fully rational
and maximize their payments. If this is true, each subject in our experiment
decides to invest the amount in the R&D project that maximizes its expec-
ted total payoff. Subjects in the duopoly and in the oligopoly treatment
take into account the investments of their competitor(s). In the following, we
derive the payoff maximising investment for each treatment.
The initial endowment of each subject in each period is 100 points. The
possible investments in the R&D project are Ii = {0, 10, 20, ..., 100} points.
8 The instructions of the experiment are included in Appendix 3.A.3.
9 Following the investment game, we conducted tests to elicit the participants’ risk, loss and
ambiguity aversion in order to control for possible correlations between the investment and
risk, loss and ambiguity aversion. The test we used for the elicitation of risk aversion is similar
to the one used by Dohmen et al. (2010) and Holt and Laury (2002), the test on loss aversion
is similar to Gaechter et al. (2010) and Fehr and Goette (2007) and the test on ambiguity
aversion is a modified version of Ederer and Manso (2013). For each participant one of the
lotteries was randomly chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. The tests can be
found in Appendix 3.A.3.
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Depending on the investment Ii, the probability of being successful pi in
this period is between 0% and 86% for subject i. The relationship between
investment Ii and success probability pi is given by
Ii(pi) =
p2i
0.0075
∀ i . (1)
Table 3.1 shows the relationship between investments and the probability
of success with rounded values. The information of the table was included in
the participants’ instructions (see Appendix 3.A.3).10 The investment in the
R&D project is subtracted from the initial endowment and the remainder is
automatically invested in a risk-free project.
Investment in R&D project 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Probability of success in % 0 27 39 47 55 61 67 73 78 83 86
Table 3.1: Relationship between investment and probability of success
Monopoly Treatment
Equation (2) shows the payoff function of a subject in the monopoly treat-
ment, which consists of the bonus and the return on the risk-free invested
remainder of the endowment.
piM =
400+ 2(100− Ii) if success110+ 2(100− Ii) if no success (2)
Equation (2) can be rewritten to
piM(pi, Ii) = pi 400+ (1− pi)110+ 2(100− Ii) . (3)
Proposition 3.1. The unique payoff-maximising investment in the monopoly
treatment is given by I∗ = 40.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
10 Note that the probability of a successful innovation increases with the investment, but the
increase declines as the investment rises. A subject can increase its probability of a successful
R&D project by investing more, but some probability of failure always remains (maximal
probability of success is 86%).
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Duopoly Treatment
Equation (4) shows the payoff function of subject i = 1, 2, with i 6= j j = 1, 2
in the duopoly treatment.
piDi =

490+ 2(100− Ii) if i succeeds and j fails
210+ 2(100− Ii) if i and j succeed
90+ 2(100− Ii) if i and j fail
10+ 2(100− Ii) if j succeeds and i fails
(4)
Equation (4) can be rewritten to
piDi (pi,pj, Ii) =pi(1− pj) 490+ pi pj 210+ (1− pi)(1− pj) 90
+ (1− pi)pj 10+ 2(100− Ii), i 6= j. (5)
The payoff function piDi depends on subject i’s probability of success pi, the
other subject’s probability of success pj and i’s investment Ii.
Proposition 3.2. The investments of the two subjects are strategic substitutes. The
unique Nash equilibrium in the duopoly treatment is given by (I∗1, I
∗
2) = (40, 40).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
Oligopoly Treatment
Equation (6) shows the payoff function of subject i = 1, 2, 3, 4 in the oligo-
poly treatment.
piOi =

770+ 2(100− Ii) if i succeeds and all others fail
360+ 2(100− Ii) if i and one other succeed and the others fail
200+ 2(100− Ii) if i and two others succeed and one fails
100+ 2(100− Ii) if all succeed
50+ 2(100− Ii) if all fail
10+ 2(100− Ii) if i fails and all other succeed
(6)
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Equation (6) can be rewritten to
piOi (pi,pj,pk,pl, Ii) =pi(1− pj)(1− pk)(1− pl) 770
+ pi pj(1− pk)(1− pl) 360
+ pi pk(1− pj)(1− pl) 360
+ pi pl(1− pj)(1− pk) 360
+ pi pj pk(1− pl) 200
+ pi pl pk(1− pj) 200+ pi pj pl)(1− pk) 200
+ pi pj pk pl 10
+ (1− pi)(1− pj)(1− pk)(1− pl) 50
+ (1− pi)pj pk pl10+ 2(100− Ii) , i 6= j 6= k 6= l . (7)
The payoff function piOi depends on subject i’s probability of success pi, the
other subjects’ probabilities of success pj, pk, pl and i’s investment Ii.
Proposition 3.3. The investments of the four subjects are strategic substitutes. The
unique Nash equilibrium in the oligopoly treatment is given by (I∗1, I
∗
2, I
∗
3, I
∗
4) =
(40, 40, 40, 40).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
Propositions 3.1,3.2 and 3.3 show that the optimal investment in the mono-
poly treatment and the Nash equilibrium investment in the duopoly and in
the oligopoly treatment are identical. The monetary incentives to invest in
the R&D project are in equilibrium independent of the degree of competi-
tion. The equality of the optimal investments across treatments allows us to
directly compare the investments under different degrees of competition. We
compare the average investment in the R&D project of the 20 periods across
the monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly treatment. Hypothesis 3.1 follows
from the theoretical predictions of Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Hypothesis 3.1. The investments in the R&D project are the same in the mono-
poly, duopoly and oligopoly treatment.
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3.3 results
Comparing the average investments over all periods across treatments shows
significant differences in investments. The average investment in the R&D
project in the monopoly treatment is 50.4 points. In the duopoly treatment,
the average investment in the R&D project is 63.5 points and 59.5 points
in the oligopoly treatment. Figure 3.1 shows the average investments per
treatment with 95% confidence interval error bars. Average investments from
period 5–20 are very similar to the average over all periods.
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Figure 3.1: Average investments in the R&D project by treatment
Result 3.1. In all treatments, subjects invest significantly more in the R&D project
than predicted by the Nash equilibrium.
In all three treatments, subjects overinvest in the R&D project compared
to profit-maximising equilibrium investment (sign tests, p-values < 0.001).
Overinvestments have been observed before in several experiments on in-
vestment decisions, for example in Sacco and Schmutzler (2011), and in most
experiments on contests (for a discussion see Sheremeta, 2013).
A Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the equality of investments between treat-
ments on subject averages yields a p-value< 0.001 for the duopoly and a
p-value of 0.0327 for the oligopoly treatment. We do not find a significant
difference between investments in the duopoly and the oligopoly treatment
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.1517).
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Result 3.2. The average investment in the duopoly treatment and the average
investment in the oligopoly treatment are significantly higher than the average
investment in the monopoly treatment.
The treatment difference between the monopoly treatment and the com-
petitive treatments is also significant in an OLS regression in which we
compare investments across treatments. Table 3.2 reports the regression re-
sults. The results of regression (1) show that subjects in the duopoly treat-
ment invest on average 13.13 points more than in the monopoly treatment
(p < 0.001) and that subjects in the oligopoly treatment invest 9.12 points
more than in the monopoly treatment (p = 0.017).11
The treatment difference between the monopoly treatment and the com-
petitive treatments stays significant when we control for gender, age, risk aver-
sion, loss aversion and ambiguity aversion in regression (2).12 The only mar-
ginally significant control variable is age, which has a positive effect on the
investment in the R&D project. None of the period dummies included in
regression (2) is significant, i.e. there does not seem to be a time trend or
end game effect. Figure 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1 shows average investments
per treatment over periods and also does not indicate a time trend in any
of the treatments. The main results also do not change if we consider only
the investments in period 1, the average investment over periods or if we
cluster the standard errors on matching groups instead of on subjects (see
Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1).
Based on Result 3.2 we can reject Hypothesis 3.1. Investments differ sig-
nificantly between the monopoly treatment and the competitive treatments.
To examine the differences in the average investments in more detail, Figure
3.2 displays the distribution of investments in the R&D project. We observe
that investments are dispersed over the whole range in all treatments. Some
subjects invests nothing of their endowment in the project, others invest their
whole endowment of 100 points. High investments of 80 or more points are
chosen in only 13.6% of all cases in the monopoly treatment, but in 32.5% of
all cases in the duopoly and in 30.1% of all cases in the oligopoly treatment.
11 The difference between the duopoly and the oligopoly treatment is also not significant in a
F-test of the dummy coefficients in regression (1) of Table 3.2 (p = 0.3205).
12 See 9 for the description of the tests we used for the elicitation of risk, loss and ambiguity
aversion (included in Appendix 3.A.3). Points range from 0 to 10 in the risk self-assessment
and 0 to 7 in the tests. Higher values imply higher degree of aversion against risk, loss or
ambiguity.
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Investment in R&D project
(1) (2)
Duopoly 13.13∗∗∗ 13.27∗∗∗
(3.308) (3.450)
Oligopoly 9.120∗∗ 9.319∗∗
(3.786) (3.637)
Female -4.662
(3.166)
Age 0.544∗
(0.277)
Risk aversion 1.248
(1.271)
Risk aversion quest. -0.671
(0.959)
Loss aversion 1.124
(0.987)
Ambiguity aversion -1.937
(1.705)
Period dummies yes
Period 1 -4.308∗
(2.313)
Constant 50.38∗∗∗ 40.85∗∗∗
(2.161) (11.66)
Observations 2600 2600
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.078
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Ro-
bust standard errors are clustered by subject and reported in
parentheses. In regression (2), only the dummy for period 1
is significant. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
Table 3.2: Determinants of the investment in the R&D project
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The highest possible investment was chosen in less than 2% of all cases in
the monopoly treatment compared to 14.3% and 16.8% in the duopoly and
the oligopoly treatment.
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Figure 3.2: Frequencies of chosen investments in the R&D project by
treatment
The observed difference in investments depending on the degree of com-
petition raises the question which aspect of competition incentivizes the sub-
jects in the competitive treatments to invest more than the subjects in the
monopoly treatment. Joy of winning is often observed in experiments. In
our experiment, subjects in all treatment can experience joy of winning, but
only subjects in the competitive treatments can experience joy of winning
against another subject. But even though a high investment increases the
probability of a successful R&D project, there is no direct link from high in-
vestments to being the only successful subject, i.e. winning against the other
subject(s).
A competitive market is more complex and riskier for the market parti-
cipants than a monopolistic market. In our experiment, the investment de-
cision in the competitive treatments involves more complexity than the in-
vestment decision in monopoly treatment. Whereas the payoff in the mono-
poly treatment depends only on the outcome of the subjects own R&D pro-
ject, the payoffs in the competitive treatments also depend on the outcome
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of the other subject’s(s’) R&D project. The investment in the monopoly treat-
ment involves the endogenous risk of failure of the investment and each
subject knows its probability of success and thereby its probability of receiv-
ing the highest bonus. The investment in the competitive treatments involves
the endogenous risk of failure of the own project and the exogenous risk of
success of the competitor(s). Because subjects in the competitive treatments
do not know their competitor’s(s’) investment, they can only form subjective
probabilities about receiving the highest bonus.13
One explanation for the observed difference in average investments across
treatments might be that subjects in the competitive treatments have beliefs
about the investment(s) of the other subject(s) that justify the observed in-
vestments. In order for the duopoly treatment’s average investment of 63.5
points to be a best response, a subject’s belief about the other subject’s invest-
ment has to be extremely low. To see this, remember that the investments in
the R&D project are strategic substitutes (Propositions 3.2 and 3.3), hence
if one subject believes that its competitor(s) invest more than the optimal
investment of 40 it should invest less and vice versa. This can be read from
the Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4 in Appendix 3.A.1. These payoff-tables show that
choosing an investment between 60 and 70 is only a best response if the
other subject chooses an investment of 0 or 10.
The average investment of 59.9 observed in the oligopoly treatment is a
best response if subjects believe that each of the three competitors invests
either 20 or 30 in the R&D project. This can be read from Table 3.A5. Espe-
cially the belief in the duopoly treatment seems unreasonable to us, there-
fore we do not think that the difference in investments between the mono-
poly and the competitive treatments can be explained by beliefs.
3.4 experiment with sequential investments
We conduct a second experiment in which we control for differences between
a competitive market and a monopolistic market. The main design of the
second experiment is similar to the first one, but subjects invest sequentially
so that we can control for beliefs. Additionally, the sequential design makes
13 Even though subjects in the competitive treatments are informed about the outcome of their
competitor’s (competitors’) R&D project when they realize their own outcome, they are not
informed about the amount invested by their competitor(s).
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the probability of success of subject 1 objectively assessable for subject 2.
The design with sequential moves does not only expose the subjects to the
same uncertainty, it also aligns the complexity of the investment decision.
Furthermore, we adjust the bonus payments in such a way that the invest-
ment incentives are always (not only in equilibrium) identical, independent
of the degree of competition.
The objective of the second experiment is to investigate subjects’ invest-
ment behaviour under different degrees of competition, controlling for differ-
ences in complexity and uncertainty between competitive and non-competitive
markets. In the first experiment we found that subjects in the duopoly and
oligopoly treatments invest significantly more than subjects in the mono-
poly treatment. We are interested in whether this effect of competition on
investment incentives is also prevalent in an experiment in which we further
assimilate the investment decision in a monopoly and a duopoly market.
3.4.1 Experimental Design
The design of the experiment with sequential investments is similar to the ex-
periment with simultaneous investments described in Section 3.2. Subjects
invest in a risky R&D project and thereby determine their project’s proba-
bility of success. A subject’s project outcome depends only on the amount
invested. The investment is costly but it increases the probability of a high
bonus. We conducted two treatments. In the duopoly-seq treatment two sub-
jects invest sequentially. Subject 2 observes the probability of success chosen
by subject 1 (p1) and decides on its own probability of success (p2). After two
random draws decided independently from each other about the outcome
of the projects, subjects learn both outcomes and their bonus. The bonus
depends on a subject’s own success and on the success of the other subject.
The uncertainty about subject 1’s project outcome imposes an exogenous risk
with known probabilities on subject 2.
We introduce a nature’s move in the monopoly-seq treatment before the
subject decides on its investment. This imposes an exogenous risk with objec-
tive probabilities on subject M in the monopoly-seq treatment. This allows
us to align the complexity and the uncertainty of the investment decision in
both treatments. First, subject M in the monopoly-seq treatment is informed
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about the probability of a bad market development (pB), decided randomly
by nature. Then it chooses the probability of success of its R&D project (pM).
The probability of a bad market development is mathematically equivalent
to subject 1’s probability of success. In both treatments subjects are exposed
to the uncertainty of their own project’s outcome and to an exogenous risk
(competitor’s project outcome/market development). They can influence the
probability of success of their R&D project but they are not able to influence
their competitor’s success/the market development. In both treatments, sub-
jects are informed about the probabilities of the exogenous uncertainty.
subject 1 
chooses p1
subject 2 gets 
to know p1
subject 2 
chooses p2
information 
about both 
project outcomes
nature decides 
on prob. of bad 
market devel-
opment pB=p1
information about 
project outcome 
and market 
development
subject M gets 
to know pB
subject M 
chooses pM
Figure 3.3: Sequence of actions in the monopoly-seq and the duopoly-seq treat-
ment
The investment decision is repeated over 20 periods. Figure 3.3 shows
the sequence of actions of one period in the monopoly-seq treatment (up-
per description) and the duopoly-seq treatment (lower description). In or-
der to compare the investments of the monopoly-seq treatment and the
duopoly-seq treatment, we use the probabilities chosen by subject 1 in the
duopoly-seq treatment as probabilities of a bad market development in the
monopoly-seq treatment. We take the complete history of probabilities p1
over the 20 periods from one subject in the duopoly-seq treatment and use
them as the sequence of probabilities pB over the 20 periods for one subject
in monopoly-seq treatment. We are only interested in the investments of
subject 2 and subject M.
3.4.2 Experimental Procedure
We conducted the experiment with a between-subject design and each par-
ticipant attended only one session. Prior to the experiment, subjects read
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the instructions and answered control questions.14 After the experiment sub-
jects answered questions regarding their risk, loss and ambiguity aversion
and filled out a standard form.
The experiments took place at MELESSA of the University of Munich in
2013. We conducted nine sessions, three with the monopoly-seq treatment
and six with the duopoly-seq treatment. Between 22 and 24 subjects partici-
pated in each session, a total of 210 subjects over all sessions. In the duopoly-
seq sessions we had either three matching groups with eight subjects or 2
groups with 8 subjects and 1 group with 6 subjects. Half of the participants in
each duopoly-seq treatment session were chosen to be first movers (subject
1), the other ones followers (subject 2). The experiment was computerized
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
About 61% of all participants were female and average age was 24 years.
Sessions lasted about 90 minutes. Subjects were paid their earnings of one
period chosen randomly out of the 20 periods plus the outcome of one ran-
domly chosen test in which we elicited subjects’ risk, loss and ambiguity
aversion.15 On average, subjects earned about EUR 16.44, including a show-
up fee of EUR 4. During the experiment, payments were expressed in points
(25 points = 1 Euro).
3.4.3 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
The central question of the experiment is whether competition has an effect
on investments. In this experiment with sequential investments, the com-
plexity of the investment decision and the monetary incentives to invest are
independent of the degree of competition. We again test whether subjects in
both treatments invest the amount in the R&D project that maximizes their
expected total payoff. In the following, we derive the payoff maximising in-
vestment for both treatments.
The initial endowment of each subject in each period is 100 points. Sub-
jects choose the success probability pi of their R&D project. The possible
success probabilities are pi = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, ..., 0.9}. Depending on the suc-
cess probability pi, the investment costs are between 0 and 100 points. The
14 The instructions of the experiment are included in Appendix 3.A.3.
15 See 9 and 12 for a description of the tests. The tests are included in Appendix 3.A.3.
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cost of the investment increases quadratically with the success probability
pi as follows:
Ii(pi) =
p2i
0.008
∀ i . (8)
Table 3.3 shows the relationship between investment cost and probability of
success with rounded values. The information of the table was included in
the participants’ instructions (see Appendix 3.A.3).16 The investment in the
R&D project is subtracted from the initial endowment and the remainder is
automatically invested in a risk-free project.
Probability of success in % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Investment costs 0 1 5 11 20 31 45 61 80 100
Table 3.3: Relationship between investment costs and probability of success of the
R&D project
Duopoly-seq Treatment
Equation (9) shows the payoff function piDi of subject i = 1, 2 with i 6= j in
the duopoly-seq treatment which is the sum of the bonus and the return on
the risk-free invested remainder of the endowment.
piDi =

200+ (100− Ii) if i succeeds and j fails
100+ (100− Ii) if i and j succeed
100+ (100− Ii) if i and j fail
0+ (100− Ii) if j succeeds and i fails
(9)
Equation (9) can be rewritten to
piDi (pi,pj) = pi(1− pj)200+ pipj 100+ (1− pi)(1− pj)100
+ 100−
p2i
0.008
. (10)
16 Note that even if a subject invests its whole endowment of 100 points, the success probability
is only 90%. This means that a subject can increase its probability of success by investing
more in the R&D project, but some probability of failure always remains.
3.4 experiment with sequential investments 91
Proposition 3.4. The dominant strategy in the duopoly-seq treatment is given
by pi = 0.4 for i = 1, 2. The unique Nash equilibrium is (p∗1,p
∗
2) = (0.4, 0.4) .
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2.
Monopoly-seq Treatment
Equation (11) shows the payoff function piM of a subject in the monopoly-
seq treatment, which is the sum of the bonus and the return on the risk-free
invested remainder of the endowment.
piM =

200+ (100− I) if project successful and market development good
100+ (100− I) if project successful and market development bad
100+ (100− I) if project failed and market development good
0+ (100− I) if project failed and market development bad
(11)
Equation (11) can be rewritten to
piM(pM,pB) = pM(1− pB)200+ pMpB 100+ (1− p)(1− pB)100
+ 100−
p2M
0.008
. (12)
Proposition 3.5. The dominant strategy in the monopoly-seq treatment is given
by pM = 0.4.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2.
The payoff functions of subject M in the monopoly-seq treatment and of
subject 2 in the duopoly-seq treatment are mathematically the same because
bonuses, cost and information are the same.17 The probability of a bad mar-
ket development pB has the same effect on subject M’s expected payoff as
subject 1’s probability of success p1 has on subject 2’s expected payoff. The
dominant strategy in both treatments is to choose a probability of success of
40%, independent of p1 and pM.
17 See equations (9) and (11) and Figure 3.3.
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Hypothesis 3.2. The investment of subject 2 in the duopoly-seq treatment and
the investment of subject M in the monopoly-seq treatment are the same.
Hypothesis 3.3. Subject 2 and subject M both choose the dominant strategy of
p = 0.4. Subject 2’s investment does not depend on subject 1’s probability of suc-
cess. Subject M’s investment does not depend on the probability of a bad market
development.
3.4.4 Results
The average chosen probability of success is 53.6% for subject 2 in the duopoly-
seq treatment and 52.6% for the subject in the monopoly-seq treatment. As
in the experiment with simultaneous investments, we observe that subjects
invest more than the equilibrium prediction in both treatments (sign tests, p-
values< 0.001). The dominant strategy of p = 0.4 was chosen in only 12.5%
of all investment decisions in the monopoly-seq treatment and in 9.5% of
all investment decisions in the duopoly-seq treatment.
Result 3.3. In both treatments, subjects on average invest significantly more than
predicted by the dominant strategy.
A Wilcoxon rank-sum test on equality of the chosen probability of success
in the monopoly-seq treatment and the duopoly-seq treatment cannot be
rejected (average over periods and subjects in a treatment, p = 0.47). A Chi-
test on independence of the distributions of the probabilities of success pM
and p2 between the treatments rejects the hypothesis on equal investment
distributions across treatments (p < 0.001). The treatment difference in the
probabilities of success between the treatments is not significant in an OLS
regression in which we compare the probability of success of subject M in
the monopoly-seq and the probability of success of subject 2 in the duopoly-
seq treatment (see Table 3.4, regression (1)).
The treatment difference becomes significant if we control for the proba-
bility of success of subject 1/the probability of a bad market development.18
18 These probabilities are mathematically equivalent across treatments and we used the prob-
abilities p1 generated by subject 1 in the duopoly-seq treatment as probabilities of a bad
market development pB which were shown to subjects M in the monopoly-seq treatment in
our experiment.
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Probability of success of the
R&D project in % (subject M and 2)
(1) (2) (3)
Monopoly -1.029 15.05∗∗∗ 15.35∗∗∗
(2.647) (4.754) (4.722)
Prob. of subject 1/ 0.0940∗ 0.0983∗
Prob. of bad market development (0.0545) (0.0527)
Monopoly × Prob. of subject 1/ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗
Prob. of bad market development (0.0809) (0.0801)
Female 5.792∗∗
(2.615)
Age 0.284
(0.241)
Risk aversion -1.735
(1.149)
Risk aversion quest. 0.0954
(0.861)
Loss aversion -1.198
(0.793)
Ambiguity aversion -1.605
(1.617)
Period dummies yes
Period 1 -4.071∗
(2.211)
Period 2 -4.984∗∗
(2.144)
Period 13 -4.357∗∗
(2.197)
Constant 53.64∗∗∗ 48.68∗∗∗ 55.53∗∗∗
(1.933) (3.418) (10.10)
Observations 2800 2800 2800
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.022 0.058
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors
are clustered by subject and reported in parentheses. All probabilities are ex-
pressed in percent. In regression (3), of the 20 period dummies only the listed
ones are significant. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
Table 3.4: Determinants of the investment in the R&D project in the seq-experiment
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Regrssion (2) in Table 3.4 shows that the treatment variable monopoly has a
highly significant and positive effect on the chosen probability.
Regression (3) shows that the difference in the investment behaviour with
and without competition is significant and large even if we control for other
characteristics. Only the control variable female has a marginally significant
and positive effect on the chosen probability. The other characteristics age,
risk aversion, risk aversion questionnaire, loss aversion and ambiguity aversion do
not have a significant effect on subjects’ investment decision.19 Controlling
for period effects does not affect the results and there does not seem to be an
end-game effect. Figure 3.A2 in Appendix 3.A.2 shows average investments
per treatment over periods. The main results of the regressions do not change
if we consider only the investments in period 1 or if we cluster the standard
errors on matching groups (see Table 3.A6 in Appendix 3.A.2).
Result 3.4. Subjects in both treatments do not choose the dominant investment
strategy. The probability of success of subject 2 depends positively on the probability
of success of subject 1 in the duopoly-seq treatment. The probability of success of
subject M depends negatively on the probability of a bad market development in the
monopoly-seq treatment.
In the experiment with simultaneous investments we found that subjects
in the competitive treatments invest on average significantly more than sub-
jects in the monopoly treatment (see Result 3.2). By controlling for the dif-
ferences in the complexity of the investment decision and the exposure to
risk we find that subjects in the duopoly-seq treatment do not invest on av-
erage significantly more than in the monopoly-seq treatment. We find that
subject 2 and subject M both do not choose the dominant strategy which is
independent of the probability of success of subject 1 and the probability of
a bad market development, respectively. Instead we find that subjects react
differently to the exogenous uncertainty. Regression (2) of Table 3.4 predicts
the following reaction functions p2(p1) of subject 2 and pM(pB) of subject
M, which are visualized in Figure 3.4:
p2(p1) = 0.4868+ 0.00094 p1 (13)
pM(pB) = 0.6373− 0.00211 pB (14)
19 For a description of the aversion tests see Section 3.3.
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Figure 3.4: Reaction functions p2(p1) and pM(pB)
In the duopoly-seq treatment, a high investment of the competitor re-
duces the subject’s expected profit. The marginal effect of the investment
remains unaffected but the higher probability of success of the competitor
has a negative wealth effect on the subject’s profit. The same holds true for
the subjects in the monopoly-seq treatment: An increase in the probability
of a bad market development imposes a negative wealth effect on a subject’s
profit, keeping the marginal effect of the investment unaffected. However,
subjects in the duopoly-seq and in the monopoly-seq treatment react differ-
ently. In the duopoly-seq treatment, the exogenous decrease in the expected
profit motivates subject 2 to increase his investment. This effect is reversed
in the monopoly-seq treatment, in which subject M is discouraged by a low
expected profit and therefore invests less.
Our findings reveal, that in our experiment with sequential investments,
the difference in the average investment disappears. But we find that sub-
jects in the duopoly-seq and the monopoly-seq treatment have a signifi-
cantly different investment strategy. Even though the experiment with se-
quential moves controls for several factors that are prevalent in competit-
ive markets such as exogenous uncertainty, strategic interaction, beliefs and
complex decision-making, subjects’ incentives to invest still differ with and
without competitive pressure.
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3.5 conclusion
In simple laboratory experiments we addressed the question whether com-
petition affects the incentives to invest in independent of the monetary in-
centives. We conduct an investment decision in treatments with competition
and without and keep the degree of competition constant. Additionally, we
design the experiment in such a way that the monetary incentives (in equilib-
rium) are independent on the degree of competition. Our main result of the
experiment with simultaneous investments in the competitive treatments is
that competition significantly increases the incentives to invest. The results
of the experiment contradict the theoretical prediction that the investments
are independent of the degree of competition. This shows that the compe-
tition between subjects has an effect on the incentives to invest. This effect
cannot be explained by differing monetary incentives.
We examine this incentive effect of competition in a second experiment, in
which we control for several differences between competitive and monopo-
listic markets. Sequential moves by the players align the complexity and the
uncertainty involved in the decision. Besides, payoffs and monetary incen-
tives are always identical, independent of the degree of competition. We find
that the average investment is the same under competition and monopoly.
But our results also show that the degree of competition affects subject’s
investment strategy significantly. Even though the marginal effect of invest-
ing is unchanged, subjects in competition increase their investment if their
expected payoff decreases exogenously, whereas subjects in the monopoly
treatment decrease their investment. Competition seems to motivate sub-
jects to invest more effort if expected profits decrease exogenously, whereas
subjects in a monopolistic market are discouraged from investing.
Our results contribute to the understanding of the interaction of competi-
tion and innovation. They support models which find a positive relationship
between competition and innovation. Our experiment adds to the existing
literature by showing that the positive correlation may not only be driven by
differing monetary investment incentives, but also by an effect which cannot
be explained by differences in monetary incentives. The experiment with
simultaneous investments demonstrates that the mere fact that individuals
interact in a competitive environment lets them increase their investments
compared to a situation in which they do not interact. The results of our ex-
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periment with sequential investments in which we aligned the uncertainty
and complexity between competition and monopoly suggests that the higher
degree of complexity and uncertainty in competitive markets compared to
monopolistic markets can explain a higher level of investments with compe-
tition. But higher complexity and uncertainty in competitive markets com-
pared to monopolistic markets can not explain the incentive effect of compe-
tition completely. Even if we equalize complexity and uncertainty, subjects in
the duopoly treatment still have a different investment strategy than subjects
in the monopoly treatment.
An exogenous decrease in expected payments from a project seems to
motivate effort in competitive markets, whereas it discourages effort in mo-
nopolistic markets. This difference can only be explained by the incentive
effect of competition, because the relationship between cost of investment
and probability of success is unaffected by the exogenous shock. This ob-
servation of the investment behaviour has important implications for the
understanding of the interaction of competition and innovation. It predicts
that firms may increase their investments in R&D if their competitors do so,
even though it is not profitable. On the other hand, it predicts that firms
in monopolistic markets tend to decrease their investments if a low payoff
becomes more likely.
These results help to reconcile some of the seemingly conflicting findings
in field evidence. Our results are complementary and provide controlled
evidence that investment decisions are affected by the degree of competition
independent of differences in monetary incentives. It would be interesting to
identify what aspect of the competitive environment affects the investment
strategy. Especially social preferences and peer effects might play a role.
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appendix 3.a
3.a.1 Experiment with Simultaneous Investments
Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure 3.A1 shows the average over subjects’ investment per period and
treatment. In all treatments and periods, the investments are above the Nash
equilibrium prediction of 40 (solid grey line). The investments of the duo-
poly and oligopoly treatment are in each period above the investments of
the monopoly treatment. There does not seem to be a time trend of endgame
effect.
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Figure 3.A1: Per period investments by treatment in the experiment with simulta-
neous investments
Table 3.A1 reports regressions on the determinants of the investment in
the R&D project additional to Table 3.2. Regression (1) shows that subjects
invest significantly more in the duopoly and the oligopoly treatments com-
pared to the monopoly treatment if we restrict the data to the first period.
Regression (2) and (3) show that repeating regressions (1) and (2) of Table
3.2, but clustering the standard errors on matching group level instead of
subject level slightly decreases the standard errors. It does not affect the
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significance of the results. The effect of the oligopoly treatment dummy is sig-
nificant at the 1% level instead of the 5% level. In regression (4) we use the
mean of the investments over all periods (which reduces the observations to
130). Again, all results stay significant and the oligopoly treatment dummy is
even significant at the 1% level.
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Investment in R&D project
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Duopoly 10.05∗ 13.13∗∗∗ 13.27∗∗∗ 13.27∗∗∗
(4.602) (2.924) (3.284) (3.373)
Oligopoly 14.66∗∗∗ 9.120∗∗∗ 9.319∗∗∗ 9.319∗∗∗
(3.173) (2.559) (2.274) (2.336)
Female -4.662 -4.662
(3.133) (3.218)
Age 0.544∗ 0.544∗
(0.304) (0.312)
Risk aversion 1.248 1.248
(1.077) (1.106)
Risk aversion quest. -0.671 -0.671
(1.069) (1.098)
Loss aversion 1.124 1.124
(0.988) (1.015)
Ambiguity aversion -1.937 -1.937
(1.769) (1.817)
Restrict to period 1 yes
Period dummies yes
Period 1 -4.308∗
(2.249)
Constant 46.09∗∗∗ 50.38∗∗∗ 41.85∗∗∗ 41.18∗∗∗
(1.225) (2.171) (10.93) (11.86)
Observations 130 2600 2600 130
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.051 0.078 0.105
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regression (1) is restricted to period
1 and standard errors are clustered by session. In regression (2)
and (3) standard errors are clustered by matching groups instead
of subjects. In regression (3), none of the 20 period dummies is
significant, i.e. there is no time trend or end game effect. Regression
(4) regresses the subject mean over periods of the investment in the
R&D project, standard errors are clustered by matching groups. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
Table 3.A1: Experiment with simultaneous investments: Additional results on the
determinants of the investment in the R&D project
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
Table 3.A2 shows the rounded total payoffs from the investment game (here-
after payoffs) of the subject in the monopoly treatment depending on its
investment I. An investment of 40 in the R&D project maximizes the sub-
ject’s payoff.
I
0 310.00
10 368.30
20 383.10
30 386.30
40 389.50
50 386.90
60 384.30
70 381.70
80 376.20
90 367.80
100 359.40
Table 3.A2: Payoffs in the Monopoly treatment
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Table 3.A3 shows the rounded payoffs of subject i depending on its own in-
vestment and the investment of the other player j in the duopoly treatment.
Similarly, Table 3.A4 shows the rounded payoffs of subject j depending on
its own investment and the investment of the other player i in the duo-
poly treatment. From the tables can be read that the investments of the two
subjects are strategic substitutes: If subject j increases its investment, it is
optimal for subject i to decrease its investment and vice versa. The payoffs
resulting from investments which are best responses for each investment of
the other player are in underlined. Comparing the best responses of player
i and player j in Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4 shows that (Ii, Ij) = (40, 40) is the
single Nash equilibrium in the duopoly treatment. The payoff of the Nash
equilibrium is double-underlined.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
Table 3.A5 shows the rounded payoffs of subject i in the oligopoly treatment
depending on the investments of the three other players −i (assuming that
players −i choose the same investment). The payoffs from investments which
are best responses of player i for each investment of the other players −i are
underlined. From the table can be read that the investments of the three
subjects are strategic substitutes: If the subjects −i increase their investment,
it is optimal for subject i to decrease its investment. This holds true for all
subjects. Comparing the best responses of all players shows that only the
investment of 40 is a best response for all subjects. Therefore, (Ii, Ij, Ik, Il) =
(40, 40, 40, 40) is the single Nash equilibrium in the oligopoly treatment.
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3.a.2 Experiment with Sequential Investments
Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure 3.A2 shows the average over subjects’ investment per period and
treatment. Subject M in the monopoly-seq treatment and subject 1 and 2 in
the duopoly-seq treatments choose a probability of success above the Nash
equilibrium prediction of 40 (solid grey line). There does not seem to be a
time trend of endgame effect.
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Figure 3.A2: Per period investments by treatment in the experiment with sequential
investments
Table 3.A6 reports regressions on the determinants of chosen probability
of success of the R&D project additional to Table 3.4. Regression (1) restricts
the analysis to the investments of period 1. It shows that subjects across
treatments react very different to the probability of subject 1/the probability
of bad market development and the difference is even more pronounced
than predicted by regression (2) in Table 3.4. Regression (1) of Table 3.A6
predicts the following reaction functions: p2(p1) = 0.3572+ 0.00314 p1 and
pM(pB) = 0.6406− 0.000287 pB.
From regression (2) can be read that repeating regressions (2) of Table 3.2
but clustering the standard errors on matching groups instead of on subjects
slightly decreases the standard errors. It does not affect the significance of
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the results. Regression (3) repeats regressions (3) of Table 3.2 but standard
errors are clustered by matching groups instead of subjects. This results in
some minor changes in the standard errors and on the significance levels,
but it does not chnage the significance of the effect of competition on the
investment decision.
108 the incentive effect of competition
Probability of success of the
R&D project in % (subject M and 2)
(1) (2) (3)
Monopoly 28.34∗∗ 15.05∗∗∗ 15.35∗∗∗
(9.811) (4.367) (4.164)
Probability of Subject 1/ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.0940∗∗ 0.0989∗∗
Probability of bad market development (0.0884) (0.0439) (0.0381)
Monopoly × Probability of subject 1/ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗
Probability of bad market development (0.174) (0.0742) (0.0720)
Female 5.792∗
(3.119)
Age 0.284
(0.258)
Risk aversion -1.735
(1.106)
Risk aversion quest. 0.0954
(0.903)
Loss aversion -1.198
(0.837)
Ambiguity aversion -1.605
(1.656)
Restrict to period 1 yes
Period dummies yes
Period 1 -4.071∗
(2.152)
Period 2 -4.984∗∗
(1.947)
Period 1 -4.357∗
(2.326)
Constant 35.72∗∗∗ 48.68∗∗∗ 55.53∗∗∗
(6.861) (2.848) (9.903)
Observations 140 2800 2800
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.022 0.058
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions with robust standard
errors in parentheses. Regression (1) is restricted to period 1 and standard
errors are clustered by session. In regression (2) and (3) standard errors are
clustered by matching groups instead of subjects. In regression (3), of the 20
period dummies only the listed ones are significant. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.010
Table 3.A6: Experiment with sequential investments: Additional results on the de-
terminants of the investment in the R&D project
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Proof of Proposition 3.4
Table 3.A7 shows the payoffs of subject 1 in the duopoly-seq treatment de-
pending on its own probability of success p1 and the probability of success
of subject 2, p2. Table 3.A8 shows the payoffs of subject 2 in the duopoly-seq
treatment depending on its own probability of success p2 and the probabil-
ity of success of subject 1, p1. The payoffs resulting from investments which
are best responses for each investment of the other subject are underlined.
Choosing the probability of success of 0.4 is a dominant strategy for both
subjects because it is the payoff-maximising strategy for each probability of
success of the other subject.
p2/p1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.0 200.0 211.0 218.0 223.0 225.0 224.0 221.0 214.0 205.0
0.1 190.0 200.8 207.6 212.4 214.2 213.0 209.8 202.6 193.4
0.2 180.0 190.6 197.2 201.8 203.4 202.0 198.6 191.2 181.8
0.3 170.0 180.4 186.8 191.2 192.6 191.0 187.4 179.8 170.2
0.4 160.0 170.2 176.4 180.6 181.8 180.0 176.2 168.4 158.6
0.5 150.0 160.0 166.0 170.0 171.0 169.0 165.0 157.0 147.0
0.6 140.0 149.8 155.6 159.4 160.2 158.0 153.8 145.6 135.4
0.7 130.0 139.6 145.2 148.8 149.4 147.0 142.6 134.2 123.8
0.8 120.0 129.4 134.8 138.2 138.6 136.0 131.4 122.8 112.2
Table 3.A7: Payoffs of subject 1 in the Duopoly-Seq treatment
p2/p1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.0 200.0 190.0 180.0 170.0 160.0 150.0 140.0 130.0 120.0
0.1 211.0 200.8 190.6 180.4 170.2 160.0 149.8 139.6 129.4
0.2 218.0 207.6 197.2 186.8 176.4 166.0 155.6 145.2 134.8
0.3 223.0 212.4 201.8 191.2 180.6 170.0 159.4 148.8 138.2
0.4 225.0 214.2 203.4 192.6 181.8 171.0 160.2 149.4 138.6
0.5 224.0 213.0 202.0 191.0 180.0 169.0 158.0 147.0 136.0
0.6 221.0 209.8 198.6 187.4 176.2 165.0 153.8 142.6 131.4
0.7 214.0 202.6 191.2 179.8 168.4 157.0 145.6 134.2 122.8
0.8 205.0 193.4 181.8 170.2 158.6 147.0 135.4 123.8 112.2
Table 3.A8: Payoffs of subject 2 in the Duopoly-Seq treatment
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
Table 3.A9 shows the payoffs of the subject in the monopoly-seq treatment
depending on its own probability of success pM and the probability of a
bad market development pB. The payoffs from investments which are best
responses of the subject for each probability pB are underlined. Choosing
the probability pM = 0.4 is a dominant strategy for the subject because it is
the payoff-maximising strategy for each probability pB.
pM/pB 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.0 200.0 190.0 180.0 170.0 160.0 150.0 140.0 130.0 120.0
0.1 211.0 200.8 190.6 180.4 170.2 160.0 149.8 139.6 129.4
0.2 218.0 207.6 197.2 186.8 176.4 166.0 155.6 145.2 134.8
0.3 223.0 212.4 201.8 191.2 180.6 170.0 159.4 148.8 138.2
0.4 225.0 214.2 203.4 192.6 181.8 171.0 160.2 149.4 138.6
0.5 224.0 213.0 202.0 191.0 180.0 169.0 158.0 147.0 136.0
0.6 221.0 209.8 198.6 187.4 176.2 165.0 153.8 142.6 131.4
0.7 214.0 202.6 191.2 179.8 168.4 157.0 145.6 134.2 122.8
0.8 205.0 193.4 181.8 170.2 158.6 147.0 135.4 123.8 112.2
Table 3.A9: Payoffs of the subject in the Monopoly-Seq treatment
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3.a.3 Instructions
All experimental instructions are translated from German.
Experiment with simultaneous choices: monopoly treatment
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
From now on please do not speak with the other participants any more.
General Information
This experiment will investigate economic decision making. Thereby you can
earn money. You will receive the income you earned during the experiment
in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your own decisions as well as the other participants’ decisions
determine your income according to the rules that are explained below. The
whole experiment lasts about 1.5 hours. At first you will receive detailed in-
structions. If you have any questions after reading the instructions or during
the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experiment conductors
will come to your place and answer your questions privately.
We refer to all persons in the masculine form in order to make the text more
readable. We ask for your understanding.
Payments
All the points you earn during the experiment will be converted to Euro at
the end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies:
500 points = 1.00 Euro
Furthermore, you will receive a show-up fee of 2000 points (4 Euro) at the
beginning of the experiment. This show-up fee also serves the purpose to
compensate for possible losses that may occur during the experiment. Fur-
thermore, you receive remuneration for answering a questionnaire at the end
of the experiment.
112 the incentive effect of competition
Anonymity
The other participants will neither during nor after the experiment receive
any information about your decisions and about how much you earned. We
analyse the data as an aggregate and never match names with data of the ex-
periments. At the end of the experiment you will have to sign a receipt that
you received your money. This receipt is only needed for accounting reasons
of our sponsor, which will not receive any additional data of this experiment.
Auxiliary Means
There is a pen at your desk. Please leave it there at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
Experiment procedere During the experiment you assume the role of a man-
ager, who invests in research and development of his company. Your com-
pany holds a monopoly position in a market, this means it is the only sup-
plier and it does not compete against other companies. The experiment lasts
for 20 rounds.
Making a decision in a round
You are a manager of a company which is a monopolist on a market. In every
round you have an investment budget of 100 points. You have to spend all
100 points. You can invest these points either in a risk-free project or in
research and development (R&D).
• Every point that you invest in the risk-free project will increase your
payment by two points, which will be given to you at the end of the
experiment.
• Every point that you invest in research and development increases the
probability that your innovation will be successful. This innovation will
improve the market position of your firm. The first points of your in-
vestment in R&D lead to a relatively high increase of the probability
of success. The more points you invest the less strong is the positive
effect on the probability of success. Please have a look at the enclosed
table for the detailed relationship between invested points and proba-
bility of success. The managers you are competing with face the same
decision like you.
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The success/failure of your R&D investment determines the gains of your
company. Your payments depend on your company’s profits:
• If you are successful your company realizes a high profit. In this case
you receive a bonus of 400 points.
• If you are not successful your company realizes a low profit. In this
case you receive a bonus of 110 points.
The detailed process in each round
• At the beginning of a round you receive a budget of 100 points that
you have to split on two investment projects.
– Every point that you invest in the risk-free project will increase
your payment by two points, which will be given to you at the
end of the experiment.
– Every point that you invest in research and development increases
the probability that your innovation will be successful. This inno-
vation will improve the market position of your firm. The effect
on the probability of success decreases with the number of points
invested in R&D. Please have a look at the enclosed table for the
detailed relationship between invested points and probability of
success. When increasing your investment from 10 to 20 points,
your probability of success goes up from 27% to 39%, an increase
of 12 percentage points. But if you increase your investment from
80 to 90 points, your probability of success rises only from 78% to
82%, an increase of 4 percentage points.
• After you decided how to split the 100 points on the two investment
projects there will be a decision about success or failure of your com-
pany’s R&D investment. This outcome is generated by a random pro-
cess only depending on the chosen success probability:
– Imagine a rotating wheel of fortune with a red and a black field.
If the wheel stops at the red field your investment is successful. If
the wheel stops at the black field your investment is not success-
ful.
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– The more points you invest the larger is the red field on the wheel
of fortune and with it the probability that your investment is suc-
cessful.
• After your wheel of fortune was turned and success or failure of your
investment is determined, your company will realize either a high or
a low profit. This market outcome has an influence on your payment:
– If you are successful you get a bonus of 400 points.
– If you are not successful you get a bonus of 110 points.
• Herewith the round ends. The next round is independent of the previ-
ous round.
• Please notice: Even if you decide to invest 0 points in R&D your pay-
ment nevertheless depend on the market outcome of your company in
this round.
Your total income of this experiment is the sum of your payments over the
20 rounds plus your show-up fee.
Do you have any questions?
Investment Probability of Increase of probability
in R&D in points success in % due to the last 10 points
invested in R&D in %
0 0 –
10 27 27
20 39 12
30 47 8
40 55 8
50 61 6
60 67 6
70 73 6
80 78 5
90 82 4
100 86 4
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Control Questions
We ask you to compute the following examples before beginning the exper-
iment. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. The experiment will
not be started until all the participants have answered the questions cor-
rectly. If you have questions, please raise your hand. The conductor of the
experiment will pass all seats and answer your questions privately.
1. You decided to invest 60 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 40 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 55%. Your investment is successful.
• What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• What is your income and the income from the R&D project in this
round?
2. You decided to invest 30 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 70 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 73%. Your investment is not successful.
• What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• What is your income and the income from the R&D project in this
round?
3. You decided to invest 80 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 20 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 39%. Your investment is successful.
• What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• What is your income and the income from the R&D project in this
round?
4. You decided to invest 100 points in the risk-free investment project
and to invest 0 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of
success is 0%. Your investment is not successful.
• What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• What is your income and the income from the R&D project in this
round?
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Experiment with simultaneous choices: duopoly treatment
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
From now on please do not speak with the other participants any more.
General Information
This experiment will investigate economic decision making. Thereby you can
earn money. You will receive the income you earned during the experiment
in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your own decisions as well as the other participants’ decisions
determine your income according to the rules that are explained below. The
whole experiment lasts about 1.5 hours. At first you will receive detailed in-
structions. If you have any questions after reading the instructions or during
the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experiment conductors
will come to your place and answer your questions privately.
We refer to all persons in the masculine form in order to make the text more
readable. We ask for your understanding.
Payments
All the points you earn during the experiment will be converted to Euro at
the end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies:
500 points = 1.00 Euro
Furthermore, you will receive a show-up fee of 2000 points (4 Euro) at the
beginning of the experiment. This show-up fee also serves the purpose to
compensate for possible losses that may occur during the experiment. Fur-
thermore, you receive remuneration for answering a questionnaire at the end
of the experiment.
Anonymity
Neither during nor after the experiment you will get to know with whom
you were matched with in each round. The other participants will also not re-
ceive any information with whom they were matched and about how much
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you earned. We analyze the data as an aggregate and never match names
with data of the experiments. At the end of the experiment you will have
to sign a receipt that you received your money. This receipt is only needed
for accounting reasons of our sponsor, which will not receive any additional
data of this experiment.
Auxiliary Means
There is a pen at your desk. Please leave it there at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
Experiment procedere
During the experiment you assume the role of a manager, who invests
in research and development of his company. The experiment lasts for 20
rounds. In every round your company competes with one other company,
which manager also invest in research and development. You are randomly
matched with one other participant of the experiment. In every round you
are matched with one other, new manager. Neither during nor after the ex-
periment you receive any information about the identity of the other persons
you were matched with. They will not receive any information about your
identity too. This guarantees full anonymity of decisions in every round.
Making a decision in a round
You are a manager of a company which competes with another company.
In every round you have an investment budget of 100 points. You have to
spend all 100 points. You can invest these points either in a risk-free project
or in research and development (R&D).
• Every point that you invest in the risk-free project will increase your
payment by two points, which will be given to you at the end of the
experiment.
• Every point that you invest in research and development increases the
probability that your innovation will be successful. This innovation will
improve the market position of your firm. The first points of your in-
vestment in R&D lead to a relatively high increase of the probability
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of success. The more points you invest the less strong is the positive
effect on the probability of success. Please have a look at the enclosed
table for the detailed relationship between invested points and proba-
bility of success. The manager you are competing with faces the same
decision like you.
Please note: The probability that your investment is successful or not is in-
dependent on the success of the other manager.
The success/failure of the R&D investments of both companies determines
the gains/losses of the two companies in the market. Your payment depends
on this market outcome:
• If only you are successful and the other manager is not successful,
your company dominates the market. In this case you receive a bonus
of 490 points, the other manager only receives a bonus of 10 points.
• If both managers are successful, both companies are on a par. In this
case both managers get a bonus of 210 points.
• If no manager is successful, both companies are also on a par, but are
less profitable. In this case both managers get 90 points.
• If only the other manager is successful, than the other company dom-
inates the market. In this case the other manager gets a bonus of 490
points and you receive 10 points.
The detailed process in each round
• At the beginning of a round you receive a budget of 100 points that
you have to split on two investment projects.
– Every point that you invest in the risk-free project will increase
your payment by two points, which will be given to you at the
end of the experiment.
– Every point that you invest in research and development increases
the probability that your innovation will be successful. This inno-
vation will improve the market position of your firm. The effect
on the probability of success decreases with the number of points
invested in R&D. Please have a look at the enclosed table for the
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detailed relationship between invested points and probability of
success. When increasing your investment from 10 to 20 points,
your probability of success goes up from 27% to 39%, an increase
of 12 percentage points. But if you increase your investment from
80 to 90 points, your probability of success rises only from 78% to
82%, an increase of 4 percentage points.
• After both managers decided how to split the 100 points on the two
investment projects there will be two separate outcomes about success
or failure of each company’s R&D investment. These outcomes are
generated by a random process only depending on the chosen success
probability:
– Imagine a rotating wheel of fortune with a red and a black field.
If the wheel stops at the red field your investment is successful. If
the wheel stops at the black field your investment is not success-
ful.
– The more points you invest the larger is the red field on the wheel
of fortune and with it the probability that your investment is suc-
cessful. The manager of the other company your company is com-
peting against can influence the red field of his own wheel of
fortune with his investments.
• After your wheel of fortune and the wheel of the other manager were
turned and success or failure of both companies is determined, one
of the following four market outcomes prevails. The market outcome
has an influence on your payment as well as on the other manager’s
payment:
– If you are successful but the other manager is not successful, you
company dominates the market. You get a bonus of 490 points
and the other manager gets 10 points.
– If both managers are successful, both get a bonus of 210 points
each.
– If both managers are not successful, both get 90 points each.
– If the other manager is successful but you are not successful, then
the other company holds a better market position than your com-
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pany. In this case the manager of the other company receives a
bonus of 490 points. You get 10 points.
• Herewith the round ends.
• In the next round every manager is matched with another new ran-
domly chosen manager. This new round is independent of the previ-
ous round.
• Please notice: Even if you decide to invest 0 points in R&D your pay-
ment nevertheless depend on the market outcome of your company in
this round.
Your total income of this experiment is the sum of your payments over the
20 rounds plus your show-up fee.
Do you have any questions?
Investment Probability of Increase of probability
in R&D in points success in % due to the last 10 points
invested in R&D in %
0 0 –
10 27 27
20 39 12
30 47 8
40 55 8
50 61 6
60 67 6
70 73 6
80 78 5
90 82 4
100 86 4
Control Questions
We ask you to compute the following examples before beginning the exper-
iment. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. The experiment will
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not be started until all the participants have answered the questions cor-
rectly. If you have questions, please raise your hand. The conductor of the
experiment will pass all seats and answer your questions privately.
1. You decided to invest 60 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 40 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 55%. The other manager decided to invest 50 points in the risk-
free project and 50 points in the R&D project. Hence, his probability
of success is 61%.Your investment is successful. The investment of the
other manager is not successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
What is your income and the income of the other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
2. You decided to invest 100 points in the risk-free investment project
and to invest 0 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of
success is 0%. The other manager decided to invest 70 points in the risk-
free project and 30 points in the R&D project. Hence, his probability
of success is 73%. The investment of the other manager is successful.
Your investment is not successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
What is your income and the income of the other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
3. You decided to invest 20 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 80 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 78%. The other manager decided to invest 60 points in the risk-
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free project and 40 points in the R&D project. Hence, his probability of
success is 55%. Both investments are successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
What is your income and the income of the other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
4. You decided to invest 60 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 40 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 55%. The other manager decided to invest 50 points in the risk-
free project and 50 points in the R&D project. Hence, his probability of
success is 61%.No investment is successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
What is your income and the income of the other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other manager:
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Experiment with simultaneous choices: oligopoly treatment
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
From now on please do not speak with the other participants any more.
General Information
This experiment will investigate economic decision making. Thereby you can
earn money. You will receive the income you earned during the experiment
in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your own decisions as well as the other participants’ decisions
determine your income according to the rules that are explained below. The
whole experiment lasts about 1.5 hours. At first you will receive detailed in-
structions. If you have any questions after reading the instructions or during
the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experiment conductors
will come to your place and answer your questions privately.
We refer to all persons in the masculine form in order to make the text more
readable. We ask for your understanding.
Payments
All the points you earn during the experiment will be converted to Euro at
the end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies:
500 points = 1.00 Euro
Furthermore, you will receive a show-up fee of 2000 points (4 Euro) at the
beginning of the experiment. This show-up fee also serves the purpose to
compensate for possible losses that may occur during the experiment. Fur-
thermore, you receive remuneration for answering a questionnaire at the end
of the experiment.
Anonymity
Neither during nor after the experiment you will get to know with whom
you were matched with in each round. The other participants will also not re-
ceive any information with whom they were matched and about how much
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you earned. We analyse the data as an aggregate and never match names
with data of the experiments. At the end of the experiment you will have
to sign a receipt that you received your money. This receipt is only needed
for accounting reasons of our sponsor, which will not receive any additional
data of this experiment.
Auxiliary Means
There is a pen at your desk. Please leave it there at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
Experiment procedere
During the experiment you assume the role of a manager, who invests
in research and development of his company. The experiment lasts for 20
rounds. In every round your company competes with three other compan-
ies, which managers also invest in research and development. You are ran-
domly matched with three other participants of the experiment. In every
round you are matched with three other, new managers. Neither during
nor after the experiment you receive any information about the identity of
the other persons you were matched with. They will not receive any inform-
ation about your identity too. This guarantees full anonymity of decisions in
every round.
Making a decision in a round
You are a manager of a company which competes with three other compan-
ies. In every round you have an investment budget of 100 points. You have to
spend all 100 points. You can invest these points either in a risk-free project
or in research and development (R&D).
• Every point that you invest in the risk-free project will increase your
payment by two points, which will be given to you at the end of the
experiment.
• Every point that you invest in research and development increases the
probability that your innovation will be successful. This innovation will
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improve the market position of your firm. The first points of your in-
vestment in R&D lead to a relatively high increase of the probability
of success. The more points you invest the less strong is the positive
effect on the probability of success. Please have a look at the enclosed
table for the detailed relationship between invested points and proba-
bility of success. The managers you are competing with face the same
decision like you.
Please note: The probability that your investment is successful or not is in-
dependent on the success of the other managers.
The success/failure of the R&D investments of the four companies determ-
ine the gains/losses of the four companies in the market. Your payments
(and the payments of the other managers) depend on this market outcome:
• If only you are successful and no other manager is successful, your
company dominates the market. In this case you receive a bonus of
770 points, the other managers only receive a bonus of 10 points each.
• If you and one other manager are successful, both companies dom-
inate the market. In this case you (and the manager of the other suc-
cessful company) get a bonus of 360 points, the other managers only
receive a bonus of 10 points each.
• If you and two other managers are successful, you (and the other two
successful managers) get a bonus of 200 points, the other managers
only receive a bonus of 10 points each.
• If you and all other three managers are successful, you will share the
market with these other four companies and you and the other three
managers get a bonus of 100 points.
• If you are not successful and all other managers are also not success-
ful, all companies are on the same level, but are less profitable. In this
case you and all other managers get 50 points.
• If you are not successful but at least one other manager is successful,
than the other company/companies dominate the market and you get
10 points.
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The detailed process in each round
• At the beginning of a round you receive a budget of 100 points that
you have to split on two investment projects.
– Every point that you invest in the risk-free project will increase
your payment by two points, which will be given to you at the
end of the experiment.
– Every point that you invest in research and development increases
the probability that your innovation will be successful. This inno-
vation will improve the market position of your firm. The effect
on the probability of success decreases with the number of points
invested in R&D. Please have a look at the enclosed table for the
detailed relationship between invested points and probability of
success. When increasing your investment from 10 to 20 points,
your probability of success goes up from 27% to 39%, an increase
of 12 percentage points. But if you increase your investment from
80 to 90 points, your probability of success rises only from 78% to
82%, an increase of 4 percentage points.
• After all four managers decided how to split the 100 points on the two
investment projects there will be four separate outcomes about success
or failure of each company’s R&D investment. These outcomes are
generated by a random process only depending on the chosen success
probability:
– Imagine a rotating wheel of fortune with a red and a black field.
If the wheel stops at the red field your investment is successful. If
the wheel stops at the black field your investment is not success-
ful.
– The more points you invest the larger is the red field on the wheel
of fortune and with it the probability that your investment is suc-
cessful. The three managers of the other companies which your
company is competing against can influence the red fields of their
own wheels of fortune with their investments.
• After your wheel of fortune and the wheels of the other managers were
turned and success or failure of all four companies is determined, one
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of the following five market outcomes prevails. The market outcome
has an influence on your payment as well as on the other managers’
payments:
– One manager is successful, the other three are not successful. The
company of the successful manager dominated the market and
the manager gets a bonus of 770 points. The other managers get
10 points.
– Two managers are successful and their companies dominate the
market. The other two managers are not successful. The two suc-
cessful managers get a bonus of 360 points each. The other two
managers who are not successful get 10 points.
– Three managers are successful and one manager is not successful.
The three successful managers get a bonus of 200 points each. The
manager who is not successful gets 10 points.
– All four managers are successful and the four companies share
the market. Each manager gets a bonus of 100 points.
– No manager is successful and the four companies share the mar-
ket but realize lower profits. In this case all managers get 50
points.
• Herewith the round ends.
• In the next round every manager is matched with three new randomly
chosen managers. This new round is independent of the previous round.
• Please notice: Even if you decide to invest 0 points in R&D your pay-
ment nevertheless depend on the market outcome of your company in
this round.
Your total income of this experiment is the sum of your payments over the
20 rounds plus your show-up fee.
Do you have any questions?
Control Questions
We ask you to compute the following examples before beginning the exper-
iment. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. The experiment will
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Investment Probability of Increase of probability
in R&D in points success in % due to the last 10 points
invested in R&D in %
0 0 –
10 27 27
20 39 12
30 47 8
40 55 8
50 61 6
60 67 6
70 73 6
80 78 5
90 82 4
100 86 4
not be started until all the participants have answered the questions cor-
rectly. If you have questions, please raise your hand. The conductor of the
experiment will pass all seats and answer your questions privately.
1. You decided to invest 60 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 40 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 55%. Your investment is successful. The investments of the other
managers are not successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
What is your income and the income of each other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other managers:
2. You decided to invest 100 points in the risk-free investment project
and to invest 0 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of
success is 0%. Your investment is not successful. The investment of the
second manager is successful, the investments of the third and fourth
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managers are not successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
What is your income and the income of each other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the second manager:
• Income of the third manager:
• Income of the fourth manager:
3. You decided to invest 20 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 80 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 78%. Your investment is successful. The investments of the other
three managers are also successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
What is your income and the income of each other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other managers:
4. You decided to invest 60 points in the risk-free investment project and
to invest 40 points in the R&D project. Hence, your probability of suc-
cess is 55%. Your investment is not successful. The investments of the
other three managers are also not successful.
What is your income of the investment in the risk-free project?
• Your income:
What is your income and the income of each other manager from the
market interaction in this round?
• Your income:
• Income of the other managers:
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Experiment with sequential choices: monopoly treatment
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
From now on please do not speak with the other participants any more.
General Information
This experiment will investigate economic decision making. Thereby you can
earn money. You will receive the income you earned during the experiment
in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your own decisions determine your income according to the rules
that are explained below.
The whole experiment lasts about 1.5 hours. At first you will receive de-
tailed instructions. If you have any questions after reading the instructions
or during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experiment
conductors will come to your place and answer your questions privately.
We refer to all persons in the masculine form in order to make the text more
readable. We ask for your understanding.
Payments
All the points you earn during the experiment will be converted to Euro at
the end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies:
25 points = 1.00 Euro
Furthermore, you will receive a show-up fee of 175 points (7 Euro) at the
beginning of the experiment. This show-up fee also serves the purpose to
compensate for possible losses that may occur during the experiment. Fur-
thermore, you receive remuneration for answering a questionnaire at the end
of the experiment.
Anonymity
The other participants will neither during nor after the experiment receive
any information about your decisions and about how much you earned. We
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analyse the data as an aggregate and never match names with data of the ex-
periments. At the end of the experiment you will have to sign a receipt that
you received your money. This receipt is only needed for accounting reasons
of our sponsor, which will not receive any additional data of this experiment.
Auxiliary Means
There is a pen at your desk. Please leave it there at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
Experiment procedure
During the experiment you assume the role of a manager, who invests in
research and development (R&D) of his company. The experiment last for 20
rounds. Only one of these 20 rounds will be randomly selected at the end
of the experiment and you will be paid out your earnings of this round.
The selected payout-round is the same for every participant. You will not be
paid for any other round.
Your company holds a monopoly position in a market, this means it is the
only supplier and it does not compete against other companies. The more
you invest in research and development, the higher is the probability that
your innovation is successful, that your company’s profit increases on these
grounds and that you receive a bonus. Independent from this bonus you
receive a fixed payment of 100 points in every round.
Making a decision in a round
You are a manager of a company which is a monopolist on a market. The
more you invest in research and development, the higher is the probabil-
ity that your innovation is be successful which increases your company’s
chances of higher profits. In every round you have a fixed payment of 100
points. Points which you do not spend on your investment will be saved
and paid out at the end of the experiment.
The relationship between investment cost and probability of success is shown
in the following table:
Keep in mind:
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Probability of success in % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Investment cost 0 1 5 11 20 31 45 61 80 100
1. If you choose a certain probability of success (for example 40%), you
have to pay the investment cost which are shown in the second row
(for example 20 points
2. The costs increase more than proportionate with the probability of suc-
cess: An increase of the probability of success from 10% to 20% in-
creases the investment cost by 4 points. An increase of the probability
of success from 60% to 70% increases the investment cost by 16 points.
3. The maximal achievable probability of success is 90%.
The profit of your company depends on the success or failure of your R&D
investment and on the general development of the market. The general de-
velopment of the market can either be good or bad. You cannot influence
whether the development of the market is good or bad, this will be decided
by chance. The exact probability of a bad or good market development var-
ies from round to round. You receive information about it at the beginning
of every round.
The bonus payment which you receive additionally to the fixed payment of
100 points is determined as follows:
• If you are successful and the general market development is good,
then your company makes high profits and you receive a bonus of
200 points.
• If you are successful and the general market development is bad, then
your company makes medium profits and you receive a bonus of 100
points.
• If you are successful and the general market development is bad, then
your company makes low profits and you receive a bonus of0 points.
Additionally you have to pay the investment cost. Your total payment in one
round therefor is:
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Payment = 100 + performance-related bonus payment - investment cost
Please consider that you receive a fixed payment of 100 points in every
round so that your payment will never be negative even if you invest the
maximum amount of 100 points and your bonus payment is0 points. Every
point that you do not invest belongs to you.
The detailed process in each round
• At the beginning of a round you are informed about the probability of
a bad market development in this round.
• Then you decide on your probability of success of your R&D invest-
ment. Depending on the chosen probability of success you have to pay
the investment cost which are listed in the table.
• After this a random mechanism decides whether you are successful or
not. Your probability of success only depends on the amount you have
invested. It is independent of the general development of the market.
– Imagine a rotating wheel of fortune with a red and a black field.
If the wheel stops at the red field your investment is successful. If
the wheel stops at the black field your investment is not success-
ful.
– The more points you invest the larger is the red field on the wheel
of fortune and with it the probability that your investment is suc-
cessful.
• At the same time another random mechanism decides on the outcome
of the market development. Imagine a second rotating wheel of fortune.
The red field represent the probability of a bad market development. If
the wheel stops at the red field the market development is bad.
• After both wheels of fortune were turned and success or failure and
market development are determined, one of the following outcomes
emerges. This market outcome has an influence on your payment:
– If you are successful and the general market development is good,
you receive a bonus of 200 points.
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– If you are successful and the general market development is bad
or if you are not successful and the general market development
is good, you receive a bonus of 100 points.
– If you are not successful and the general market development is
bad, you receive0 points.
– Herewith the round ends.
• In the next round a new investment decision has to be made and a
new general market development will be determined. The next round
is totally independent of the previous round.
Please note: Even though you play this experiment over 20 rounds only
one round will be paid. This round will be selected randomly at the end
of the experiment and is the same for all participants. All other rounds are
irrelevant for your payments.
Do you have any questions?
Control Questions
Please answer the follwing control questions. Wrong answers have no con-
sequences for you. The experiment will not be started until all the parti-
cipants have answered the questions correctly. If you have questions, please
raise your hand. The conductor of the experiment will pass all seats and
answer your questions privately.
1. You decided on a probability of success of 60%. The probability of a
bad market development is 50%. Your investment is successful. The
actual market development is good.
• What is your bonus from the R&D project in this round?
• What is your total payment is this round?
2. You decided on a probability of success of 0%. The probability of a
bad market development is 30%. Your investment is not successful.
The actual market development is bad.
• What is your bonus from the R&D project in this round?
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• What is your total payment is this round?
3. You decided on a probability of success of 80%. The probability of a
bad market development is 40%. Your investment is successful. The
actual market development is bad.
• What is your bonus from the R&D project in this round?
• What is your total payment is this round?
4. You decided on a probability of success of 50%. The probability of a
bad market development is 60%. Your investment is not successful. The
actual market development is good.
• What is your bonus from the R&D project in this round?
• What is your total payment is this round?
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Experiment with sequential choices: monopoly treatment
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
From now on please do not speak with the other participants any more.
General Information
This experiment will investigate economic decision making. Thereby you can
earn money. You will receive the income you earned during the experiment
in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment you and the other participants are asked to make
decisions. Your own decisions and that of the other participants determine
your income according to the rules that are explained below.
The whole experiment lasts about 1.5 hours. At first you will receive de-
tailed instructions. If you have any questions after reading the instructions
or during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experiment
conductors will come to your place and answer your questions privately.
We refer to all persons in the masculine form in order to make the text more
readable. We ask for your understanding.
Payments
All the points you earn during the experiment will be converted to Euro at
the end of the experiment. The following exchange rate applies:
25 points = 1.00 Euro
Furthermore, you will receive a show-up fee of 175 points (7 Euro) at the
beginning of the experiment. This show-up fee also serves the purpose to
compensate for possible losses that may occur during the experiment. Fur-
thermore, you receive remuneration for answering a questionnaire at the end
of the experiment.
Anonymity
You are neither during nor after experiment informed with whom you are/were
matched in each single round. The other participants will neither during nor
after the experiment receive information about the matching or about your
3.A appendix 137
income, too. We analyse the data as an aggregate and never match names
with data of the experiments. At the end of the experiment you will have
to sign a receipt that you received your money. This receipt is only needed
for accounting reasons of our sponsor, which will not receive any additional
data of this experiment.
Auxiliary Means
There is a pen at your desk. Please leave it there at the end of the experiment.
The Experiment
Experiment procedure
During the experiment you assume the role of a manager, who invests in
research and development (R&D) of his company. The experiment last for 20
rounds. Only one of these 20 rounds will be randomly selected at the end
of the experiment and you will be paid out your earnings of this round.
The selected payout-round is the same for every participant. You will not be
paid for any other round.
Your company competes in each round with another company, whose man-
ager also invests in R&D. The more a manager invests in R&D, the higher
is the probability that his innovation is successful, that his company’s profit
increases on these grounds and that he receive a bonus. Independent from
this bonus each manager receives a fixed payment of 100 points in every
round.
The managers of both companies decide one after the other how much they
invest in R&D. First manager 1 decides on his investment without knowing
how much manager 2 will invest. Manager 2 observes the investment choice
of manager 1, but he does not know whether the investment of manager 1is
successful or not. Only after manager 2 has made his investment, a random
drawing decides about success or failure of both investments and about the
payments of both managers.
Half of all participants is manager 1 in all 20 rounds and the other half of
the participants is manager 2 in all 20 rounds. Before the first round begins
you will be informed about your role. In each round you are matched with
another manager of the other role.
You are not informed about the identity of the persons you are matched
with, neither during nor after the experiment. This ensures full anonymity
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of the decisions in all rounds.
Making a decision in a round
You are a manager of a company which competes with another company.
The more you invest in research and development, the higher is the proba-
bility that your innovation is be successful which increases your company’s
chances of higher profits. In every round you have a fixed payment of 100
points. Points which you do not spend on your investment will be saved
and paid out at the end of the experiment.
The relationship between investment cost and probability of success is shown
in the following table:
Probability of success in % 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Investment cost 0 1 5 11 20 31 45 61 80 100
Keep in mind:
1. If you choose a certain probability of success (for example 40%), you
have to pay the investment cost which are shown in the second row
(for example 20 points
2. The costs increase more than proportionate with the probability of suc-
cess: An increase of the probability of success from 10% to 20% in-
creases the investment cost by 4 points. An increase of the probability
of success from 60% to 70% increases the investment cost by 16 points.
3. The maximal achievable probability of success is 90%.
4. The probability of success of your R&D investment is independent of
the success of the investment of the other manager.
Whether the companies succeed or fail with their investments in R&D de-
termines the profits or losses of both companies in the market. Your bo-
nus payment, which you receive additionally to your fixed payment of 100
points, depends on this market outcome:
• If only you are successful, but the other manager is not successful, your
company dominates the market. In this case you receive a bonus of 200
points, the other manager only receives0 points.
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• If both managers are successful or if no manager is successful, both
companies are on a par. In this case both managers get a bonus of 100
points.
• If, both companies are also on a par, but are less profitable. In this case
both managers get 90 points.
• If only the other manager is successful, than the other company dom-
inates the market. In this case the other manager gets a bonus of 200
points and you receive 0 points.
Additionally you have to pay the investment cost. Your total payment in one
round therefore is:
Payment = 100 + performance-related bonus payment - investment cost
Please consider that you receive a fixed payment of 100 points in every
round so that your payment will never be negative even if you invest the
maximum amount of 100 points and your bonus payment is 0 points. Every
point that you do not invest belongs to you.
The detailed process in each round
• First manager 1 decides on his probability of success. Depending on
the chosen probability of success he has to pay the investment cost
which are listed in the table.
• Then manager 2 is informed about the probability of success which
manager 1 has chosen. Manager 2 does not know whether the invest-
ment of manager 1 was successful or not. Now manager 2 has to choose
on his probability of success. He also has to pay the investment cost
which are listed in the table.
• After both managers have decided on their probability of success, a
random drawing decides whether manager 1 and whether manager 2
are successful. The probability of success depends only on the amount
he has invested. It is independent of the investment of the other man-
ager:
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– Imagine for each manager a rotating wheel of fortune with a red
and a black field. If your wheel stops at the red field your in-
vestment is successful. If the wheel stops at the black field your
investment is not successful.
– The more points you invest the larger is the red field on the wheel
of fortune and with it the probability that your investment is suc-
cessful. The manager of the other company your company is com-
peting against can influence the red field of his own wheel of
fortune with his investments.
• After your wheel of fortune and the wheel of the other manager were
turned and success or failure of both companies is determined, one
of the following three market outcomes prevails. The market outcome
has an influence on your payment as well as on the other manager’s
payment:
– If you are successful but the other manager is not successful, you
company dominates the market. You get a bonus of 200 points
and the other manager gets 0 points.
– If both managers are successful or if both managers are not suc-
cessful, both get a bonus of 100 points each.
– If the other manager is successful but you are not successful, then
the other company holds a better market position than your com-
pany. In this case the manager of the other company receives a
bonus of 200 points. You get 0 points.
• Herewith the round ends.
• In the next round every manager is matched with another new ran-
domly chosen manager. This new round is independent of the previ-
ous round.
Please note: Even though you play this experiment over 20 rounds only
one round will be paid. This round will be selected randomly at the end
of the experiment and is the same for all participants. All other rounds are
irrelevant for your payments.
Do you have any questions?
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Control Questions
Please answer the follwing control questions. Wrong answers have no con-
sequences for you. The experiment will not be started until all the parti-
cipants have answered the questions correctly. If you have questions, please
raise your hand. The conductor of the experiment will pass all seats and
answer your questions privately.
1. You decided on a probability of success of 60%. The other manager de-
cided on a probability of success of 50%. Your investment is successful.
The investment of the other manager is not successful.
What is your bonus and the bonus of the other managers because of
your investment in the R&D in this round?
• Your bonus:
• Bonus of the other manager :
What is your total payment and the total payment of the other manager
is this round?
• Your payment:
• Payment of the other manager:
2. You decided on a probability of success of 0%. The other manager
decided on a probability of success of 30%. The investment of the other
manager is not successful. Your investment is not successful.
What is your bonus and the bonus of the other managers because of
your investment in the R&D in this round?
• Your bonus:
• Bonus of the other manager :
What is your total payment and the total payment of the other manager
is this round?
• Your payment:
• Payment of the other manager:
3. You decided on a probability of success of 80%. The other manager
decided on a probability of success of 40%. Both investments are suc-
cessful.
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What is your bonus and the bonus of the other managers because of
your investment in the R&D in this round?
• Your bonus:
• Bonus of the other manager :
What is your total payment and the total payment of the other manager
is this round?
• Your payment:
• Payment of the other manager:
4. You decided on a probability of success of 50%. The other manager
decided on a probability of success of 60%. Both investments are not
successful.
What is your bonus and the bonus of the other managers because of
your investment in the R&D in this round?
• Your bonus:
• Bonus of the other manager :
What is your total payment and the total payment of the other manager
is this round?
• Your payment:
• Payment of the other manager:
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Instructions for tests on risk, loss and ambiguity aversion
Additional Decisions
Now three short parts follow. Each of the three parts consists of seven de-
cisions (seven rows), in which you have to decide for one out of of two
possibilities. All together you have to make 31 decisions. One of these 21
decisions is randomly chosen for your payment.
In Part 1 you have to choose in each of the seven rows between a lottery and
a secure payment. At the lottery you get in each row with 50% probability 7
Euros and with 50% probability 1 Euro. The secure payment varies in each
row.
In part 2 you have to choose in each of the seven rows whether you want to
participate in a lottery or not. At the lottery, you receive one out of two pay-
ments, each payment being equally likely. The payments vary from row to
row. If you do not participate in the lottery you receive zero Euro in each row.
In part 3 you decide in each of the seven rows for lottery A or lottery B. In
both lotteries you can either get 7 Euros or 1 Euro. In lottery A, the probab-
ilities of receiving 7 Euros or 1 Euro are randomly chosen by the computer.
In lottery B the probabilities are given and vary from row to row.
Payments:
After you have made all 21 decisions, the computer randomly selects one
out of the 21 decisions. If you have chosen a lottery in this decision, a ran-
dom process decides with the respective probabilities about the outcome of
the lottery and your payment. If you have chosen a secure payment at the
selected decision, you receive this payment.
Part 1
Please decide in every row whether you want to participate in the lottery or
whether you want the safe payment.
1. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. Safe payment: 4.5 Euros. ◦
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2. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. ◦ Safe payment: 4 Euros. ◦
3. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. ◦ Safe payment: 3.5 Euros. ◦
4. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. ◦ Safe payment: 3 Euros. ◦
5. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. ◦ Safe payment: 2.5 Euros. ◦
6. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. ◦ Safe payment: 2 Euros. ◦
7. Lottery: With 50% probability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 1 Euro. ◦ Safe payment: 1.5 Euros. ◦
Part 2
Please decide for each lottery whether you want to participate or not. If you
do not participate in the lottery, you receive 0 Euro. In case any of these
rows will be chosen for payment, you have to pay a possible loss from your
earnings or your participation fee.
1. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 1 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
2. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 2 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
3. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 3 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
4. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 4 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
5. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 5 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
6. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 6 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
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7. Lottery A: With 50% probability you lose 7 Euro, with 50% probability
you win 6 Euros. Participate ◦ Not participate ◦
Part 3
Please decide in every row whether you want to participate in lottery A or
lottery B. In lottery A the probabilities of winning 7 or 1 Euro are unknown.
1. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 80% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 20% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
2. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 70% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 30% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
3. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 60% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 40% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
4. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 50% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 50% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
5. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 40% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 60% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
6. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 30% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 70% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
7. Lottery A: You either win 7 Euros or 1 Euro. Lottery B: With 20% prob-
ability you win 7 Euro, with 80% probability you win 1 Euro. Lottery
A ◦ Lottery B ◦
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